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Abstract 
As increasing numbers of developing countries seek to build their own international 
financial centres, it is critical to take account of this new phenomenon in the realm of 
development  studies.  Previous  development  theories  have  devoted  a  great  deal  of 
attention to the analysis of industrialisation in the manufacturing sector, but insufficient 
attention  to  this  new  subject.  At  odds  with  neoliberal  laissez-faire  evolution,  the 
financial statism identified in this thesis as (a) state ownership in the financial sector; (b) 
financial  restraint  policies;  and  (c)  state  control  over  capital  mobility  and  currency 
convertibility, suggests an alternative approach adopted by the Chinese state to develop 
Shanghai into an international financial centre from the 1990s.   
It is argued that IFCs‘ development is multi-faceted and can only be addressed in a 
country-specific  context.  The  study  demonstrates  that  due  to  the  imperfection  of 
institutions and infrastructure in China as a transitional economy in the 1990s, financial 
statism has played an active role in maintaining socio-economic stability at macro level, 
creating  market  institutions  and  urban  infrastructure  at  meso-level  and  precluding 
exogenous  financial  risks  at  meta-level.  Despite  the  observation  of  several 
disadvantages and deficiencies, financial statism has successfully transformed Shanghai 
into a domestic financial centre at the nascent stage of China‘s financial development. 
Utilizing a process-tracing method, it was also discovered that given recent contextual 
changes, the Chinese state has started to withdraw its financial statist regime, paving the 
way for a more open and liberalised market system to further transform Shanghai into 
an international financial centre. The thesis concludes that market-driven and state-led 
development  can  be  complementary  and  financial  statism  might  serve  as  invisible 
scaffolding in the development of an IFC, particularly in large, fast-growing emerging 
economies.   
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1. Introduction 
 
When one is about to take an inspiration, he is sure to make a (previous) 
expiration; when he is going to weaken another, he will first strengthen 
him; when he is going to overthrow another, he will first have raised him 
up; when he is going to despoil another, he will first have made gifts to 
him.   
--Lao-Tzu,
1 
Tao Te Ching 
   
We  are  living  in  a  globalizing  world.  Economies  and  people  have  become  more 
inter-connected than ever before. Outstripping increased cross-border flows of    goods 
and  services,  the  recent  wave  of  economic  globalisation  since  the  1980s  has  been 
marked by a surge in financial flows among advanced economies and more notably, 
between  advanced  economies  and  emerging  economies  (Roxburgh  et  al.  2011). 
Meanwhile,  with  advances  in  telecommunications  and  information  technologies, 
international  financial centres  (IFCs) have  been conceived  as  the nodes  of  a  global 
network  of  cities  that  control  financial  flows  (Poon  2003;  Taylor  2005;  Friedmann 
1986). Over the past few decades we have witnessed the phenomenon of an increasing 
number of cities in large, fast-growing emerging economies beginning to build up their 
own international financial centres (see section 2.1).   
Indeed, the surge of emerging economies has changed the landscape of global finance. 
                                                 
1  Lao-Tzu was a philosopher and poet of ancient China. He is best known as the reputed author of 
the Tao Te Ching and the founder of Taoism.   
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According  to  IMF  (2014),  emerging  economies  have  contributed  82  percent  to  the 
world economic growth in 2013. Even though they still remain relatively lowly ranked 
in terms of national income per capita, they are playing an increasingly important role in 
international finance. Some commentators have noted the global economic regime is 
shifting  from  control  by  several  developed  economies  towards  more  developed  and 
developing economies, particularly BRIC
2  countries (Yeung 2010; Rottier and Veron 
2010).   
Among  the  most  striking  issues  related  to  such  seismic  changes   are  how  these 
late-developing economies will be able to build their own IFCs . While there is a vast 
and rapidly growing literature on the IFCs ‘ development in advanced economies (e.g. 
Kindleberger  1974;  Cassis  and  Bussiere  2005;  Faulconbridge  2004;  Kendrick  1980; 
Reed 1980; Roberts 2004; Shirai 2007; Schenk 2007), the literature on the development 
of IFCs in emerging economies is rather inadequate. Since the 1980s, neo-liberalism has 
become the mainstay of economics while neo-classical analysis has been applied to 
traditionally non-economic subject matters such as political science, urban development 
and new public management (Wade 2009). This philosophy has inevitably influenced 
development  studies  in  recent  years.  As  recognised  by  Kindleberger  (1974),  the 
evolution  of  international  financial  centres  such  as  London  and  New  York  was  a 
long-term,  self-sustaining  and  spontaneous  process.  The  laissez-faire  approach  thus 
suggests that an IFC is gradually built up over time and transition from one phase to 
another occurs over a relatively long timeframe. According to neo-liberal logic, state 
intervention rarely determines the destinies of international financial centres in a lasting 
or fundamental way (see Cassis 2006). 
The thesis emphasizes that a well-functioning international financial centre is based on a 
wide range of essential, coherent institutions, such as various financial firms (banks; 
security  firms;  insurance  companies),  markets  (e.g.  foreign  and  stock  exchanges), 
associations  and  cooperatives.  These  will  be  accompanied  by  rules,  norms  and 
                                                 
2  In 2001, Goldman Sachs‘s research report identified BRICs (Brazil, Russian, India and China) as a 
group of countries with the potential to catch up with the G-7 (see Wilson and Purushothaman, 2003). 
In 2010, South Africa joined the grouping.    
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regulations.   
However,  the  laissez-faire  approach  advocated  by  neo-classical  economists  and 
neo-liberals  often  neglects  the  significance  of  institutional  structures  in  developing 
countries.  Therefore,  the  prescription  they  offer  to  LDCs  is  to  follow  the  path  of 
so-called  Anglo-American  model  and  to  adopt  neo-liberal  policies  of  privatisation, 
deregulation, financial openness and liberalisation.   
The  thesis  demonstrates  that  financial  sectors  in  late-developing  countries  were 
significantly  inferior  to  those  in  advanced  economies.  Hitherto,  many  developing 
countries lacked market institutions and there was little reason to presume that markets 
would  develop  on  their  own  (Reinert  1999;  Chang  2000).  They  were  not  only 
confronted  by  endogenous  problems  such  as  institutional  weaknesses,  market 
incompleteness and knowledge gaps, but also faced intense external competition from 
established foreign counterparts in this increasingly globalised world (see section 4.3.2).   
Moreover, developing countries have less capacity for financial regulation and greater 
vulnerability to shocks (de la Torre et al 2007). When a market system is not established 
and the private sector is still in its incipient stage, the privatisation of a financial sector 
poses great risks, jeopardising the stability of the society and its economic development. 
Based on this, simply using neoliberal/laissez-faire approach advocated by the current 
advanced  economies  to  develop  IFCs  in  LDCs  would  retard  and  even  block 
development. 
Inasmuch as institutional development is crucial to the building of IFCs in developing 
countries, new institutional economics (NIE) provides some inputs for the role of the 
state in this process. Although the NIE is a neoclassical-inspired approach, it rejects the 
orthodox  assumption  of  perfect  information  and  costless  transaction  by  adding 
institutions to the process of economic change (Menard and Shirley 2008). In this way, 
it has changed neo-classical economics from a static to a dynamic theory. Douglass 
North (1981, 1990a) has been leading the movement to study the broader institutional 
framework (including the role of the state)  in shaping how markets and institutions 
function. To  neo-institutionalists, the state has  a dual  role.  On the one  hand,  it can 
specify rules to maximize societal outputs and play a developmental role. On the other  
- 17 - 
hand,  it  can  also  drive  off  resources  to  the  governing  elites  or  class  and  become 
predatory (North 1979, 1981). Yet most of them maintain a faith in private ownership 
and  argue  that  private  property  rights  should  be  enforced  by  the  state  in  order  to 
encourage development (North 1981, p.21).   
Since  the  1990s,  the  various  strands  of  liberal  and  neo-classical  development 
approaches have been criticised by many scholars, analysts and commentators (Nolan 
and Wang 1999; Chang 2002; Brohman 1995;  Evans 1995; Marois 2012). Drawing 
upon the East Asian Miracle, the so-called ‗developmental state view‘ is the antithesis of 
neo-liberalism. The critics argue that late-developing countries face different problems 
than  advanced  economies  and  state  intervention  in  industrial  policies  is  necessary 
(Johnson 1982; Amsden 1989；Wade 1990). The state can be an important substitute for 
market failure that often occurs at the developmental stage of an economy. Yet it should 
also  be  mentioned  that  the  limitations  of  a  developmental  state,  e.g.  soft-budget 
constraints and conflicts of interest, are consistently challenged by other commentators 
(e.g. Krueger 1990; Lardy 1998, 2012).   
In the 1990s, Aoki et al. (1998) shifted the problem of state-versus-market dichotomy to 
a market-enhancing view, emphasising the state‘s role as the facilitator of private-sector 
coordination. This new emerging view recognises market forces in the allocation of 
resources  but  contends  that  there  might  be  room  for  well-designed,  restricted  state 
intervention in collaboration with the private sector to foster economic development. 
However, studies of the development of IFCs have not drawn as much attention as other 
literature  in  this  area,  which  has  mainly  focused  on  manufacturing,  exports  and 
industrialisation. 
Based  on  the  cited  changing  intellectual  contexts,  this  thesis  seeks  to  explore  the 
changing role of the state in the development of IFCs, particularly in large, fast-growing 
emerging economies. This task is an important one as the debate on the ―market-driven‖ 
and ―state-led‖ for IFCs‘ development has created polarisation in both academic and 
policy circles (e.g. HPEC 2007;  Pan et  al  2010).  The first  step of  our  efforts  is  to 
explore  an  alternative  interventionist  approach  adopted  by  the  Chinese  state  in 
developing Shanghai into an IFC since the 1990s.  
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The thesis  demonstrates that  well-designed  state intervention  at  early stage of  IFCs 
development  is  necessary  due  to  widespread  endogenous  institutional  failures  and 
external  competitions  in  late-developing  countries.  In  this  thesis,  this  alternative 
approach termed as ―financial statism‖ refers to a composite of state-owned financial 
institutions  (SFIs)
3 ,  financial  restraint  poli cies  and  a  capital  control  regime.  
Conceptually  grounded  in the recently articulated market -enhancing perspective,  it 
emphasizes that at a certain stage, financial statism approach can be helpful to reinforce 
market institutions and improve related  infrastructure necessary to the development of 
IFCs in  a large emerging economy like China . Chapter 4 introduces the conceptual 
model  of  financial  statism   while  Chapter  9  presents  a  further  discussion  on  the 
limitations and evolution of financial statism following the SIFC case study. 
In addition to constructing a conceptual model, we adopt a broader and more inclusive 
perspective on the formation of an IFC.   More particularly,  the  thesis  develops  an 
analytical framework that distinguishes four levels of development:   
(1) The micro-level of financial markets and institutions agglomeration 
(2) The meso-level of urban and business environment in a host city 
(3) The macro-level of political and macro-economic conditions for the hinterland   
(4) Meta-level connectivity to a global network (see section 3.5).   
This analytical framework allows the development of a schema to understand what can 
be done to facilitate the formation of an IFC in LDCs and what cannot be achieved, at 
least not in the short term.   
In the case of Shanghai, we examine the impact of Chinese‘s financial statism on IFC 
development at macro-, meso- and meta- levels (see Chapter 6). Utterly conflicted with 
the Anglo-American model of financial liberalisation, the case study shows that the 
Chinese  state  has  masterminded  a  huge  transformation  in  Shanghai  International 
                                                 
3  State-owned financial institutions (SFIs) include a wide variety of institutions, such as commercial 
banks, development banks, postal banks, insurance companies, credit guarantee funds, leasing firms, 
etc (Luna-Martinez and Vicente, 2012).  
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Financial  Centre  (SIFC)  development  under  financial  statism.  The  research  project 
enables an understanding how financial statism as alternative approach may - or may 
not - promote the development of SIFC. 
The findings of the case study suggest that at the early stages of market development, 
China‘s state banks and its interest rate control policies are successful in mobilising 
deposits from the household to the strategic sector, championing SOEs‘ market reforms 
and stimulating economic take-off. Hence financial statism has a significant impact on 
macro-economic conditions of a host country, and thus the progress of financial centre 
development.  In  addition,  financial  statism  policies  have  also  been  effective  in 
modernising  infrastructure  and  improving  the  investment  environment,  which  has 
boosted the agglomeration of various financial institutions and markets in Shanghai. It 
is  evident  that  financial  statism  has  been  successful  in  developing  Shanghai  into  a 
domestic financial centre in the 1990s. Yet the study also shows that this approach has 
its  limitations  and  constraints,  which  have  impeded  Shanghai  transforming  from  a 
domestic  financial  centre  into  an  international  one  (see  chapter  7).  Given  recent 
contextual changes, it is also discovered that the Chinese state has started to withdraw 
its financial statism policies, paving the way for a more open and liberalised market 
system to further transform Shanghai into an IFC (see chapter 8). 
The central argument employed is that an approach that determines the evolution of 
IFCs‘ development is shaped by constraints derived from the past and the consequences 
of innumerable incremental choices of a state authority that continually modify such 
constraints. In this way, this thesis extends further the market-enhancing view. Therein 
we suggest that financial statism is likened to ―invisible scaffolding‖. Just as scaffolding 
is necessary to provide temporary assistance when erecting a building, financial statism 
is also a supportive aid in the shaping of international financial centres, particularly in 
late-developing countries. The scaffolding metaphor offers a better understanding of 
both the changing role of the state in IFCs‘ development and an explanation for the 
differences  between  developing  and  advanced  economies  with  regard  to  financial 
development. We conclude that financial statism is better to be withdrawn or dismantled 
after functional, competitive market institutions have been established in LDCs.   
The  quotation  at  the  beginning  of  this  chapter  from  Lao-Tzu,  an  ancient  Chinese  
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philosopher and Taoist, is consistent with this broad, dialectic and necessarily complex 
view of the financial statism approach. According to Taoism, yin and yang are two 
universal concepts used to describe how apparently opposite and contrary forces are 
actually  complementary,  interconnected  and  interdependent  in  the  natural  world 
(Porkert 1974), e.g. male and female, light and dark, active and passive, motion and 
stillness. In the process of IFCs‘ development, market institutions (structure) and state 
managers (agency) are considered symbiotic. Financial statism postulates that market 
structures constrain but do not determine the outcome of IFCs‘ development. Rather, 
state  managers  are  able  to  configure  and  reconfigure  market  structures  through 
deliberate policy efforts, which may lead to the success of an IFC in late-developing 
countries. Financial statism as scaffolding represents a similar philosophy in the context 
of IFCs‘ development where two opposites (market-driven versus state-led) co-exist in 
harmony and are able to cross-pollinate, thereby destroying the duality. 
This thesis seeks to avoid simplistic, ideological views, instead aiming to develop a 
more nuanced approach to IFCs‘ development based on a synthesis of current research 
and operational experience. The building blocks of the theoretical framework can be 
described as threefold:   
(1) The theory related to the formation of IFCs, particularly contributory factors to 
their development 
(2) A focus on the perspectives of the role of the state on economic development 
(3) The  theory  of  international  finance,  with  an  emphasis  on  financial  restraint 
policies, capital control regimes and their impact on IFCs‘ development. 
Meanwhile, several theoretical deductions draw upon insights from new institutional 
economics and interventionist perspectives in development theories. It is hoped that this 
study would shed some lights about the changing role of the state, the IFC evolution in 
late-developing countries as well as conditions underlying this dynamism.   
Outline of the Dissertation 
After the introduction, chapter 2 presents the research context of the dissertation.  It 
starts with a brief discussion of the IFCs evolution in an era of globalization and goes  
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on to review the key issues faced by IFCs in large, fast-growing developing countries. 
Moreover, the contextual background of the case study is presented – why China needs 
to build Shanghai into an international financial centre?   
Chapter  3  provides  a  systematic  literature  review  of  concepts,  mechanisms  and 
contributory  factors  of  IFCs‘  development.  Three  sets  of  different  theoretical 
perspectives  are  examined;  the  neoclassical  economic  perspective,  the 
socio-geographical perspective and the financial-growth perspective. Based on this, I 
have created an integrated multi-layer framework of IFCs‘ development, which provides 
a sound foundation for further study on the role of state.   
Chapter  4  focuses  on  the  role  of  the  state  in  various  discourses  on  development 
approaches, from laissez-faire development views to various state interventionist views. 
Based  on  critical  analyses  and  characteristics  of  IFCs‘  development,  an  alternative 
interventionist approach - financial statism - is developed.   
Chapter 5 addresses methodological issues, particularly the strengths and weaknesses of 
a single case study as a method in the study. The research question and hypothesis of the 
dissertation is also presented.   
Chapter 6 investigates China‘s financial statism and its impact on SIFC development at 
macro, meso and meta levels. The research findings provide a counter-example to the 
conventional wisdom in the Anglo-American model of IFCs‘ development. The study 
shows  that  financial  statism  provided  a  ―helping  hand‖  to  SIFC  development 
particularly  during  China‘s  economic  transition  in  the  1990s.  Three  main  positive 
outcomes  of  financial  statism  are  presented:  (a)  the  maintenance  of  economic 
development  and  social  stability  at  a  macro-level;  (b)  the  fostering  of  market 
mechanisms and infrastructure at a meso-level and; (c) the reduction of external risks at 
a meta-level. 
Chapter 7 provides a micro-level evaluation of the performance of SIFC since the 1990s, 
focusing on the evolution of financial markets, institutions, services and human capital 
in Shanghai. Meanwhile, a comparative analysis is made between the status of SIFC and 
other IFCs in the major developed and emerging economies. The study suggests that  
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despite of some deficiencies and disadvantages, Shanghai made remarkable progress to 
become a financial centre enabled by a regimen of financial statism.   
Chapter 8 discusses the recent changes to financial statism following China‘s accession 
into the World Trade Organization (WTO), including diversification of ownership in the 
banking  sector,  the  liberalisation  of  interest  rates  and  the  internationalisation  of  the 
Renminbi. The underlying reasons behind these changes are anatomised. The case of 
Shanghai shows that Chinese financial sector is leaning towards a greater emphasis on 
market mechanisms and away from administrative rule. 
Chapter 9 offers a metaphor of scaffolding to explain the changing role of Chinese state 
in  SIFC  development.  It  is  suggested  that  financial  statism  might  be  regarded  as 
invisible ―scaffolding‖ – a deliberate development strategy designed by the Chinese 
state in the process of transforming Shanghai into an international one.   
Chapter  10  provides  concluding  remarks  on  the  role  of  the  state  in  developing 
international  financial  centres.  It  summarises  the  research  findings  and  analyses  the 
strengths and limitations of the scaffolding metaphor. Some policy recommendations 
regarding the role of the state in IFCs‘ development for late-developing-countries are 
provided at the end. It emphasises that LDCs should find an approach based on their 
own contextual setting, rather than replicating the practices of developed countries.     
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2. Research Contexts 
 
Who  controls  the  food  supply  controls  the  people;  who  controls  the 
energy can control whole continents; who controls money can control 
the world.   
------ Henry Kissinger 
 
This thesis mainly deals with the changing role of the state in IFCs development for 
large,  fast-growing  emerging  economies.  This  chapter  describes  the  contextual 
background of this study. The first section presents a brief history of IFCs evolution as 
well as their new characteristics in the recent wave of financial globalisation. Next, I 
identify  several  key  issues  that  are  faced  by  IFCs  development,  notably  in  large, 
fast-growing developing countries. The section 2.3 introduces the contexts of the case 
study– Shanghai‘s re-emergence as an international financial centre since the 1990s.   
2.1 IFCs Evolution in a Globalizing World 




6  and Constantinople all functioned as major financial 
centres, providing ―brokerage, credit and allied services‖ to the trade (Mainelli 2006). 
During the Renaissance, the city states of Venice, Florence, Naples and Genoa became 
                                                 
4  Samarkand is currently the second-largest city in Uzbekistan and is most famous for its central 
position on the Silk Road between China and the West in Ancient times.  
5  In the 12th century, Marrakech was the most important city in former imperial Morocco and a 
cultural, religious, and trading centre for sub-Saharan Africa. 
6  Timbuktu  flourished from the trade in salt, gold, ivory and slaves   and was  part of the Mali 
Empire early in the 14th century.   
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mercantile centres that dominated trade between Europe and the Orient from the 14
th to 
16
th Centuries. Nevertheless, the modern financial centres only emerged in the 18
th and 
19
th Centuries with the ascendancy of the Anglo-American centres. London and New 
York have still maintained their pre-eminent positions to the present (see Fratianni 2008; 
Cassis 2006). 
At the end of World War II, the United States consolidated its power as the supreme 
political and economic leader of the World and the US dollar became the dominant 
currency for international settlement and reserve. From then on, the world entered an 
era  of  stability  in  international  financial  system  terms  until  the  collapse  of  Bretton 
Woods in the 1970s. Since then the world has witnessed oil crises, the expansion of 
multinational  companies,  the  rise  of  Euro-dollar  and  Asia-dollar  markets  and  the 
unleashing  of  control  over  capital  movements  by  many  governments. 
Contemporaneously, there have been periods of fluctuation in the money and capital 
markets and changes in the patterns of the international financial system. 
Since the 1970s, financial centres have started to spread into small developing countries 
and regions such as the Caribbean, Panama, Singapore, Hong Kong, Bahrain, Beirut and 
the Channel Islands, most of which were former colonies of Western powers. Unlike 
New York and London, in the main these financial centres have no direct link with the 
real  economies  in  their  own  countries.  They  mainly  deal  in  foreign  currencies  and 
primarily  provided  services  for  non-resident  clients,  facilitated  by  freedom  from 
regulation, taxes and exchange controls (Park, 1982; IMF 2000). These centres were 
thus  able  to  offer  favourable  environments  that  were  able  to  obviate  the  various 
constraints that might arise in onshore financial centres. They were variously termed 
―offshore centres‖, ―paper centres‖, or ―tax havens‖. However, after the 1990s, most of 
these centres have declined, with the exception of Singapore and Hong Kong.   
In recent  years, economic globalisation has enhanced integration of world economic 
activity through increased cross-border flows of a greater variety of goods and services. 
In the past two decades, the world has seen resources, especially capital, shifted more 
speedily from West to East – and from North to South. In particular, financial flows 
have experienced exponential growth. According to a survey from McKinsey Global 
Institute, global financial stock has increased sharply from USD 12 trillion in 1980 to  
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USD 212 trillion in 2010. The increase of capital flows increased dramatically in the 
last two decades, particularly among developing and undeveloped countries. Since 1995, 
cross-border  capital  flows  have  tripled  and  peaked  at  USD10.9  trillion  in  2007. 
Although they declined sharply in 2008 and 2009 due to the global financial crisis, there 
was a rebound in 2010 with capital flows totalling    USD 4.4 trillion (Roxburgh et al 
2011).  Figure  2.1  depicts  the  total  domestic  financial  assets  and  their  cross-border 
movement in 1999 and 2009 respectively. As we can see, capital movements across 
borders in 1999 were mainly taking place between developed countries, such as the 
United  States,  Western  Europe  and  Japan;  while  financial  assets  in  developing 
economies  were  relatively  small.  In  2009,  domestic  financial  assets  in  emerging 
economies increased dramatically and cross-border investment became more frequent 
among  developing  countries.  Such  large  capital  flows  require  international  financial 
centres that are able to process large volumes and international transaction.   
Moreover, it is also notable that in the past few decades, a new direction of global 
capital  flows  has  emerged.  In  the  conventional  central-periphery  model,  the  centre 
controls  and  influences  the  periphery  and  exports  financial  capital  and  high-value 
industrial goods to the periphery (Subacchi 2008). Since the late 1970s, OPEC countries 
have accumulated a large amount of capital through oil trade surpluses. In 2008, some 
40% of global foreign currency reserves were held in the Middle East. Since the global 
financial  crisis  in  2008,  the  world‘s  geopolitical  arena  has  been  undergoing  major 
adjustment, which has been bringing about a rebalancing of economic power between 
developed  and  developing  countries  (Yeung  2010).The  emerging  economies  have 
achieved  strong  economic  growth  amid  recovery  and  are  playing  an  increasingly 
important role in international finance. A report from The World Economic Forum states 
that capital has recently flown from emerging economies, such as China and the Middle 
East, to developed markets, such as the United States (WEF, 2010a). Following the 
East-Asia  miracle,  China  and  other  countries  in  south-eastern  Asia  also  hold  large 
foreign  currency  reserves  generated  by  trade  surpluses.  This  has  greatly  altered  the 
landscape of the global economy and has a direct bearing on the necessity of IFCs‘ 
development for developing countries. 
    
- 26 - 
Figure 2.1 A comparative analysis of cross-border investment between 1999 and 2009 
 
 
Source: Roxburgh et al (2011) 
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In  an  increasingly  globalized  world,  international  financial  centres  are  substantially 
different from their historical counterparts. To a certain degree, international financial 
centres  have been transformed from a  geographic concept  to  a functional  one. One 
might say that financial centres, rather than banks, have become the key apparatus for 
financial intermediation. Poon (2003) described international financial centres as one of 
the  ―control  centres  of  global  financial  flows‖.  As  argued  by  Castells  (2000a), 
international  financial centres  in the  Information Age  cannot  be reduced to  a small 
number  of  cities  at  the  top  of  a  hierarchy.  Beyond  the  main  global  cities,  other 
continental, national, and regional economies have their own nodes that connect to the 
global network (p.443). He also points out that the hierarchy in the network is neither 
assured nor stable, but is subject to fierce inter-city competition. His argument has at 
least two implications. Firstly, IFCs are the nodes or hubs of capital flows in the global 
network and; secondly, developing countries should also establish linkages to the global 
network through the creation of IFCs. 
In the past two decades, the development of international financial centres (IFCs) in 
large,  fast-growing  developing  countries  has  become  increasingly  noteworthy  and 
prevalent. Cities such as Shanghai, Mumbai, Sao Paulo, Moscow, Seoul and Istanbul are 
all  vying  for  becoming  international  financial  centres  (see  Table  2.1).  The  new 
phenomenon has been driven by the rapid pace of economic globalisation, coupled with 
tremendous advances in telecommunications and electronic networks. Rottier and Veron 
(2010) describe the new context of financial integration ―financial multi-polarity‖, and 
suggest that the geography of global finance is rapidly evolving from a mainly North 
Atlantic focus towards a much broader territory. Nasser Saidi, Chief Economist of the 
Dubai International Financial Centre, claims that the rise of the emerging world will 
inevitably force the global financial system to change from a ―hub-and-spoke model‖ 
(with  London  and  New  York  as  the  hubs)  to  a  spider‘s-web  model  of  many 
interconnected  hubs  (The  Economist  2012).  Lu  Hongjun,  the  president  of  Shanghai 
Institute of Finance, also asserts: ―The global layout of financial centres will become 
pluralistic with both developed nations (such as the United States, the United Kingdom 
and Japan) and new economies such as the BRIC nations playing key roles‖ (Ma, 2009).   
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Table 2.1: Development of IFCs in large, fast-growing developing countries 
  Seoul, South Korea. The South Korean government launched its Northeast Asian 
Financial  Hub  for  Seoul  in  2003  and  published  a  detailed  action  plan  aimed  at 
achieving this goal in July 2005 (Yeung 2010). 
  Mumbai,  India.  In  2007,  the  Indian  Ministry  of  Finance  published  a  report  on 
Making Mumbai an International Financial Centre, written by the High Powered 
Expert Committee (HPEC 2007). 
  Istanbul, Turkey. The Turkish Government aims to make Istanbul ―a regional and 
global financial centre‖, and included this aspiration in its Ninth Development Plan 
covering 2007-2013(IFC-Istanbul 2008). 
  Moscow, Russia. In May 2008, Russia announced it would build Moscow into an 
international  financial  centre  by  2025.  Dmitry  Medvedev,  the  then  Russian 
President,  delivered  a  thesis  at  the  12th  International  Economic  Forum  in 
Saint-Petersburg, stating: ―Converting Moscow into a strong financial centre, and 
converting  the  rouble  into  a  leading  regional  reserve  currency,  are  the  key 
components to secure competitiveness of our financial system‖ (GOM, 2008). 
  Shanghai,  China.  On April  29,  2009,  the  Chinese  central  government  formally 
stated that Shanghai would become an international financial centre compatible with 
the country‘s economic strength and the Renminbi‘s international status by 2020. 
Source: compiled by author. 
In  short,  as  increasing  numbers  of  developing  countries  seek  to  build  their  own 
international financial centres, it is critical to take account of this new phenomenon in 
the  sphere  of  development  studies.  An  efficient  financial  services  sector  has  direct 
consequences  for  economic  growth.  The  promotion  of  financial  and  other  relevant 
services  is  significant  for  developing  countries  as  it  enables  them  to  use  financial 
resources from home and abroad more efficiently. The big questions now are； 
  How will these late-developing economies be able to build their own IFCs? 
  What  will  this  mean  for  the  developed  countries  that  have  dominated  this 
arena?  
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2.2 Key Issues Faced by IFCs in Large, Fast-growing Developing 
Countries   
Traditionally, IFCs have been connected with advanced economies. The literature on 
IFCs‘ development in emerging economies is rather sparse. Despite this there are some 
discussions  in  extant  literature  regarding  relevant  topics  in  large,  fast-growing 
developing countries, including India, Russia, Nigeria and China. This thesis now aims 
to  highlight  three  key  issues  faced  by  IFCs  in  these  countries:  Internal  challenges, 
external competition, and policy options.   
Internal Challenges 
The  major  internal  challenges  faced  by  IFCs  in  developing  countries  include 
institutional weaknesses, market deficiencies, and urban environment unattractiveness. 
For example, HPEC (2007, p.xxi) report identifies two key  deficiencies in financial 
markets in India that have impeded Mumbai‘s emergence as an IFC. Firstly, the absence 
of a ‗properly functioning bond market, a currency market and a derivatives market for 
currencies and interest rates‘, and secondly, the absence of ‗institutional investors (e.g. 
mutual  funds,  banks,  insurance  companies  and  pension  funds)  that  have  the  size, 
visibility and capability of those in established IFCs‘.   
In Russia, Moscow also faces a wide range of challenges in its attempts to build an IFC. 
Ogloblina (2012)  demonstrates that the business  environment  in  the Russian capital 
does not appeal to foreign investors. Poor infrastructure, e.g. transport, communications 
networks, etc., are other negative factors. In Nigeria, despite the aspiration of the federal 
government  to  become  Africa‘s  major  international  financial  centre  (FGN  2007), 
Olaseni and Alade (2012) cite infrastructural weaknesses for thwarting this ambition.     
To counter these challenges, some cities (e.g. Moscow, Bangalore) have adopted a new 
paradigm,  so-called  ―entrepreneurial  urban  management‖  (Kolossov  and  O‘Loughlin 
2004). The key feature of this approach is to introduce private sector and market forces 
in the creation of an IFC in developing countries. This approach is also questioned by 
some commentators. For example, Goldman (2011) observes that hot money - US hedge 
and derivative funds in particular - flooded Bangalore and other Indian cities after the  
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2008 global financial crisis, pursuing high returns in the name of ―world-city‖ making. 
He termed this phenomenon ―speculative urbanism‖, as competing cities have leveraged 
their infrastructure and lands to attract foreign and private capitals to improve city life. 
The large-scale re-capitalisation cities in emerging economies has given rise to new 
problem of social justice, as numerous residents are displaced and the poor people have 
often suffered the most (Goldman 2011).   
External Competition 
In  the  meantime,  the  race  among  cities  either  in  developing  countries  or  in  the 
developed world to establish themselves as IFCs has intensified (Jarvis, 2011; Young et 
al., 2009). In the Asia Pacific region, aside from well-established IFCs – Tokyo, Hong 
Kong and Singapore - cities such as Sydney, Shanghai, Wellington, Seoul and Taipei 
have  all  launched  new  initiatives  since  the  1990s  aimed  at  becoming  international 
financial centres. Yeung (2010) was optimistic about the prospect and opportunities for 
financial centres in Asia Pacific. In a vision of emerging Asia, he claimed Asia‘s major 
financial centres were poised to gain even greater prominence as hubs of business and 
creation in the post-crisis era of increased globalisation. 
However, competition among IFCs can be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, 
competition  among  IFCs  breeds  efficiencies  in  financing  and  increases  returns  on 
investment. On the other, it may also bring new risks, such as increased market volatility, 
financial risk contagion, and harmful tax and subsidy competition (Young et al. 2009). 
In particular, Young et al. (2009) warned that intense competition among IFCs in the 
Asia Pacific area may lead to greater regional fragmentation instead of integration. They 
discovered  an  interesting  phenomenon  whereby  funds  in  surplus  countries  were  not 
moving in very large amounts to countries within the region that were looking for such 
fund but to the global financial centres, such as New York and London. Similarly, the 
City of London remains sceptical about the future of IFCs in Asia, citing an important 
structural  weakness.  While  the  United  States  and  European  markets  are  built  upon 
single currencies and unified regulatory environments, IFCs in the Asia Pacific region  
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are hampered by fragmented financial structures due to a range of different currencies 
and regulatory environments
7  (City of London 2008).   
To cope with unbridled competition, Young et al . (2009) suggest IFCs in the region 
should co-operate more and establish an integrated Asia-Pacific IFC network. However, 
this seems to be a wishful thinking as geo-political situation in this region is much more 
complicated (see Smith 2009). 
Policy Options 
Faced with both internal problems and external competition, IFCs have increasingly 
become  components  in  a  deliberate  strategy  designed  by  policy  makers  or  market 
participants (Lannoo 2007).To some extent, IFCs competition is a function of global 
competition among policy regimes in terms of capability and effectiveness (Young et al. 
2009;  HPEC  2007).  Although  there  are  some  pioneering  studies  on  the 
state-led/agency-driven  global  city  formation  (e.g.  Zhang  2014;  Amen  et  al  2006), 
inquiries  into  the  role  of  the  state  in  IFCs‘  development  are  rather  inadequate.  In 
particular, investigations into the theoretical paradigm of the ―state-led approach‖ in the 
evolution of international financial centres are relatively rare.   
There is a gap in studies concerning the role of the state in the development of IFCs: 
How  and  why  financial  clustering  and  agglomeration  occur  and  to  what  extent  the 
nation-state is able to facilitate the concentration of markets, firms and people into one 
place. In particular, this thesis identifies three open policy questions associated with IFC 
development in developing countries.   
Firstly,  to  what  extent  state-ownership  in  a  financial  sector  has  affected  the  IFCs‘ 
development in LDCs? There have been heated debates on whether the state should 
                                                 
7  One might question that the UK is not part of the Eurozone , but London remains preeminent in 
the IFCs hierarchy. Thus the lack of unitary currency does not seem to be an obstacle to IFCs 
development. Yet it is the fact that European economic integration is much more advanced than that 
in Asia Pacific Region.  
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maintain a privileged position over other economic agents in terms of access to financial 
resources  (see  HPEC  2007,  pp.188-189).  La  Porta  et  al.  (2002)  claim  that  the 
competitive weakness of the financial sector in developing countries is due to the nature 
of state ownership, asserting that state-owned banks are less innovative and efficient 
than  private  ones,  handicapped  by  corrupt  politicians  and  incompetent  employees. 
According to neo-liberal theorists, the only efficient and complete way to improve the 
financial  sector  in  developing  countries  is  to  transfer  property  rights  from  the  state 
sector to private ones (see Shirley 1997, 1999; Shirley and Walsh 2000). Privatisation 
and the free market would quickly enhance the allocative efficiency of economic and 
financial resources, thus contributing to high-quality growth (Kolodko 1999). 
In  the  contemporary  developing  world,  state  ownership  in  financial  system  is  quite 
commonly seen. La Porta et al. (2002) observed that state ownership of banks remained 
prevalent: in an average country, 42 percent of the equity in the 10 largest banks was 
still state-owned in 1995 after many countries had undertaken privatisation. In some 
developing countries such as Algeria, Belarus, China, Egypt, India and Syria, the asset 
market share of state banks still exceeded half the assets of the banking system in 2010 
(World Bank 2012). At odds with developing countries, most advanced economies such 
as  United  States,  the  United  Kingdom  and  Japan  hold  lower  percentages  of  state 
ownership in financial sectors.   
One particular issue related to this question is whether late-developing countries should 
privatise  their  financial  industries,  such  as  their  banking  sectors,  to  promote  IFCs‘ 
development. Some economists argue state ownership has caused competitive weakness, 
low efficiency and lack of innovation (e.g. La Porta et al., 2002) in LDCs. In India, a 
HPEC  (2007,  p.  195)  report  recommended  the  reduction  of  ―the  state‘s  present 
shareholding in all types of financial firms to below 49 percent by end-2008, below 26 
percent  by  end-2010,  and  toward  a  full  exit  by  2015‖  in  order  to  enhance  its 
competitiveness and allow Mumbai to emerge as an IFC. However, the World Bank 
(2001) notes that in those countries (e.g. Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia) with 
rapid privatisation and liberalisation of their banking industries, these states paid a huge 
price and had to re-nationalise the banking sector amid the financial crisis. For example, 
in South Korea state ownership in the banking sector increased from 20 percent to 40 
percent, and such ownership hit 80 percent in Indonesia (it was 40 percent before the  
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crisis). 
Secondly,  should  deregulation  and  free  market  forces  be  the  catalysts  for 
late-developing  countries  to  establish  an  IFC?  Neo-liberal  economists  highlight  the 
significance  of  financial  development  on  economic  development  in  developing 
countries  (e.g.  Goldsmith,  1969;  Shaw,  1973;  Obstfeld,  2007).  Most  of  them  argue 
financial  repression  is  a  substantial  barrier  to  successful  economic  development, 
particularly for late-developing countries. They have advocated that the financial sector 
in developing countries should be more liberal and open to the developed world. In 
contrast  to  the  neo-liberal  view,  Gerschenkron  (1962)  argues  that  the  state  should 
become  directly  involved  in  organising  financial  markets  in  order  to  kick-start  a 
developmental process, so as to compete with already-industrialised countries. Some 
developing  countries  also  employ  financial  restraint  policies,  such  as  deposit  rate 
controls, restricting competition in the financial market and adopting policies to curb 
asset substitutability (Hellman et al., 1998). Nevertheless, research into the financial 
restraint policies on the IFCs‘ development in developing countries is ambiguous and 
unverified.   
Thirdly, how significant it is to have free capital flows and full currency convertibility 
in the development of an IFC in late-developing countries? As the defining feature of an 
IFC,  full  access  to  international  market  and  currency  convertibility  are  critical  to 
success. Therefore, is it appropriate for developing countries to lift their capital control 
regimes as early as possible as a way to promote IFCs‘ development? Yet in the real 
world,  most  of  developing  countries  still  impose  stringent  capital  controls  across 
borders, such as China, Brazil and India. Is this in conflict with their goals and what are 
the implications of capital control policies to IFCs‘ development in LDCs? These are the 
interesting questions we would like to address in this thesis. 
The investigation of the role of the state on IFCs development is a challenging task, 
since it is closely associated with the relationship between the state and the market, 
which has been a controversial topic in the academic arena for many years (see Brett 
2009; Martinussen, 1997; Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985). Given different political, 
cultural and historical contexts, there is arguably no uniform model that can be applied 
to all the LDCs in terms of IFCs‘ development. Therefore, to get to grip with these  
- 34 - 
problems,  it  would  be  more  feasible  to  address  them  only  in  the  context  of 
country-specific circumstances and institutional features. 
2.3 The Re-emergence of Shanghai as an IFC: A Case in Point 
In this thesis, I use Shanghai as a case study to examine the role of the Chinese state in 
developing  its  own  international  financial  centre.  Shanghai  used  to  be  a  leading 
financial centre in East Asia in the early 20
th Century. As early as 1847, a British-Indian 
Joint Venture, the Oriental Banking Corporation opened its branch office in Shanghai as 
the first foreign bank in the city (Kuilman 2005, p.12). Three years later, the Imperial 
Bank of China began operating in Shanghai (Cheng 2003, p. 25). In 1936, Shanghai was 
the seventh largest city in the world with a population of 3.81 million (Yatsko 2001, 
p.56). At that time, the turnover of the Shanghai Stock Exchange was the third largest in 
the world after New York and London. About 90 percent of the country‘s financial 
assets and over half its foreign trade were concentrated in Shanghai. However, the city‘s 
progress as an economic and financial hub was disrupted by the second Sino-Japanese 
War  (1937-1945)  and  the  following  civil  war  (1947-1949).  A  large  number  of 
entrepreneurs and bankers fled to Hong Kong and Shanghai  was eclipsed by Hong 
Kong thereafter (Yang, et al. 2010, p.4).   
When  the  Chinese  Communist  Party  won  the  civil  war,  they  embraced  the  Soviet 
socialist model of economic development. According to Chinese traditional version of 
socialist  political  economy,  financial  services  were  ―non-productive  labour‖  and  a 
hotbed  of  speculation  and  exploitation  (Wu  2007,  p.298).  The  centrally-planned 
economy thus focused its attention on the growth of material production. After 1949, 
Shanghai turned into an industrial city and the largest manufacturing base in the country. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, Shanghai was the bridgehead of the centrally-planned economy 
with the proportion of State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) in excess of 85 percent. These 
SOEs, primarily manufacturing companies, were able to source cheap raw materials and 
low interest loans, from which they could make profits and then remit these to the 
central government. During that period, Shanghai was perceived as the ―cash cow‖ of 
the country (Han 2000). In 1978 Shanghai‘s population represented only one percent of 
China‘s  total  and  its  land  area  constituted  only  0.06  percent  of  the  country  but  it 
contributed 10 percent of overall GDP, 33 percent of foreign export trade and 16 percent  
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of fiscal revenue. As Logan (2010, p.5) notes: 
With  the  reunification  of  the  country  under  the  Communist  Party  after  1949,  China 
maintained a defensive posture toward the West and had tense relations with the Soviet 
Union…during  the  period  of  the  Cultural  Revolution  policy  was  aimed  at  creating 
self-reliant domestic development. The government pursued an anti-urban agenda, seeking 
to decentralize production and reduce inter-regional and rural-urban inequalities, with a 
large share of the cost financed by transfers from historically more productive centres like 
Shanghai.   
From  the  late  1970s,  China  began  carrying  out  top-down  market  reform.  However, 
Shanghai played a ―rear guard‖
8  action as the central government was concerned the 
risks that reform would bring might undermine its fiscal revenue and economic stability. 
Nevertheless,  Shanghai‘s  SOEs  lost  the  exclusive  privileges  they  enjoyed  under  a 
central planned economy. Access to cheap energy and raw materials was no longer its 
preserve. However, Shanghai still needed to remit a fixed proportion of its tax revenue 
to the central government. Consequently, financial conditions in Shanghai deteriorated 
and little was invested in the built environment during the 1980s. The city suffered from 
―a lack of transportation facilities, a housing shortage and a crisis of environmental 
pollution‖  (Newman  and  Thornley,  2005,  p.238)  and  lost  its  capacity  for  further 
development. During that period, its economic growth was relatively slow compared 
with other provinces in the country. 
In order to reinvigorate the city‘s economy, the Shanghai Municipal Government (SMG) 
conducted a strategic review of the city‘s developmental master plan – with a view to 
uncovering new engines to power the city‘s growth. Between 1984 and 1987, a large 
number of scholars, senior officials and practitioners were brought together to provide 
recommendations for the city‘s future development. Wang Zhan, the Director of the 
Shanghai  Development  Research  Centre  (SDRC),  made  the  following  comments 
                                                 
8  For reasons of stability and safety, Shanghai was not be included as the Special Economic Zone 
(SEZ) in the early 1980s with other four SEZs in South China (namely Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou 
and Zhuhai) that enjoyed favorable policies for their economic development.  
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regarding the threats faced by Shanghai in the 1980s and the opportunities for it.   
First, the main advantage of the city in the 1980s was sizable state-owned manufacturing 
sector, which was linked to revenue remittance to the central government. Following that 
model,  the  city  could  hardly  obtain  enough  revenue  for  its  regeneration  and  was  thus 
unsustainable. Second, to break this vicious circle, what Shanghai could do was to generate 
a stronger tertiary sector, through lobbying the central government for more preferential 
financial policies. More specifically, Shanghai desperately wanted to have greater latitude 
for raising capital from financial markets to fund a new wave of urban regeneration
9.   
As a result, a blueprint was mapped out in the consultative report  Shanghai: going 
forward  to  the  21st  Century  to  rejuvenate  the  city  as  an  international  economic, 
financial and trading hub. From the outset the Shanghai International Financial Centre 
(SIFC)  was  a  local  initiative  by  the  municipal  government  to  regenerate  its  vapid 
economy and dilapidated urban environment.   
Shanghai‘s  IFC  development  was  finally  endorsed  by  the  central  government.  The 
pre-eminent Chinese politician, Deng Xiaoping stated: 
Shanghai used to be a financial centre, a place where the currency was freely convertible, 
and in the future, Shanghai should continue to serve as a financial centre…If we want to 
have a seat in the world of finance, we need to rely on Shanghai (Deng 1993). 
In 1992, the 14
th National Congress of the Communist Party passed a resolution to build 
Shanghai  as  ―the  dragon  head  and  one  of  the  international  economic,  financial  and 
trading centres to drive the growth of the Yangtze River Delta and in turn the take-off of 
the  whole  economic  region‖  (quoted  in  Wu  2003,  p.1684).  Since  then,  SIFC 
development has been boosted by the endorsement of the central government. Although 
Shanghai was a leading financial centre in the 1930s, China‘s financial industry was 
seriously restrained afterwards and its financial markets were closed over the 40 years 
of the planned economy. Therefore, the bid to rebuild Shanghai into an IFC was doomed 
to be a journey full of perplexity and exploration. 
                                                 
9  These two points were made by Wang Zhan in a meeting, when the author was a research fellow in 
SDRC.    
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Table2.2: Shanghai‘s ranking in global financial markets (2010) 




Market capitalisation (USD billion)  2,644  5 
Market turnover(USD billion)  4,495  2 
Capital raised by share(USD billion)  82  4 
Bond Market  Market outstanding (RMB trillion)  20.3  5 
Market turnover (RMB trillion)  64.5  N.A. 
Financial Futures Market  Turnover (RMB trillion)  82.1  N.A. 
Volume ( 10,000 hands)  9,175  29 
Gold Market  Market turnover (RMB trillion)  1.6  1 
Foreign Exchange Market  Daily  Average  turnover  (USD 
billion) 
19.77  22 
Interest Rate derivative 
market 
Daily  Average  turnover  (USD 
billion) 
1.52  22 
Source: World Federation of Exchange, SFPI (2011) 
Transforming the SIFC development from a local initiative to a national strategy was a 
significant step towards gaining political support from the central government. From 
1990,  the  Chinese  state  played  an  active  role  in  the  process  of  SIFC  development. 
Shanghai thus shifted its role from ―rear guard‖ to ―spearhead‖ when it came to market 
reform in China. From 1992 to 2007, Shanghai experienced 16 consecutive years of 
double digit growth (see Table A3 in Appendix 2). By 2010 Shanghai had become the 
centre for many of the country‘s financial activities, including stock exchange trading, 
inter-bank  lending,  bond  trading,  foreign  exchange  trading,  futures  and  commodity 
trading. A broad variety of financial products and instruments were also introduced to 
the  market;  including  A  shares
10,  B  shares
11,  Treasury  bonds,  corporate  bonds, 
convertible bonds, repos，outright forward contracts, interest rate swaps, margin buying 
and short selling, exchange traded funds (ETFs), listed open-ended funds (LOF) and 
                                                 
10  A-shares: denominated in RMB and available to domestic investors and OFII. 
11  B-shares: traded in USD or Hong Kong dollars, were available originally to foreign investors only. 
Since 2001, domestic investors have been allowed to use foreign currency to invest in B shares.    
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warrants  etc.  There  is  also  ample  evidence  that  Shanghai‘s  financial  markets  made 
extraordinary advances in their breadth and depth as well as in the agglomeration of 
financial institutions (see chapter 8 for details).    Table 2.2 shows several indicators that 
Shanghai‘s financial market had risen to the top 10 worldwide by 2010.   
The case of Shanghai and its unique context make it significant for the study for IFCs‘ 
development in LDCs. Experiencing tremendous economic growth during the past 30 
years, China has become the world‘s locomotive of economic development and the key 
provider of surplus investment capital for the global economy. By 2010, China‘s GDP 
had  surpassed  Japan‘s  and  it  had  become  the  second-largest  economic  entity  in  the 
world. China‘s market socialism in its concept and substance has sparked widespread 
interest among academics. Furthermore, China is still a developing country: its GDP per 
capita ranking was only 83
rd in the world in 2013. As the business capital of China, 
Shanghai offers both positive and negative examples of how IFCs‘ development can be 
promoted in a late-developing-country and how the state can keep a strong hand in an 
economic transition in a post-socialist era. It is also hoped that China, together with 
other  BRICs‘  countries,  could  become  the  bellwether  of  Global  South,  providing 
exemplary guidance of IFCs‘ development for the developing world.   
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3. The Formation of IFCs: Concept, 
Mechanism and Different Perspectives   
 
Tomorrow’s  financial  centre  will  reveal  a  different  face,  which  will 
require  new  efforts  of  adaptation;  but  as  the  nerve  centres  of 
international financial activity, they remain hard to replace. 
---Youssef Cassis (2006, p.287)   
 
This  chapter  provides  a  theoretical  literature  review  of  different  perspectives  on 
international  financial  centres.  The  following  questions  are  discussed:  What  is  an 
international financial centre? What is its relevance in the world economy? Why does an 
international financial centre come into being? Why does this happen in a particular 
place, as opposed to others? How important is it for a developing country to have an 
IFC? What are the key factors that determine the formation of an international financial 
centre? This chapter helps to understand the characteristics and contributory factors of 
IFCs in a comprehensive fashion and lays the groundwork for exploring the role of the 
state in IFCs‘ development in LDCs.   
3.1 Concept and Typology   
Generally, a financial centre is depicted as a geographic concept. Laurenceson et al. 
(2009) view it as ―an area, normally a city or even a spot within a city‘s boundaries 
where a wide range of financial activities are concentrated‖, e.g. Wall Street in New 
York and The City/Canary Wharf in London. This definition is ostensibly correct but it 
overlooks  some  underlying  characteristics  of  a  financial  centre.  According  to 
Kindleberger (1974, p.6), financial centres perform ―a medium-of-exchange function 
and an interspatial store-of-value function‖. From this, we can see that an international 
financial centre is a place where financial institutions from many different countries  
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come together to carry out financial intermediation across borders. Financial centres are 
not merely an agglomeration of institutions physically, but rather a system, a network 
and an economic complex with peculiar functions, including raising capital, clearing 
transactions, setting prices and diversifying risks.   
The  first  and  most  important  function  of  a  financial  centre  is  to  aggregate  or 
disaggregate  financial  resources  across  borders  or  regions.  International  financial 
centres provide a platform to bridge the providers and the users of capital and transfer 
the money across time, space and sectors, so that both large and small projects can be 
financed.  They  are  conceived  as  the  ―capitals  of  capital‖  (Cassis  2006),  as  they 
concentrate large pools of financial intermediaries  and capital  in one place, thereby 
increasing the efficiency of financial transactions (McGahey et al., 1990). In one sense, 
an IFC is not only a place where multinational financial institutions service clients, but 
also a haven for international savings and pools of liquidity seeking profits (Park 1982).   
Secondly,  financial  centres  are  places  where  financial  transactions  are  cleared  and 
coordinated across borders. At the turn of the  19th Century, the main function of a 
financial  centre  was  to  underpin  international  trade,  along  with  the  complementary 
activities of currency exchange, insurance and shipping (Cassis 2006, p.8). Gradually, 
financial  centres  were  able  to  effect  payment  and  settlement  by  acting  as  clearing 
houses - not only for trading companies, but also for financial intermediaries.  They 
created a system of interregional payments to facilitate trade and commerce and make 
transactions in diverse markets more efficient (McGahey et al 1990). In this respect, 
financial centres can be defined as the places where intermediaries coordinate financial 
transactions and arrange for payments to be settled (Cassis 2006, p.2). 
Thirdly, financial centres are capable of setting asset prices. Just as with real goods, 
financial products require a pricing mechanism to facilitate resource allocation across 
different areas. For example, interest and exchange rates, securities pricing etc. These 
prices provide important signals to managers of firms in their selection of investment 
projects and financing. An international financial centre is in essence a high-volume,  
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cross-border financial market with a large number of broker-dealers, market makers
12 
and other participants, all of whom are imperative to  an effective and efficient pricing 
mechanism and a liquid market.   
The fourth basic function of  financial centres  is to diversify the risks wrought  by 
uncertainty.  Financial centres provide risk -pooling and risk-sharing opportunities for 
both households and business, such as various financial derivatives and hedging tools. 
In  a  well-functioning  financial  centre,  investors  are  able  to  reset  their  portfolio s 
conveniently in tandem with any changes in future expectations. More importantly, the 
concentration of financial services‘ firms and employment in the financial centre leads 
to a frequent exchange of information and ideas that can reduce the risks from financial 
activities.  In  this  sense,  the  financial  centres  provide  effective  mechanisms  for 
managing uncertainty and controlling risks in financial markets, e.g. price hedging. Yet 
it is worth mentioning that diversifying risks do not inevitably lead to minimizing risks 
as a whole. For instance, financial centres could also give rise to new risks, such as 
market volatility, financial risk contagion and so on, which is particularly challenging in 
weak institutional environments (Young et al 2009).     
What are the differences between domestic financial centres and international financial 
centres?  This  primarily  depends  on their geographic coverage.  A domestic financial 
centre is mainly confined to internal state boundaries; an IFC operates across borders. A 
more comprehensive definition of an IFC is presented by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF 2000),   
International  financial  centres  are  large  international  full-service  centres  with  advanced 
settlement and payments systems, supporting large domestic economies, with deep and 
liquid markets where both the sources and uses of funds are diverse and where legal and 
regulatory  framework  are  adequate  to  safeguard  the  integrity  of  principal-agent 
relationships and supervisory functions. 
                                                 
12  Market maker refers to a company, or an individual, that quotes both a buy and a sell price in a 
financial  instrument  or  commodity  held  in  inventory,  hoping  to  make  a  profit  (Radcliffe  1997, 
p.134).    
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Reed  (1981)  demonstrates  a  five-stage  evolutionary  hierarchy  in  which  a  financial 
centre serves (Table 3.1).     
Table 3.1: Five-stage evolutionary hierarchy of a financial centre 
Stage  Geographic Coverage  Types  of  Financial 
Centre 
I  Immediate surroundings  Domestic   
II  An area wider than the local one  Domestic   
III  National space  Domestic 
IV  Contiguous countries and political 
dependencies 
International (Regional) 
V  Financial centres worldwide  International (Global) 
Source: Adapted from Reed (1981, p.57) 
It  is  obvious  that  a  financial  centre  from  stage  I  to  stage  III  belongs  to  domestic 
financial centres while it emerges as an IFC at stage IV and V. An international financial 
centre is distinctive from other financial centres ―in the sense that the facilities which it 
offers are far more extensive than elsewhere‖ (Wasseman et al. 1963, quoted in Reed 
1981, p.283).   
As seen from Reed‘s stage IV, a regional financial centre serves its regional economy 
beyond  its  national  frontiers.  Examples  of  such  financial  centres  are  Hong  Kong, 
Singapore, Dubai and Frankfurt. When an international financial centre moves up to the 
apex of the hierarchy and serves worldwide, it becomes a global financial centre (Stage 
V). A global financial centre is the nexus between that country‘s wealth and the global 
market  and  between  foreign  investors  and  that  country‘s  investment  opportunities 
(Sassen 2006, p.136). 
Reed‘s categorisation does not mention another type of international financial centre - 
the offshore financial centre. Offshore financial centres are mainly tax havens for wealth 
management, rather than providing full financial services, e.g. Panama and the Cayman 
Islands. They seek to attract business by offering facilities to help individuals or firms 
get round the rules, laws and regulations elsewhere (see IMF 2000; Roberts 1994d).  
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Most offshore financial centres are booking centres, corresponding to McCarthy‘s paper 
centres,  and  are  only  for  booking  deposits  and  loans  (Park  1982).  They  are  often 
regarded as ―fake‖ financial centres, as there are no real transactions taking place. In 
view of this, we have excluded offshore financial centres in this study. 
Reed‘s discourse of five-stage evolution can be understood as a linear progression of 
IFC  development  into  a  hierarchy.  In  the  real  world,  financial  centres  at  different 
hierarchical stages coexist at certain points with horizontal as well as vertical linkages, 
constituting a network of financial centres (Lai 2011). For example, in the United States, 
it is widely acknowledged that New York is a global financial centre, and several other 
cities  such  as  Washington  DC,  Chicago,  Boston,  Houston,  Los  Angeles,  and  San 
Francisco  act  as  domestic  and  regional  financial  centres
13. These financial centres 
usually  cooperate  as  well  as  compet e  with  one  another .  Undoubtedly,  the  global 
financial centre is at the centrepiece of an IFC network.   
In  a  nutshell,  international  financial  centres  can  be  understood  physically  and 
functionally. The agglomeration of different financial institutions and markets into one 
place is the most fundamental process of I FCs‘ development. Nevertheless, its various 
functions of fundraising, settlement, pricing and risk diversification need be considered 
as the ultimate aim for their development, given that a successful IFC is not merely 
contingent on the number of financial institutions concentrated in one place.   
3.2  The  Analyses  of  IFCs  from  a  Neo-classical  Economic 
Perspective 
What are the underlying reasons for an IFC‘s  ability to  attract  an agglomeration of 
financial institutions? In other words, what are the benefits that these IFC participants 
                                                 
13  Washington D.C. hosts the Federal Reserve and is the policy-making and financial management 
centre; Chicago is the eastern financial centre and futures transaction centre; Boston is one of the 
fund management centres; Houston is a regional financial centre for central America; Los Angeles is 
a financial centre for the country and Pacific Basin; San Francisco is a regional financial centre for 
Western America as well as venture capital investment.    
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gain from concentrating in a central place? There is no widely accepted definition of 
how international  financial centres  came about  (Reed 1981, p3;  Laulajainen, 2003). 
Economists provide their answers based on comparative advantages (e.g. cost of land, 
capital, labour etc.), economies of scale and agglomeration economies (or externalities).   
The first serious discussions and analyses of financial centres were published in 1974 
with  Kindleberger‘s  seminal  work  The  Formation  of  Financial  Centres:  a  Study  in 
Comparative Economic History. In his book, Kindleberger (1974) makes an analogy of 
the financial centres‘ efficiency as mediums of exchange with that of money (pp. 5-11). 
He notes a considerable reduction in transaction costs when dealing with a single centre 
rather than dealing with many locations. These gains are proportional to the shift from 
N (N-1)/2 to N-1, where N is the number of locations. Davis (1990) employs industrial 
location  theory  as  an  analytical  framework  to  explain  the  rise  and  fall  of  financial 
centres. He identified a range of factors that might influence the formation of financial 
centres  by  focusing  on  behavioural  principles  of  major  financial  and  business 
intermediaries.  According  to  him,  the  main  consideration  of  banks  and  financial 
intermediaries when choosing a location is mainly based on the supply of factors of 
production (e.g. availability of capital, staffing, premises, equipment and machinery, 
regulation and tax regimes etc.), the demand for the product (e.g. level of economic 
activity, income, trading etc.) and external economies.   
It is evident concentration of financial firms in one place can provide efficiencies and 
liquidity. The scale of a financial market is conducive to collaboration and teamwork 
among  banks  and  other  financial  firms,  such  as  arranging  loan  syndication,  credit 
transaction  and  risk  sharing.  This  also  reduces  the  costs  of  developing  important 
infrastructure  such  as  clearing  offices,  courier  services  and  other  advanced 
telecommunication facilities. For example, an active inter-bank lending market provides 
an efficient channelling of financial resources among banks. In this regard, the IFC is 
often conceptualised as the intermediary of financial intermediaries. 
The geographical proximity of different financial markets can bring economies of scale, 
since  there  are  close  ties  with  one  another.  For  example,  a  Treasury  bond  market, 
commercial paper market and inter-bank lending market are all inextricably connected 
to one other. Inefficiency will be caused if they are segregated and located in different  
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places. Grilli et al. (1989) labelled these ―thick market externalities‖, highlighting the 
relationship between productivity and market size. When the productivity of individual 
firms can benefit from the proximity of competitors or other firms, concentration arises. 
It is an appealing way of explaining the growth and agglomeration of financial markets, 
both physical and non-tangible.   
Moreover, the agglomeration of different  firms  and institutions  in  one  location  also 
facilitates the sharing of various resources. They not only have more convenient and 
cheaper access to the specialist services of lawyers, accountants, actuaries, computer 
programmers and consultants; the can also share facilities and organisations that serve 
groups of financial firms, such as clearing houses, organised exchanges and professional 
associations  (McGahey  et  al., 1990). Meanwhile, the proximity of business  contact, 
particularly face-to-face communication with their clients from multinational enterprises 
or regulatory bodies, is considered essential to promoting rapid dissemination and quick 
responses,  which  favour  ongoing  innovation  and  technological  spillover
14  (Meyer 
1991). 
Recently, industry clustering thesis has also been used to explain the evolution of IFCs. 
A  cluster  is  a  ―geographically  proximate  group  of  interconnected  companies  and 
associated  institutions  in  a  particular  field,  linked  by  commonalities  and 
complementarities‖ (Porter 2008)
15  . Firms in a cluster can reduce their direct input 
costs by sharing a large labour pool and suppliers that serve the cluster. Other benefits to 
clustering include access to institutional and public goods, such as trade conferences, 
local business journals, and extensive software and hardware training opportunities (Yee 
2006). Some researchers  in  the field of  urban economics also argue the balance of 
centripetal and centrifugal forces  determines the agglomeration of financial clustering 
(e.g. Gehrig 1998; Reszat 1998). The centripetal forces include economi es of scale, 
information spillover, liquid markets and labour markets. Centrifugal forces include 
                                                 
14  This coincides with the information hinterland theory from socio-geographers (See section 3.3.1). 
15  For example, Poon (2003) has used clustering analysis to examine the spatial  organization and 
evolution of capital markets in 43 cities from 1980 to 1998.  
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market access costs, traffic congestion, high business costs and localised information.   
Is  there  a  self-sustaining  mechanism  in  the  development  of  an  IFC?  Davis  (1990) 
analyses the impact of ―sunk costs‖ and concludes that once an IFC had been identified, 
it could sustain itself for some time unless major economic and political changes occur, 
which he labelled ―cumulative causation‖. Finally, for multinational enterprises, factors 
such as tariff barriers, political stability and strategic considerations are also important.   
Economists have sought to explain why financial firms and markets tend to concentrate 
on one particular location and to develop it into a financial centre. Kindleberger (1974) 
characterises the process of IFC development as an ―evolutionary and time-consuming 
process‖.  His  theory  is  specifically  tailored  to  the  explanation  for  an  international 
financial centre such as London and New York. However, this perspective is unable to 
explain  why  a  financial  centre  would  be  located  in  one  place  rather  than  another. 
Another weakness of this approach centres on its failure to examine the factors that 
shape how the role of the state evolves over time. Neo-classical economists presume 
that IFCs‘ development only happens in advanced economies with developed financial 
markets.  The  theoretical  gap  is  obvious  when  applying  it  to  emerging  economies, 
particularly those in the process of economic transition. 
3.3 The Analyses of IFCs from a Socio-geographic Perspective 
Socio-geographers  highlight  the  interaction  of  financial  deregulation,  technological 
advancement  in  telecommunications  and  globalisation  in  the  development  of  IFCs 
(Porteous  1995;  Thrift  1994;  Zhao  et  al  2004;  Sassen  2001).  In  this  section,  I  will 
introduce two important strands from the socio-geographic perspective: the Information 
Hinterland theory and the World City thesis.   
3.3.1 The Information Hinterland Theory 
Porteous  (1995)  gives  considerable  emphasis  to  the  relationship  between  financial 
information and transactions as well as their impact on physical locales. He proposes a 
theoretical framework to explain why financial activities tend to be concentrated in one 
particular  location  over  another.  In  this  framework,  he  identifies  two  key  concepts:  
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information  hinterland  and  information  asymmetry.  The  information  hinterland  is 
defined as ―the region that provides the best access point for the profitable exploitation 
of  valuable  information  flows‖  (p.  113).  Financial  firms  who  are  closer  to  the 
information  hinterland  are  therefore  able  to  act  earlier  at  lower  cost.  Information 
asymmetry, according to Porteous, is caused by two kinds of information; standardised 
and non-standardised. Standardised information  is  generally  able to  be codified  and 
transmitted  electronically.  However,  non-standardised  information  is,  in  most  cases, 
difficult to codify and has to be transmitted in person. Consequently, local firms, foreign 
firms  and  the  government  have  different  abilities  when  it  comes  to  accessing  local 
information, which creates the problem of ―information asymmetry‖ (Zhao et al. 2005, 
p.311). According to Porteous (1995), in order to access, collect and interpret huge 
amount of non-standardised information correctly, financial firms tend to locate near the 
information hinterland of an international city, i.e. an IFC (Zhao et al, 2004).   
One contribution of information hinterland theory is that it considers financial services 
as  ‗high-value-added‘  information  services.  Therefore,  financial  centres  are  also 
conceived as hubs that transform dispersed information into an organic one. Therefore, 
an IFC is an information collector and user whose existence is contingent on its ability 
to add new value to information (Zhao 2003). Laulajainen (2003, p. 332) argues that the 
ability to ―collect, exchange, rearrange and interpret‖ information is the most persistent 
characteristic of an IFC, surpassing other factors, such as capital exports and regulation. 
In order to obtain international pre-eminence, only a handful of cities can have the 
gateway function for a region (information hinterland). He then postulates that three 
interlinked time zones centring on North America, Europe and Asia Pacific underpin the 
supremacy of New York, London and Tokyo as three global financial centres. 
Information hinterland theory has also sought to explore whether international financial 
centres would continue to exist in the digital era. O‘Brien (1992) argues that advanced 
information  and  telecommunications  technology  have  brought  about  ―the  end  of 
geography‖ in banking and finance, and thus financial institutions will no longer have to 
be  in  financial  centres.  Computer  networks  mean  some  financial  services  can  be 
provided electronically, rendering redundant the need for personal contact. Carincross 
(1997) declares the ―death of distance‖; since distance will not determine the cost of 
communications electronically. It is evident such these arguments will be challenged  
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heavily by information hinterland theory. As noted earlier, the effects of information 
asymmetry tend to  push financial  firms  closer to an information source in  order to 
interpret the non-standardised information necessary to maximise profit. This type of 
information is far more difficult to obtain: it requires technical conditions as well as 
social  infrastructure.  This  type  of  social  infrastructure  is  critical  to  the  success  of 
financial centres. Sanyal (2007b) also highlights that informal human interaction and 
lifestyle are critical to the competitiveness of financial centres, since activities such as 
innovation, creativity and the diffusion of ideas need a constant exchange of ideas and 
―fuzzy  information‖.  This  all  demonstrates  that  international  financial  centre  will 
continue to exist because improved telecommunications allows the decentralisation of 
some  activities  involving  standardized  and  routine  transactions,  but  facilitates  the 
centralisation  of  others  involving  innovative  and  customized  transactions  (Tschoegl 
2000).   
3.3.2 The World City Thesis 
The world city thesis explains the formation, spatial and hierarchical distribution of 
international financial centres. Friedmann (1986) argues that ―the new division of labour‖ 
is organised through ―world cities‖ and points out that cities rather than states have 
become the most fundamental geographic units. In his hypothesis his emphasis is on 
world cities as ―basing points‖ for the concentration and accumulation of international 
capital.  Sassen  (2001)  reinforces  the  world  city  hypothesis  by  claiming  that 
globalisation  and  information  industry  development  mean  that  spatial  dispersion  of 
production have created new forms of centralisation of producer services (including 
financial services) in order to manage the global network of production sites. These 
centralised locales, which Sassen coins ―global cities‖ thus act as nerve centres of the 
world economy. According to Sassen (2006, p.7), today‘s global cities are： 
  Command points in the organisation of the world economy 
  Key locations and marketplaces for the leading industries of the current period – finance 
and specialised services for firms 
  Major sites of production, including the production of innovations, for these industries 
Sassen‘s view highlights that these new forms of centralised place entail a marketplace 
with a multitude of advanced corporate service firms and financial institutions (2001,  
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p.330). It is generally acceded that global cities and international financial centres have 
similar characteristics. New York, London and Tokyo, for example, all contain large 
numbers of corporate headquarters, financial services firms and high-paid professional 
jobs. While a financial centre is seen as the pivot of a financial network, a global city is 
the  strategic  control  point  in  the  organisation  of  the  world  economy  and  in  a 
multinational corporate network (Zhao et al, 2004, p.579).   
According  to  the  world  city  thesis,  the  current  network  of  financial  centres  differs 
sharply from earlier versions. Traditionally, international financial services were directly 
linked to international trade. The larger the volume of imports and exports by a country 
in international trade, the larger the scale of its international financial sector. Over the 
past 30 years however the global manufacturing and financial system has become more 
complex,  with  a  dramatic  expansion  of  multinational  companies  and  a  concomitant 
expansion of transnational banks. Meanwhile, the flow of economic resources beyond 
national borders has increased massively. As such, a cross-border network of financial 
centres has also been generated to ensure the management, control, and servicing of this 
new  organisation  of  production  and  finance  (Sassen  2001,  p.24)  .  Therefore,  the 
importance of an IFC is not merely determined by the scale of international trade, but 
also by the level of connectivity with the ―world city network‖. As HPEC (2007, p.43) 
notes,   
What is significant is that all significant IFCs start to constitute an integrated web of global 
finance.  In  that  sense,  the  specific  financially-based  linkages  among  global  IFCs  may 
supersede  the  importance  of  more  general  linkages  among  their  national  and  regional 
economies.   
Another  point  of  note  in  the  world  city  thesis  is  that  globalisation  processes  have 
produced not only a few leading cities, but a ―world city network‖ with many more 
cities from emerging economies having different nodal characteristics (Taylor 2005). 
Cities with different sizes are more connected with each other within the new context of 
globalisation and digitalisation. In recent years, cities in late-developing-countries have 
successively connected to this network and become important nodes within it. As more 
nodes  are  added  to  the  network  its  value  increases  exponentially.  Castells  (1996) 
suggests the current network society comprises a ―space of flows‖ rather than a ―space  
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of places‖, which is a good way of understanding the IFCs‘ hierarchical development 
across  the  world.  He  says  the  space  of  flows  constitutes  ―electronic  circuits  and 
information  systems‖,  but  it  is  also  made  of  ―territories,  physical  places,  whose 
fundamental or symbolic meaning depends on their connection to a network‖ (Castells 
2000b, p. 696). 
3.4 The Analyses of IFCs from a Financial-Growth Perspective 
In this section, I will analyse how important it is for developing countries to strive for 
financial development and thereafter the formation of international financial centres. In 
both the practical and academic arenas, there are two contradictory strands of thought 
on  the  IFCs‘  development.  Some  argue  IFCs‘  development  in  developing  countries 
helps these countries to integrate with the world economy and the globalisation process. 
They see IFCs as an important development strategy for economic development. Others 
argue IFCs‘ development in developing countries is a new instrument of imperialist 
control imposed by Western developed countries.   
3.4.1 IFCs as Developmental Strategy 
The  discourse  over  the  creation  of  IFCs  as  a  part  of  a  developmental  strategy  in 
developing countries is closely linked to the relationship between financial development 
and economic growth. The financial sector is reckoned to be ―the brain of the entire 
economic system, the central locus of decision-making‖ (Stiglitz et al. 1993). To policy 
makers in  emerging economies, the primary  purpose of the  IFCs development is to 
channel capital from developed countries to late-developing-countries and to help the 
latter upgrade their industrial structures (see HPEC 2007; FGN 2007).   
Patrick (1966) has made an instrumental contribution to this issue by identifying two 
discourses  -  ―demand-following‖  and  ―supply-leading‖.  According  to  Patrick, 
―demand-following‖ means the creation of modern financial institutions and financial 
services are shaped by development demand in the real economy. ―Supply-leading‖
16 
                                                 
16  The supply-leading discourse highlights three connotations: (1) the pro-activity of a financial  
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refers to the creation of financial institutions and the supply of related services before 
the  real  sector  has  a  demand  for  them.  Patrick  illustrates  that  the  supply-leading 
approach is able to stimulate real growth, particularly in modern, innovative sectors. 
Supply-leading  theory  posits  that  financial  development  can  take  place  earlier  than 
economic development. Accordingly, the formation of financial centres is not just the 
natural evolution of economic development but the consequence of state intervention 
and promotion. 
Economists  such  as  Goldsmith  (1969),  McKinnon  (1973)  and  Shaw  (1973)  have 
highlighted the connection ―between a country‘s financial superstructure and its real 
infrastructure‖. According to Goldsmith (1969, p.400), the financial superstructure of an 
economy  ―accelerates  economic  growth  and  improves  economic  performance  to  the 
extent that it facilitates the migration of funds to the best user, i.e. to the place in the 
economic system where the funds will yield the highest social return‖. In his seminal 
work-Money  and  Capital  in  economic  Development  (1973)  McKinnon  argues  that 
―financial  repression‖  is  a  substantial  barrier  to  successful  economic  development, 
particularly in late-developing-countries. He argues that the development of financial 
intermediation is considered vital to the economic development process. Levine (2003, 
2005)  made  a  comprehensive  study  of  the  links  between  financial  development, 
liberalisation  and  economic  growth.  He  demonstrated  that  financial  development 
crucially affects the speed and pattern of overall economic development. The expansion 
of financial markets can increase the efficiency of capital allocation, boosting saving 
and consumption, both of which are critical to economic development. King and Levine 
(1993) use cross-country regressions and case studies to show that a well-developed 
financial system promotes growth by channelling credit to its most productive uses. 
Although  still  far  from  conclusive,  many  empirical  studies  have  shown  that  a 
well-developed  financial  system  is  useful  to  channel  capital  to  its  most-productive 
sectors (see Nabi and Suliman 2009).   
                                                                                                                                               
system in motivating saving and investment; (2) the antecedence of a financial system to economic 
growth; (3) the role of the state in financial and economic development (Patrick 1966).  
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To assess the relationship between international finance and growth, it is necessary to 
explore  the  topic  within  a  much  broader  context.  The  current  global  economy  has 
become  both  real  and  a  fictitious.  The  fictitious  economy  generally  refers  to  the 
invention  of  many  new  financial  instruments  such  as  securitisation,  which  liquefy 
capital and allow it to circulate globally. During the past decades, the increased capital 
inflows  to  the  emerging  economies,  both  FDI  and  portfolio  flows,  appears  to  be 
important in achieving growth in these countries (Sandar Kyaw and Macdonald 2009). 
Meanwhile, with this vigorous economic growth, the emerging economies are required 
to increase their responsibilities and influence in international financial organisations. 
By concentrating financial institutions and services in a certain place, the international 
financial  centres  could  not  only  reduce  transaction  and  information  costs,  but  also 
promote  a  more  complete,  better-regulated  and  resilient  financial  system  (Obstfeld 
2007). Financial integration can help countries build more robust and efficient financial 
systems by introducing international practices and standards; by improving the quality, 
efficiency  and  breadth  of  financial  services;  and  by  introducing  stable  inflows  of 
international funds (Claessens 2000). The prosperity of financial markets can create a 
large pool of technological know-how and a range of products within the country‘s 
economy that both improve efficiency and the size of the market for the benefit of both 
the  producer  and  the  consumer.  Greenwood  and  Smith  (1997）argue  that  financial 
markets will make a considerable contribution to economic development, which in turn 
will lead to the formation of new markets. More importantly, the IFCs‘ development 
implies that the financial system in individual countries can be more aligned with global 
standards, so as to establish better and more collaborative financial governance in line 
with global trends.   
From the perspective of new structural economics, each level of economic development 
is a point along the continuum from a low-income agrarian economy to a high-income 
post-industrialised one. The journey requires continuous diversification and upgrading 
from  existing  industries  to  new,  more  capital-intensive  ones  (Lin  2011).  For  large 
developing countries, development might be unbalanced: some areas (cities) will likely 
develop much faster than more rural areas. These cities with advantages in the domestic 
economy has aspired to become IFCs and acted as the gateway to the global financial 
network.    
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Yet  some  commentators  continue  to  cast  doubt  on  the  necessity  of  developing 
international financial centres in late-developing countries. Cassimon et al. (2012) argue 
that the finance-growth  nexus  is  not  linear;  the relationship  is  at  its  weakest  in  the 
poorest countries due to the backwardness of their institutions. Kaufman (2001) posits 
that this does not appear to be ―an opportune time‖ for developing countries to devote 
considerable public resources  into developing their own  IFCs,  even if  the countries 
could  satisfy  the  requirements.  He  puts  forward  two  points:  firstly,  technological 
advancement enables financial transactions using the internet; secondly, the locality of 
an IFC is much easier to transfer than before.   
3.4.2 IFCs as new Instruments of Imperialist Control 
In  contrast  to  the  preceding  perspective  that  IFCs  are  favourable  for  developing 
countries, some commentators hold more cautious views. Gorostiaga (1984) interprets 
the IFCs‘ development in underdeveloped countries as new instruments of dependency 
and imperialist control. Using the case of Panama, he demonstrates that IFCs in the 
developing world entail new forms of dependency for the peripheral countries in their 
economic  relations  with  the  centre.  According  to  him,  the  IFCs  are  strategic 
mechanisms that reinforce the globalisation of production and serve as tax havens and 
non-regulated financial platforms for the generation of global profits by transnational 
corporations and banks. Moreover, the historical and geographical backgrounds of these 
host cities/states make them  suitable as  operation platforms for these  IFCs,  such as 
Hong Kong, Singapore, the Bahamas, Beirut and Panama. As he puts it:   
The new articulation of the capitalist system is the collusion of the transnational finance 
capital of the various blocs within a global strategy of control and maximization of profits 
on a world scale 
 (Gorostiaga 1984, p. 66).   
As Huntington (1996) pointed out in his book - Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking 
of World Order, the Western countries dominate the world in 14 ways, three of which 
are associated with finance: they ―own and operate the international banking system, 
control all hard currencies, and dominate international capital markets‖. According to 
Scholey  (1987),  international  financial  centres  are  ―the  hub  of  a  global  network  of 
trading,  financing  and  broking  businesses  with  tentacles  reaching  deep  into  market  
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places  of  other  countries‖.  It  is  apparent  that  traditional  IFCs  are  the  places  where 
Western powers are able to exercise their power and maintain their dominance.     
Nicolas  Shaxon  is  a  recent  scholar  who  purports  to  identify  the  mechanics  of  the 
modern monetary system and claims developing nations are paying the cost. In his book 
―Treasure islands: Tax Havens and the men who stole the world‖, Shaxon (2011) argues 
that the British Empire has been replaced by a new form of financial empire centred in 
the City of London. The financial centres, particularly ―tax havens‖ are new type of 
―colonialism‖ through secret jurisdictions, tax evasion and escaping regulation at home. 
As he describes it, ―they (the colonists) went out of the front door, and came back in 
through  a  side  window‖.  He  sees  the  worldwide  offshore  financial  network  as  a 
―spider‘s web‖ and claims the objective of the network is to feed capitalists in the City 
of London (the global financial centre), thereby redistributing wealth upwards and risks 
downwards with the poorest countries losing most.   
More commentators have criticised IFCs in the wake of the global financial crisis in 
2008. They argue that the current international financial system is inappropriate and 
incurs  deep  exploitation  of  the  developing  nations.  In  the  words  of  Mahathir 
Mohammad (2012), the former Prime Minister of Malaysia: ―The financial market spins 
off no real businesses, creates hardly any jobs and gives rise to no trade. Getting greedy, 
they abused the system, manipulating the market for greater profits.‖ Bankers botch up 
economies;  creating  house  price  surges  and  other  speculative  bubbles  while  paying 
themselves excessively for engendering economic crises. The recent protests, such as 
Occupy Wall Street in New York and other financial centres around the world echo 
Susan  Strange‘s  famous  remark  from  1986  that  we  are  living  in  an  age  of  ―casino 
capitalism‖.   
Some  neo-Marxist  theorists  hold  the  same  view  but  from  a  different  angle.  They 
maintain  that  not  only  imperialism  and  colonialism  from  a  previous  era  but  also 
contemporary  forms  of  economic  imperialism  have  impeded  progress  in  the 
late-developing-countries (Martinussen 1997). For them, national financial autonomy in 
developing  countries  is  being  controlled  by  a  small  number  of  capitalists  from 
developed countries, while the capacity of the state to influence financial services has 
diminished.  Moreover,  the  standards  and  rules  set  by  the  financial  centres  in  the  
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developed countries force everyone else to apply them even if they are unsuitable for 
their own economic development. Over a long time period, developing countries were 
connected  to  traditional  agricultural  and  manufacturing  industries.  They  provided 
wealthy developed countries with low-value-added products based on natural resources 
and cheap labour. The development of service industries such as finance lagged behind 
in  the  developing  world.  For  them,  transaction  costs  have  increased  as  a  direct 
consequence of the expansion of economic activity brought by globalisation. And yet, in 
the  absence  of  functioning  financial  markets,  allocation  of  capital  and  economic 
resources are low-efficient. The peripheral countries are now trying to upgrade their 
industrial structures and develop service industries, particularly in their large cities. The 
development  of  IFCs  in  developing  countries  signals  the  ―gaining  of  real  national 
independence and self-centred economic progress‖(Martinussen 1997). 
The consideration of the IFCs as a new mechanism of imperialist domination and a new 
form  of  control  over  the  periphery  is  certainly  a  wake-up  call  for  the  emerging 
economies. The IFCs can provide their host countries with important benefits such as 
seigniorage
17, employment, foreign exchange earnings, tax income, and funding for 
current account and fiscal deficits (Kaufman 2001). The policies of IFCs contribute to 
investment, employment, and the efficient  functioning  of markets and government 
policies in developing countries (Hine 2009, p.3). On the other hand, externality is not 
always  positive;  sometimes  it  can  engender  adverse  effects,  such  as  congestion 
externalities (Davis 1990).  Negative externalities  can  outweigh economies of scale. 
They can thus bring about diseconomies such as rising business costs and an imbalance 
in regional development. These debates demonstrate that an IFC is arguably a mixed 
blessing for developing countries (Table 3.2).   
 
 
                                                 
17  Seigniorage from having one‘s currency used by others as an international currency, so that the 
government can raise funds at a lower interest cost, is often considered one of the advantage of    an 
IFC  
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Table 3.2 Benefits and costs of an international financial centre 
Benefits  Costs 
  Raising capital 
  Reduce transaction costs 
  Optimise financial resource 
allocation 
  Integrate into the world financial 
system 
  Seigniorage   
  More efficient financial firms 
through competition from foreign 
banks 
  High-paid employment opportunities 
  Rising    salaries and housing rents 
  Imbalance of regional development 
  Smaller IFCs may surrender some 
control over their domestic economy 
  Relatively large investment in human 
capital and human capital is highly 
mobile 
  Susceptible to fraud and corruption 
  Financial risk contagion 
Source: compiled by author 
For late-developing countries, it is important to recognise that the ultimate purpose of 
IFCs‘  development  is  not  to  create  new  financial  hegemony  and  privilege,  but  to 
buttress  economic  restructuring  and  upgrading.  As  most  developing  countries  are 
typically  characterised  by  agrarian  or  labour-intensive  economies  and  developed 
countries tend to have competitive advantage in capital-intensive economies, they have 
a different endowment structure (Lin 2010). Therefore, late-developing countries should 
maximise the strengths  and benefits in the creation of an IFC whilst eliminating or 
decreasing the costs and drawbacks. In this process, the role of the state should play an 
active part, which I spell out in the Chapter 6.   
The review on a body of IFCs‘ literature demonstrates that all these perspectives look at 
the development of IFCs but each approaches it from a different angle with a different 
set of beliefs and values. However the vast majority of studies tend to view the IFCs‘ 
development as single, linear and one-dimensional and have overlooked the role of the 
state and particularly the ownership structure in the IFCs‘ development.   
In particular, current analyses of IFCs‘ development are mainly segregated and isolated 
within a particular discipline. The neo-classical theorists‘ work on IFCs‘ development is  
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largely based on micro-level analysis (e.g. financial markets, institutions, services and 
professionals) or geographic distribution of finance. In fact, the IFCs‘ development is 
multi-faceted. Further, most studies are tailored for matured economies (primarily in the 
Anglo-sphere) rather than large, fast-growing emerging economies (e.g. BRICS). As 
well as this, most inquiries are static, rather than dynamic. All of these approaches are 
practical in explaining certain points, but most of them are static analyses. There has 
been  extensive  literature  on  the  studies  of  international  financial  centres,  largely 
focusing on their evolution, competitiveness and hierarchy in the world economy (e.g. 
Reed,  1980;  Davis,  1990;  Roberts,  1994a,  b,  c,  d;  Leyshon,  1997;  Poon,  2003). 
Nevertheless,  the  research  on  the  dynamics  of  IFCs‘  development  is  relatively 
insufficient. Major theories on IFCs‘ development overstate the power of the markets 
while the active role of the state is to a large extent overlooked. Further discussion will 
be conducted in the next chapter.   
3.5 Multi-layered Analytical Framework for the Emergence of an 
IFC 
How can the rise and decline of the international financial centres be explained? The 
existing literature details a broad set of attributes that give rise to the prosperity of 
international financial centres (see Nadler et al. 1955; Reed 1980; McGahey et al. 1990; 
Huat et al. 2004; Poon 2003; Jao 2003; Sagaram and Wickramnayake 2005; Cassis 2006; 
Walter 1998; Laulajainen 2003). It also makes sense to measure the success of IFCs 
using various financial variables as benchmarking. For example, Reed
18  (1980) uses a 
                                                 
18  The variable measures adopted by Reed (1980, pp. 225-6) are: 1. Capital/deposit ratio of the large 
internationally  active  banks  headquartered  in  the  centre.  2.  Capital/asset  ratio  of  the  large 
internationally active banks headquartered in the centre. 3. Pre-tax earnings/capital ratio of the large 
internationally active banks headquartered in the centre. 4. Pre-tax earnings/assets ratio of the large 
internationally  active  banks  headquartered  in  the  centre.  5.  Revenue/asset  ratio  of  the  large 
internationally active banks headquartered in the centre. 6. Total international currency clearings of 
the centre. 7. Size (liabilities) of the centre‘s Eurocurrency market. 8. Total amount of international 
bonds issued in the centre during the year. 9. Foreign financial assets held in the centre. 10. Foreign 
financial liabilities held in the centre. 11. The daily average of the centre‘s stock exchange activity.  
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data-set of sixteen variables and concludes that the hierarchy of financial centres is 
determined  primarily  by  the  ability  of  international  currency  clearing,  the  size  of 
Eurocurrency market, the portfolio of international financial assets and the number of 
the large, internationally active commercial banks. Jao (2003) claims that a city cannot 
be a genuine IFC unless it satisfies six conditions, such as a foreign exchange turnover 
of no less than USD 10 billion, the concentration of over 100 foreign banks and so on. 
His arguments have taken some flak as such static data could be invalid depending on 
time and conditions
19.   
Based on the literature review of different perspectives on IFCs ‘ development, it is 
suggested that it is systematic, multi-dimensional and dynamic. In view of this, I have 
developed  a  more  comprehensive  multi-layered  framework  to  encompass  IFCs‘ 
development;  notably  macro,  meso,  micro  and  meta  levels.  Each  of  these  plays  a 
significant role in any successful IFC (Figure 3.1). The macro-level is concerned with 
the  general  environment  of  the  country/hinterland  that  an  IFC  serves  and  includes 
components such as political stability, economic power, legislative systems etc. The 
meso-level  refers  to  the  business  environment  for  the  host  city  of  an  IFC,  such  as 
infrastructure, the tax regime and urban amenities. The micro-level is related to the 
agglomeration  of  financial  markets,  financial  institutions,  financial  services,  human 
capital etc. The meta-level considers the connectivity of the IFC to the global network.   
 
                                                                                                                                               
12. The number of large internationally active commercial banks headquartered in the centre. 13. 
The number of large internationally active foreign banks with offices in the centre. 14. The number 
of foreign financial centres with direct links, provided by the foreign internationally active banks, to 
the local centre. 15. The centre‘s airline passenger traffic. 16. The centre‘s airmail/airfreight volume. 
19  According to Jao (2003), the six indicators of a genuine IFC are: (1)It has a daily forex turnover 
of not less than USD10 billion; (2) It has a presence of foreign banks, net of representative offices, 
of not  less than 100;  (3)  It has a presence of foreign non -bank financial intermediaries,  net of 
representative offices, of not less 200; (4) It has cross-border inter-bank claims and liabilities of not 
less than USD100 billion each  day; (5) It has total bank lending abroad of not less than US$20 
billion; (6)  It is chosen as the location for  regional headquarters by not less  than 200 foreign 
companies (including banks and financial institutions).  
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Figure3.1: The comprehensive multi-layered framework of IFCs development 
 
Source: Author 
Macro Level: Macro-economic, political and legislative environment 
The development of an IFC is closely concerned with the macro-level environment. At 
this  level,  three  ingredients  are  particularly  important  in  the  evolution  of  an  IFC: 
political stability, economic prowess and a well-designed legislative environment. 
More than anything, a successful IFC should have a politically stable environment. It is 
hard to imagine the survival of an international financial centre amid enduring violence, 
conflicts or even wars. Historically, a large number of international financial centres lost 
their positions due to political unrest or military catastrophe. For example, Shanghai lost 
its position as an East-Asian financial centre in the 1930s due to the invasion of the 
Japanese and subsequent domestic wars. Beirut used to be an international financial 
centre in the Middle East until the 1982 Lebanon invasion.   
A buoyant international financial centre is reliant on a buoyant and diversified economic 
hinterland. Economic activity and stability within the centre are seen as imperative. In  
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his  book  Capitals  of  Capita,  Cassis  (2006)  explored  the  IFCs‘  evolution  from  18
th 
Century to the present. Through long-term historical analysis, he attributed the rise of 
major financial centres to the economic power of the country that hosts them (p.281). 
Cassis notes: 
The rise or decline of an international financial centre cannot be understood independently 
from the economic and social environment of the country in which it operates; from the 
weight carried by the financial sector in this economy; from the preference given to it 
compared with other activities, especially industrial, by the political authorities; and from 
the political influence that the financial elites are able to exert. (Cassis 2006, p.5) 
The rise of an IFC was closely linked with the economic prowess of its hinterland. 
Fratianni  (2007)  reviews  the  historical  record  of  seven  IFCs  –  Florence,  Venice, 
Genoa, Antwerp, Amsterdam, London and New York- from the 14
th Century to the 19
th 
Century.    Apart from financial innovations and institutional change driven by market 
expansion, the evolution of IFCs was largely determined by the transformation of the 
economic centre from continental Europe to Maritime Anglo-American.   
Sagaram  and  Wickramanayake  (2005)  contend  that  a  centre  complemented  with  a 
strong economic base will have the advantage of economies of agglomeration, with 
more  efficient  resources  at  its  disposal.  To  function  optimally,  an  IFC  should  have 
sufficient levels of economic activity to underpin it. With regard to IFCs‘ development 
in large developing countries, the ability of a city to become a regional international 
financial centre or global financial centre depends hugely on its host country's economic 
power.   
The  third  equally-important  element  at  the  macro-level  is  a  reliable,  resilient  and 
transparent legal and regulatory system. The regulatory mechanism is more delicate to 
an IFCs development. On the one hand, it is important that the financial industry is 
placed under sound supervision for the sake of risk containment. On the other hand, 
avoidance of over-regulation is also important for financial innovation and competitive 
advantage. Therefore, governments often face the dilemma of weighing the stability and 
flexibility  of  a  regulatory  climate.  IFCs  favour  predictability  when  it  comes  to 
government  regulation  and  change  is  often  viewed  as  unwelcome.  It  is  not  easy  to 
benefit from financial innovation when there is uncertainty over the approval of a new  
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product or service by the legal authority (Young et al 2009, p.23). Abundant empirical 
evidence has established the fact that a country‘s financial development is related to its 
institutional  characteristics,  e.g.  prudential  regulation  and  supervision,  contract 
enforcement  and  more  broadly  the  rule  of  law  (e.g.  Levine  1997;  Beck  et  al. 
2000;Andrianova  et  al  2008). Meanwhile,  regulations  need  to  be  administered  with 
sufficient flexibility to  adjust quickly to a changing environment (Dufey and Giddy 
1978, p40).   
Different legal systems in a host country would also have a profound impact on the 
distribution of IFCs (La Porta et al. 2008). Zhao (2010) claims the Anglo-American 
system, or common-law system, is superior to the continental European legal system on 
the grounds that the former is more flexible and resilient. In the common law tradition 
(negative-list regulation rules) such as operates in the United Kingdom and the United 
States, it is very easy to introduce new products and services on condition they are not 
prohibited by law. Under the legal framework of the civil law tradition, the so-called 
positive-list regulation holds sway: regulations do not allow anything new unless it is 
specifically listed in written statute beforehand.   
Another important factor for ensuring market functionality is transparency. Participants 
in  financial  markets  have  different  motives.  Investors  purchase  securities  for  better 
returns; businesses issue stocks for financing; and security firms supply professional 
services for profit. All of them need free information flows and transparency to achieve 
their specific targets. Otherwise, financial resources cannot be allocated efficiently or 
fairly. 
Meso Level: Urban and business environment in a host city 
In the development of an IFC, high-quality urban infrastructure is crucial for attracting 
investment and supporting international financial business.  In addition to necessities 
such  as  clean  air  and  water,  modern  office  space,  an  efficient  transport  system, 
widespread  air  links  and  robust  telecommunications  are  all  important  aspects  of  an 
attractive infrastructure. Indeed, almost all of the leading IFCs have state-of-art physical 
and  financial  infrastructure  that  allows  them  to  maximise  the  benefits  of 
telecommunications  and  to  organise  and  govern  the  new  conditions  for  operating  
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globally (Sassen 2006, p.140). In this regard, not only is it important to understand the 
characteristics  of  financial  centres‘  historical  development  but  also  to  consider  the 
impact of modern-day IT to enable an understanding of the kind of financial services, 
institutions and markets that will likely comprise future financial centres. 
The  taxation  regime  is  also  important  in  any  IFC  development  as  it  is  difficult  to 
provide uniform taxation to financial firms around the world. A business-friendly tax 
regime has a direct impact on the distribution of IFCs, since it can attract corporate 
investors  as  well  as  high-skilled  professionals.  This  will  cause  regulatory  arbitrage, 
which implies that a state can influence the IFCs‘ development by using favourable tax 
regimes. For example, in the British-ruled Cayman Islands, the favourable regulatory 
environment has absolved firms from income tax, corporate tax and capital gains tax. 
Some might argue that a tax regime is often determined by a central government and 
should  be  regarded  as  part  of  macro-economic  policies  at  macro-level.  I  believe  a 
favourable tax regime could be established at city level, rather than country level, e.g. a 
free-trade zone or a special economic zone. A favourable tax regime at city level can 
better channel financial resources to a certain place, although it is often blamed for its 
lack of taxation equality.   
A successful international financial centre should also provide various urban amenities 
so as to attract and retain talent pools. In the words of Sanyal (2007a, pp.7-8):   
The creation of an international financial centre has to look at the wider eco-system rather 
than just the financial sector. First, it must be an attractive place to live for the talented. 
Second,  every  effort  must  be  made  to  ensure  that  the  city‘s  human  capital  does  not 
decluster. Third, tertiary educational facilities are needed both inside the city and within 
easy reach. ―Attractiveness‘ is not just about physical aesthetics but about the ―soft‖ factors 
that encourage the talented to converge and interact. 
Therefore, the urban amenities mentioned here are not just modern infrastructure and 
hard  facilities,  but  also  various  social-cultural  elements,  including  entertainment, 
education, health care, arts and culture, etc.   
Urban  policies  can  also  influence  the  formation  of  an  IFC.  Sagaram  and 
Wickramanayake  (2005)  conducted  an  empirical  investigation  into  a  wide  range  of  
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factors on IFCs‘ development in Hong Kong, Singapore and Japan. Their study shows 
that in the cases of Hong Kong and Singapore, government policies are positive and 
significant  for  their  IFCs‘  development.  Hong  Kong‘s  policy  architecture  reflects  a 
position of ―positive non-interventionism . . . [as] a deliberate policy choice rather than 
merely  an  absence  of  policy‖  (Schenk,  2002,  p.322;  Jarvis,  2011).  Singapore  has 
deliberately focused its efforts on clustering international expertise. Thus the city-state 
concentrated on improving the quality of immigration, tertiary education, entertainment 
facilities and global linkages. Interestingly, Japanese government policies were negative 
to its financial centre growth and sustainability. The inappropriate policies were mainly 
due to resistance coming from the banking, securities, and insurance industries (Shirai 
2007). 
Micro  Level:  Agglomeration  of  Financial  Markets,  Institutions  and  Human 
Capital 
The depth and breadth of financial markets is the keystone of an IFC. As previously 
mentioned, neo-classical economists have contributed much to illustrate why financial 
firms  tend  to  concentrate  their  business  in  a  certain  place.  Economies  of  scale, 
comparative advantage and the externalities are valid in interpreting the agglomeration 
of financial firms and markets at micro-level. A pre-eminent financial centre not only 
has a well-established market system, it also takes a leading position in the global or 
regional financial market. For instance, London has the largest foreign exchange market, 
bond market and insurance market in the world and New York hosts the largest stock 
market, mutual funds market and private equity market. Most other leading international 
financial centres have a premier position in niche markets, e.g. Chicago (derivatives), 
Zurich (asset management), Hong Kong (IPO) and Singapore (Asia-US dollar market).   
It is thus understandable that an international financial centre is the central place for the 
clustering  of  various  financial  services.  Apart  from  the  conventional  services  of 
financing services, such as fundraising, money transfer, currency exchange, clearing and 
settlement, a leading international financial centre will also provide all kinds of adjunct 
services, such as logistics, insurance, brokerage, accounting and legal services. These 
services  are  clustered in one place to  create  an  agglomeration economy  and  reduce 
transaction costs.  
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At a micro-level, financial firms have been the participants in financial markets as well 
as  service  providers.  A  successful  international  financial  centre  also  hosts  various 
financial firms from across the world.   
Last but not least, human capital is crucial to the success of an international financial 
centre. With the development of information and communications technology, there is 
an  increasing  requirement  for  highly  skilled  professionals  to  interpret  various  data. 
Meanwhile, financial instruments and tools have become increasing complicated and 
require  talented  labour.  Furthermore,  there  is  also  a  high  demand  for  lawyers, 
accountants,  consultants  and  IT  technicians  who  are  able  to  provide  other  ancillary 
services.     
Meta Level: Connectivity to Global Network 
The meta-level is primarily concerned with the linkages to other countries, i.e. free 
capital flow across borders and full currency convertibility (both current account and 
capital account), which is critical in differentiating a domestic financial centre from an 
international  one.  An  open,  fuctional  market  makes  it  possible  for  individuals  and 
corporations  from  home  and  abroad  to  compete  on  an  equal  footing.  The  full 
convertibility of currency allows all investors - foreign and domestic - to convert the 
domestic currency into the currency of their choice. Most developed countries lifted 
their capital controls in the 1980s, such as the United Kingdom and United States.   
Consideration  of  all  these  ingredients  is  necessary  for  a  full  picture  of  an  IFC‘s 
development.  Here  it  is  important  to  note  that  for  late-developing  countries,  these 
factors were not always naturally endowed. Instead, the state might have had to step in 
to deliberately create or improve them. This is the central issue that we want to explore 
in the following chapters.   
3.6 Summary 
This chapter introduces the definition of the IFC and reviews different perspectives of 
IFCs in literature. The work that focused on IFCs has been divided into three sets: the 
economic, the socio-geographical and the financial-growth. The economic perspective  
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mainly  attributes  the  growth  of  IFCs  to  economies  of  scale,  externalities  and 
comparative  advantage  (e.g.  cost  of  land,  capital  and  labour).  Within  the 
socio-geographic literature, attention has been paid to the importance of information 
flows (Porteous, 1995), with emphasis on geographic distance to valuable information 
and  access  to  non-standardised  information.  Another  strand  of  the  socio-geographic 
perspective  is  the  world-city  thesis,  which  explains  the  formation,  spatial  and 
hierarchical distribution of international financial centres and their connection to the 
―world  city  network‖  (Sassen,  2001;  Taylor,  2005).  The  financial-growth  theorists 
provide  two  main  conflicting  viewpoints:  one  sees  the  IFCs‘  development  as  a 
development strategy and the other considers that IFCs‘ development in the developing 
countries is a ―new instrument of imperialist control‖ (Gorostiaga, 1984) imposed by 
advanced capitalist states.     
It  is  argued  that  the  IFCs‘  development  is  a  multi-faceted  matter  and  their  success 
requires a broad set of factors ranging from political stability, macro-economic growth 
(macro-level),  to  urban  and  business  environment  in  a  host  city  (meso-level)  and 
connectivity  to  a  global  network  (meta-level).  However,  in  current  research,  these 
contributory factors are segmented and segregated. The literature survey finds that the 
role of the state in IFCs‘ development has been understated, although it demonstrates 
many elements of IFCs‘ development and competitiveness are directly linked to public 
policies and the role of the state. In the next chapter, I will review different perspectives 
of development theory and try to explain why the state needs to play a more active role 
in IFCs‘ development, particularly in late-developing-countries. 
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4.  The  Role  of  the  State  in  IFCs’ 
Development: An Alternative Approach 
 
I sincerely believe that banking establishments are more dangerous than 
standing armies…   
--- Thomas Jefferson 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, IFCs‘ development is not purely a financial issue 
and should be viewed in a multidimensional way encompassing different  players at 
different levels. Among others, the state is one of the most significant stakeholders in 
the IFCs‘ development. In this chapter, I try to explore the role of the state in IFCs‘ 
development. This chapter is organised as follows. Firstly, I examine the concept and 
intrinsic nature of the state. Next, I discuss different perspectives regarding the role of 
the state in development, from the laissez-faire to various interventionist views. The 
primary purpose of this brief review of literature is to point out areas of agreement and 
disagreement  over  the  role  of  the  state  in  different  theoretical  perspectives  and  to 
identify  the  gaps  in  the  role  of  the  state  in  IFCs‘  development  for  late-developing 
countries.  Finally,  I  set  forth  an  alternative  approach  for  the  IFCs‘  development, 
particularly in late-developing countries.   
4.1 The Definition of the State and its Dual Nature 
The concept of the state is notoriously difficult to define, as Dunleavy and O‘Leary 
(1987, p.1) put it, ―the state is not a material object, but a conceptual abstraction‖. States 
are compulsory associations claiming control over territories and the people within them 
(Skocpol 1985, p.7) . According to Weber (1978, p.54),    
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A compulsory political organization with continuous operations will be called a ―state‖ 
insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order.   
Weber also identifies several primary formal characteristics of the modern state, which 
include:  an  administrative  and  legal  order  subject  to  change  by  legislation  and  the 
administrative staff whose activities have to be oriented by legislation and regulations 
(Weber 1978, p. 56).    Two aspects of this definition are particularly noteworthy. First, 
the Weberian state is a set of institutions with dedicated, meritocratic administrative 
staff (bureaucracy) that strictly follow the legitimate order. Second, Weber regards the 
modern  state  as  a  compulsory  organisation  with  instruments  of  authoritative 
rule-making  and  enforcement  within  a  bounded  territory  and  thus  the  activities  of 
administrative staff inevitably involve coercive force.     
However, in the real world, the bureaucratic machinery defined in the Weberian state 
appears  too  idealistic.  The  complexity  of  the  state  lies  in  the  different  interests  it 
represents and the conflicts among these interests. Rueschemeyer and Evans (1985, p.48) 
point out that the state tends to have four connotations: (i) an expression of pacts of 
domination, which represent a governing class‘ interests, (ii) the ability to act coherently 
as a corporate unit, representing bureaucracy‘s interests; (iii) openness to becoming an 
arena of social conflict; and (iv) the presentation of itself as the guardian of universal 
interests. As O‘Donnell (1979, p.290) puts it,   
Tension between the underlying reality of the state as guarantor and organizer of social 
domination on the one hand, and as agent of a general interest which, though particularized 
and limited… is characteristic of any state.   
From the perspective of institutionalism, the state has a dual nature (Dugger 1989). On 
the one hand, the state is a parasitic institution that drains off public resources for the 
interests of a governing elite and dominates the bulk of the population through force and 
fraud. On the other hand, the state is also a productive institution that creates resources 
for the common good and for peaceful development. It is also one that establishes an 
administrative and legal order for protecting the rights of every citizen. Therefore, the 
state can be both predatory and productive and play a ―grabbing hand‖ as well as a 
―helping  hand‖.  This  means  the  role  of  the  state  should  be  studied  in  its  political,  
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economic, social and historical contexts.   
It is also necessary to distinguish the state from the government. After the Second World 
War, political scientists in the United States tended to relegate the concept of the state 
and focus instead on the government, the political system and political behaviour. It was 
not until the 1980s that academics began once more to revisit the importance of the state 
in any significant way. Theoretically, the state is the collection of administrative, legal, 
and  political  institutions  that  together  monopolise  legitimate  force  and  territorial 
sovereignty within a country‘s borders (Grieco and Ikenberry 2003). Therefore, the state 
is considered as more than the ―government‖. In most circumstances government plays 
the major administrative and bureaucratic role in fulfilling the functions of the state. 
When we consider the role of the state, it definitely entails the role of the government as 
well.   
4.2 The Role of the State in Different Perspectives of Development 
4.2.1 The Laissez-faire Approach and its Critiques   
The laissez-faire approach in development can be traced back to Adam Smith (1776)‘s 
Wealth of Nations in the18th Century, in which he stresses the economic benefits from 
the ―invisible hand‖. In the following two centuries, this basic idea of an unfettered 
market  has  evolved  into  neo-classical  economics,  modernisation  theory  and  recent 
neo-liberalism. All of them insist that markets are efficient per se and competition is 
effective (Todaro and Smith 2011).   
The neo-classical economists are not only sceptical of developmental intervention but 
also show a deep mistrust of all forms of state intervention in all kinds of economic 
activities (Lund 2010). They believe the state is unnecessary, ineffective and generally 
decreases societal welfare. One particular strand of the ―grabbing hand‖ view (Shleifer 
and Vishny 2002) holds that government interventions are predatory pursuits for the 
benefit of politicians and bureaucrats. They argue the state should not interfere with 
economic development unless necessary. The essential state is a minimal state, whose 
function is limited to maintaining law and order. The state should refrain from direct 
intervention and take a back seat as a ―night watchman‖.    
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In  developmental  studies,  the  theory  of  modernisation  (Rostow  1960;  Martinussen 
1997), which espouses neo-classical economics, views developed countries as modern 
and developing countries as traditional. The role of the state is to remove the obstacles 
to  competition  to  enable  free  market  competition.  According  to  Pye  (1966),  the 
development is ―a process whereby the traditional and backward Third World countries 
developed towards  greater similarity  with  the  Western, or rather, the  North-Western 
world‖.  In  the  1950s  and  1960s,  modernisation  theory  was  used  by  some  Western 
scholars to guide development in developing countries.   
Neo-liberalism is defined by neo-classical economic ideas about the nature of markets 
and economic growth (Robison and Hewison 2010).The rise of neoliberalism in the 
1970s and 1980s coincided with the breakdown of the Keynesian welfare state in the 
United States and the United Kingdom. Neoliberalism in essence blames ―everything 
that does not work on the works of the state and credits everything that works to the free 
market‖ (Yeung 2000, p. 138). It argues that both economic efficiency and economic 
growth will be stimulated by ―permitting competitive free market to flourish, privatising 
state-owned  enterprises,  promoting  free  trade  and  export  expansion,  welcoming 
investors from developed countries, and eliminating the government regulations and 
price distortions in financial markets‖ (Todaro and Smith 2011). Neo-liberals argue that 
poor  resource  allocation  and  too  much  state  intervention  prevents  markets  from 
functioning properly and it has hampered growth (Skinner 2007).   
By the 1980s, neoliberalism had become a mainstream social, political and economic 
movement  that  effectively  held  sway  in  most  parts  of  the  world.  International 
organisations such as the World Bank
20  and the IMF were promoting and enforcing 
neoliberal policies throughout the capitalist world, especially in the 1980s (Taylor 1997; 
                                                 
20  It  should  also  be  noted  that  after  global  financial  crisis  2008,  the  World  Bank  (2012)  has 
reconfigured the role of the state in financial development. In the Global Financial Development 
Report 2013, the World Bank provides new insights on the role of the state in financial systems, 
from regulation and supervision of financial institutions and markets, to competition policy, to state 
guarantees and state ownership of banks, and to enchantments in financial infrastructure.  
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Yeung  2000,  p.137).  Thus  it  has  become  a  political  project  that  was  ―primarily 
concerned  to  promote  a  market-led  transition  towards  the  new  economic  regime‖ 
(Jessop 1993, p. 29; Yeung 2000, p.136).For example, the IMF and the World Bank 
conducted a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) through which these international 
financial  institutions  granted  loans  to  developing  countries  but  with  conditions  of 
structural reforms attached, known as ―conditionality‖  (Chant and Mcllwaine 2009). 
These conditions included currency devaluations, reductions in public spending, price 
reforms, trade liberalisation, the reduction and removal of subsidies, privatisation of 
public enterprises and institutional reforms (Potter et al. 1999). In 1989, the economist 
John  Williamson  coined  the  term  ―Washington  Consensus‖
  21  to  describe  ten 
neo-liberal policy instruments he identified as standard in any package to developing 
countries.   
Pursuant to neo-liberal logic, the evolution of international financial centres (e.g. New 
York,  London)  in  Western  advanced  economies  is  generally  an  evolutionary, 
self-sustaining and spontaneous process (Kindleberger 1974; Reszat 1998). For instance, 
Kindleberger (1974) describes the evolution of banking business in his staple theory:   
…banking starts out to serve the needs of sovereigns and nobles; develops in connection 
with  commerce;  then…with  governmental  finance;  next  with  transport…;  then  with 
industry;  and  finally  with  intermediation  in  insurance,  mortgages,  consumer  finance, 
factoring, pension funds, and the like.   
Overall, Kindleberger attributes the formation of financial centre primarily to private 
forces  and  casts  doubt  on  governmental  policy  as  a  catalyst.  He  argues  that 
governmental policy ―can accelerate or slow down‖ the emergence of given city as a 
financial centre but ―it can probably not change the outcome‖ (Kindleberger 1974). He 
asserts  that  private  forces  in  many  cases  will  resist  the  concentration  efforts  by 
government if this does not conform to their profit motives ( ibid. p.70) . 
                                                 
21  The original ten points of the Washington Consensus include: 1. fiscal discipline, 2. Reordering public expenditure 
priorities, 3. Tax reform, 4. Liberalising interest rates, 5. A competitive exchange rate, 6. Trade liberalisation, 7. 
Liberalisation of inward foreign direct investment, 8. Privatisation, 9. Deregulation, 10. Property rights (Williamson 
2004).    
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For neo-liberals, government interference suffocates financial competitiveness through 
tight control and misguided policies. Cassis (2006) maintains state intervention rarely 
determines the destinies of international financial centres in a lasting or fundamental 
way.   
There  are  countless  examples  showing  that  state  interference  harms  financial  markets‘ 
competitiveness,  even  without  take  wars,  when  economic  activities  everywhere  were 
subject  to  far  tighter  control,  or  interventionist  measures,  such  as  credit  control  or 
nationalisations, into account. One only need think of the various measures intended to 
channel or limit international movements of capital: the need for a green light from the 
political authorities to list a foreign security on the Paris and Berlin stock exchanges before 
1914; the embargo on foreign issues in London in the early 1920s; exchange controls in 
post-war Europe; the introduction of the Interest Equalization Tax in the United States in 
1963; measures aimed at curbing the development of Euromark etc in continental Europe 
in the 1960s, and so on. (Cassis 2006, p.284) 
Therefore, neo-liberals argue that state intervention in financial development must be 
reduced to a minimum, except where private interests of financial market participants 
do not align with public interests and for reasons of competitive fairness. Following this 
logic, the development of IFCs in the developing countries is achievable by following 
the processes that were used by developed countries.   
Critiques 
This laissez-faire view has been criticised by a number of commentators. The critics, 
mainly taking the experiences of Japan and the Asian Tigers, have countered that the 
developmental  state  works  for  developing  countries.  Hitherto,  many  developing 
countries lacked market institutions and there was little reason to presume that markets 
would develop on their own. Scholars point out that in almost every one of the East 
Asian cases, the state played a far more active role than that stated in the Washington 
Consensus. In practice, all cases of successful economic development have involved 
state intervention and improvisation of an industrial strategy (Shapiro and Taylor, 1990; 
Wang 2000).   
From a historical perspective, every rising power has relied on the state to kick-start 
growth or at least to protect fragile infant industries. For example, as early as 1791,  
- 72 - 
Alexander Hamilton, America‘s first treasury secretary, called for the protection of the 
country‘s fledgling industries through tariffs. For almost two centuries, US tariffs were 
rarely below 30 percent, and often much higher (Nolan and Wang 1999). Even Great 
Britain, the initiator of free-trade thinking, created a giant national champion in the form 
of  the  East  India  Company  (The  Economist  2012).  In  this  respect,  Alexander 
Gerschenkron, a Russian-born American economic historian, has  made  a significant 
contribution to the analyses of the relationship between development and capital. In his 
view, late-developing countries are characterised by a disconnect between the scale of 
economic  activity  required  for  development  and  the  effective  scope  of  their  private 
economic network (Gerschenkron 1962). The economies of developing countries are 
segregated and their markets do not function optimally. As a consequence, goods prices 
and capital gain are distorted. Furthermore, local entrepreneurs in LDCs are unable to 
accumulate sufficient capital to compete with already-industrialised countries. To figure 
out these problems, the state should directly involve itself in financial markets. He also 
points out that the later the state embarks on a development process, the more cost it 
will incur to satisfy the increasingly minimum efficient scale of production. 
Reinert (1999) concurs that in now-developed countries, national markets did not occur 
spontaneously.  In  effect,  well-functioning  markets  in  now-developed  countries  have 
been  created  by  the  state  since  the  Renaissance  through  the  provision  of  a  legal 
framework, standards, credits, physical infrastructure and the state has even functioned 
temporarily as an entrepreneur of last resort. In particular, Helleiner (1995, p. 319) has 
cited the Euro-dollar market centred in the City of London, which he says was not a 
―stateless‖ market. Rather, its existence rested on state support from the outset. When 
the  United  States  supported  London  in  this  new  Euro-dollar  activity,  the  Bank  of 
England quickly gave its full support through a number of regulatory initiatives, seeing 
it  as  a  way  to  offset  Britain‘s  diminished  political  influence  with  a  more  powerful 
economic role for its capital city.     
A similar argument is put forward by Ha-Joon Chang (2002) in his book - Kicking Away 
the  Ladder.  He  claims  that  now-developed-countries  had  not  exactly  enacted 
laissez-faire policies when they themselves were in the process of development    He 
argues that the developed countries are now attempting to ―kick away the ladder‖ by 
which they have climbed to the summit of greatness, thereby preventing developing  
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countries  from  adopting  policies  and  institutions  that  they  themselves  used.  Britain 
replaced  mercantilism  with  economic  liberalism  after  industrial  revolution  but  it  is 
important to note its willingness to transfer to the free trade model only after it had 
become the most powerful player in the world with no rivals.
 In the case of England, 
Polanyi (1944, p.76) notes: ―the road to the free market was opened and kept open by an 
enormous increase in continuous, centrally organised and controlled interventionism‖.   
A  more  fundamental  criticism  of  neo-liberalism  is  that  it  is  based  on  the  faulty 
assumption that all economic activities are alike. However, developing countries have 
their own historical and cultural backgrounds and this cannot be underestimated and 
dismissed in favour of a uniform model. In his studies of developing countries, Jacobs 
(2003)  found  that  variations  in  national  embeddedness  have  resulted  in  dissimilar 
development outcomes among nation-states. Another difference between developed and 
developing countries lies in the fact that the latter have often suffered problems from 
deficient institutions and unsatisfactory legislative systems. The development of legal 
and regulatory institutions took hundreds of years in the advanced countries of the West 
(Mishkin  2007).  Yet  in  most  developing  countries,  the  institutional  weaknesses  and 
market incompleteness are widespread (see Brett 2009). All of these suggest that the 
extent of state intervention varies from country to country, and the developing countries 
often experience greater direct state intervention in the market than developed countries 
(Wee 2002). Brohman (1995, p.122) also casts doubt on the concept of modernisation 
and expresses discontent over the construction of a single model of modernity based on 
the experience of a few industrial countries. He argues that modernisation theory is ―too 
simplistic and too vague to be taken seriously as comprehensive theory of development‖ 
(p. 125), which ignores much of the richness and diversity of societies that produce 
different trajectories of development.   
In large part, the new institutions created by modernisation have failed to find roots in the 
indigenous social and cultural traditions of Third World societies… (Brohman 1995, p.130)   
In summary, the market fundamentalists overestimate the wisdom of the marketplace. 
On  the  one  hand,  they  ignore  the  fact  that  their  states  did  intervene  when  they 
kick-started their own economic development; on the other, they fail to understand the 
different  social  settings  between  developed  and  developing  countries.  The  financial  
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sectors in late-developing countries is not only confronted by endogenous problems 
such as institutional weakness, market ineffectiveness and brain drain, but also face 
intense  external  competition  from  foreign  counterparts  in  an  increasingly  globalised 
world. In such circumstances, if they were to follow the path suggested by neo-liberals, 
relying only on spontaneous market evolution, it would be doomed to failure. Therefore, 
for IFCs‘ development in developing countries, the laissez-faire approach seems highly 
improbable. 
4.2.2 New Institutional Economics (NIE) and the “North Paradox” 
Institutions and organization are critical to IFCs development because of the support 
they  provide  for  various  services  and  exchange.  The  study  of  institutions  changed 
dramatically  when  Oliver  Williamson  (1975)  set  out  to  investigate  the  firm  as  an 
institution based on the earlier work of Ronald Coase (1937, 1960). A similar pioneering 
work conducted by Douglass North (1981, 1990a) argues it is institutional change that 
laid  the  foundations  for  industrial  revolution.  Along  with  these  seminal  works,  the 
academic arena has seen the emergence of the new institutional economics (NIE) in the 
last quarter of 20
th Century. Since then, institutions have become one of the heated 
topics in social science, including economics and political science (March and Olsen 
1984). The state also became an object of institutional analysis (see Hodgson 2006; 
North 1981).   
NIE casts some lights on the role of the state in IFCs‘ development. It is worth noting 
that NIE does not abandon neoclassical economic theory. While neo-institutionalists 
accept orthodox assumption – the scarcity of resource and competition (Menard and 
Shirley  2008,  p.2),  they  criticised  neo-classical  theory  for  ignoring  the  costs  of 
information, uncertainty and transactions. In particular, neo-institutionalists underline 
the significance of institutional structures such as property rights, rules and regulations, 
the role of the state and even private enterprise. Unlike neo-classical economists, they 
stress that aside from market failure, ―institutional failures‖ are widely existed; thus 
economic,  financial  and  even  urban  development  need  to  be  examined  in  a 
comparative-institutional way (Coase 1960; Williamson 1973). 
One of NIE‘s main inputs to economics has been to understand how institutions emerge,  
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operate  and  change, thereby transforming neoclassical  economics  from a static to  a 
dynamic  theory  (Menard  and  Shirley  2008).  According  to  neo-institutionalists, 
institution is defined as a set of rules, norms and constraints, formal or informal, that 
actors  generally  follow  to  reduce  uncertainty  and  control  their  environment,  and 
organizations as durable entities with formally recognized members, whose rules also 
contribute to support production and exchange and to achieve other objectives
22(North 
1990a, Menard and Shirley 2008).  In his paper  The Problem of Social Cost, Ronald 
Coase  (1960)  points  out  that  ―only  in  the  absence  of  transaction  costs  did  the 
neoclassical paradigm yield the implied results; with positive transaction costs, resource 
allocations are altered by property rights structures‖. North (1990a) contends that the 
expansion  of  market  scale  lead  to  specialisation  and  the  division  of  labour,  which 
created an increase in transaction costs. The increase in transaction cost thus implies 
allocative inefficiency. Increasing returns is among the important forces shaping the 
path  of  institutional  change  and  it  has  a  countervailing  effect  on  the  increase  of 
transaction costs. Therefore, economic institutions adapt according to the new contexts 
of social and economic change and these changes paved the way for technical advances 
in the economic revolution.   
North  (1990a)  mentions  that  institutional  change  evolved  with  the  expansion  of 
financial  markets  and  an  increase  in  capital  flows.  He  suggests  the  institutional 
innovation in the financial sector that lowered transaction costs can occur at three cost 
margins (North, 1990a, p. 125):   
  those that increased the mobility of capital 
  those that lowered information costs 
  those that spread risk 
Within the context of economic globalisation, the enlargement of market scale causes 
rising transaction and funding costs. This requires institutional change and innovation 
and IFCs‘ development in developing countries can be understood as one of the results 
                                                 
22  Note that we refer loosely to the ―institutions‖ to refer to both the organizations and institutions 
related to IFCs development, from time to time, in this thesis.  
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of  such  efforts.  In  this  regard,  to  investigate  IFCs  development  from  neoclassical 
economics to NIE is an attempt to understand the evolution of IFCs in a more dynamic 
way. 
Meanwhile, neo-institutionalists clarify the dual nature of the state in economic and 
social development. In his book, Structure and Change in Economic History, North 
(1981) presents a model of the state as both a contract and a predatory regime. He 
argues that the state has two paradoxical objectives (hereafter labelled as the ―North 
Paradox‖): Firstly, to specify rules and enforcements which will provide a structure of 
property rights for maximising the rents
23  accruing to the ruler; second ly, to reduce 
transaction costs in order to   maximise  output of the soci etal  well-being  and hence 
increase tax revenues accruing to the state.   
To North (1990a, p.51), the ruler is not confined to a single absolute ruler but could be 
the whole ruling group or class that a democratic government represents. In modern 
representative democracy, the ruler  might  also gain rents in exchange for providing 
certain services or  by  enacting  particular rules  for  certain constituent groups.  With 
multiple interest groups, the ownership structure is a result of ongoing tensions between 
the desires of the rulers on the one hand, and the efforts of the parties in the exchange to 
reduce transaction costs on the other. The North Paradox suggests not only is the state 
crucial for economic growth, but it is also the source of ―man-made economic decline‖ 
(North  1981,  p.20).  Moreover,  the  discourse  of  NIE  provides  a  hint  towards 
understanding ownership structure in the financial sector. North‘s model of the state is 
consistent  with  rational  choice  institutionalism,  which  suggests  that  the  state  is  a 
rational actor pursuing the ―logic of interest‖ (see Schmidt 2005; Hall and Taylor 1996).   
                                                 
23  In economics, rent has two meanings. Firstly, it is described in terms of ―excess returns‖ above 
―the resource owner‘s opportunity cost‖ that take place in competitive markets (Tollison 1982). In 
this instance, rent is short-lived, as competition will drive it to market levels. Here rent-seeking is 
equivalent to profit-seeking. Secondly, rent can be contrived artificially through state intervention or 
government regulation of a market, e.g. monopoly rents arising from government control of bank 
charters, returns from patents or copyrights etc. It is our belief that the kind of rent accruing from 
government actions is what is meant in the ―North Paradox‖.  
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It is also notable that state managers devised property ownership structure in their own 
interests, which sometime leads to inefficient property rights (North 1979, 1981). As 
North (1990b, p.360-361) contends, 
Institutions are not necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient; rather they, 
or at least the formal rules, are created to serve the interest of those with bargaining power 
to create new rules. 
However, there are also several limitations. Firstly, North‘s model of the state is based 
on a capitalist state and does not explore the various forms of state ownership in depth. 
North argues that property rights and the ownership structure play a significant role in 
institutional  evolution.  Yet  his  argument  is  developed  through  perpetuating  the 
assumption that private ownership is more efficient than public ownership (North 1981, 
p.21). Besides, the NIE approach has maintained the primacy of the legal and private 
ownership  over  all  other  social,  economic  and  political  factors  in  development 
(Przeworsk 2004; Marois 2012).   
Secondly, despite the fact that rents can be contrived artificially, it does not mean they 
are  always  negative  in  terms  of  societal  welfare. Rents  can sometimes be taken by 
corrupt bureaucrats for self interest (Buchanan et al 1980), but in many cases, they flow 
to  strategic  SOEs  or  innovative  private  firms.  We  should  therefore  differentiate  a 
legitimate function of a state from a common-law crime of bureaucracy such as fraud, 
embezzlement and theft (Pasour 1987). For instance, lobbyists from particular interest 
groups will help create the transfer of public resources to particular sectors. In this 
regard, the justification of the rationale for rents is closely connected to the appropriate 
role of the state. If we assume economic development is one of the defining roles of the 
state,  we  would  be  hard  pressed  to  argue  that  the  government‘s  investment  in 
infrastructure is an entirely negative rent-seeking phenomenon. For example, Hellmann 
et al. (1998) demonstrated that giving rents to financial intermediaries and production 
firms has promoted financial deepening, particularly in a number of high-performing 
East  Asian  Countries  (see  section  4.3.1).  However,  North  (1981,  1990a)  fails  to 
elaborate the differences between these two rents.  
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4.2.3 The Developmental-state View Versus the Market-enhancing View 
Since the 1980s, with the rise of the newly industrialised economies in East Asia, a 
number  of  economists  have  put  forward  a  new  approach  -  the  developmental  state 
theory    to explain why they have been able to catch up the developed economies (see 
Johnson  1982;  Wade  1990;  Amsden  1989).  The  developmental-state  view  regards 
market failures to be more pervasive in developing economies (for example, due to the 
lack  of  liquid  capital  markets)  and  thus  looks  to  state  intervention  as  an  important 
substitute for market coordination. According to Amsden (1989, p.143), the allocation 
of subsidies is one of the features of state intervention. The incentive enables the state to 
entice a set of entrepreneurial groups to undergo industrial transformation. This has not 
only  rendered  the  government  a  banker,  but  an  entrepreneur.  Hence,  the  state  and 
nascent  industrial  groups  are  conceived  to  be  in  a  symbiotic  relationship.  Unlike 
structuralists who downplayed the key role of markets in the industrialisation process, 
the East Asia developmental state view emphasises the ―synergy‖ between the state and 
the  market  (Onis  1991).  In  his  work,  Wade  (1990)  demonstrates  the  advantages  of 
bank-based, interest-rate-controlled financial systems in East Asia countries. He argues 
that Taiwan‘s industrial success lay in the ―governed market‖, a series of policies that 
―enabled the government to guide – or govern – market processes of resource allocation 
so  as  to  produce  different  production  and  investment  outcomes  than  would  have 
occurred  with  either  free  market  or  simulated  free  market  policies‖  (pp.  26-27)  . 
Nevertheless, he also points out that state intervention will set off complex relationships 
among  the  state,  private  sector  businesses  and  the  banking  sector,  resulting  in  low 
efficiency and malpractice in the financial sector. 
As  opposed  to  the  neoliberal‘s  discourse  of  the  ―grabbing  hand‖,  the  role  of  the 
developmental state has been called the ―helping hand‖. From the perspective of the 
developmental state, the appropriate question for the role of the state is not ―how much‖ 
but ―what kind‖ (Evans 1995, p.10) . In other words, the crucial role of the state is not 
fading away, but it needs to be redefined. Peter Evans identifies four particular roles that 
provide the underlying structural basis for successful state involvement in industrial 
transformation  (Table  4.1).  The  first  two  -  ―custodian‖  and  ―demiurge‖  -  can  be 
construed as variations on the tradition roles of regulator and producer. The second pair,  
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which he calls ―midwifery‖ and ―husbandry‖, focuses more on the relation between 
bureaucracy and the private sector. Midwifery refers to inducing private sectors to enter 
areas that they are not willing to enter. Husbandry means providing the support and 
stimulation to private sectors when they are already in situ.   
Table 4.1: Roles of the state in industrial transformation   
Roles of the State  Functions 
Custodian(regulator)  Prevent private sector from doing anything illegal, as protection 
and policing 
Demiurge(producer)  Replacing/competing with private sectors, such as SOEs 
Midwifery  Inducing  private  sectors  to  enter  the  areas  that  they  are  not 
willing to enter 
Husbandry  Provide  support  and  prodding  to  private  sectors  when  they 
already in situ 
Source: Author adapted from Peter Evans (1995) 
How can state-led development not be captured by a few interest groups? Peter Evans‘ 
discourse  of  embedded  autonomy  illustrates  a  delicately  balanced  combination  of 
capable meritocratic bureaucracies and industrialising elites. He argues that an insulated, 
meritocratic bureaucracy keeps developmental states from degenerating into predatory 
states. For him, the autonomy of the state requires the insulation of the bureaucracy 
from  private  economic  interests.  However,  insulation  does  not  mean  isolation. 
Bureaucrats  need  to  have  a  close  relationship  with  business  but  they  also  have  to 
formulate  and  implement  policies  autonomously.  The  success  of  industrialisation  in 
these countries is associated with the close relationship between the bureaucrats and 
private  industrial  elites.  Through  frequent  contact  and  information  exchange,  the 
bureaucrats  are  able  to  understand  the  needs  of  private  entrepreneurs  and  thus  to 
formulate and implement more effective industrial policies. One of the confusions of 
embedded autonomy is how to achieve it in any particular developing country. In his 
work, Evans (1995) mentions the role of SOEs in supporting industrial transformation 
when private capital is inadequate. However, he does not delve into the significance of 
state-owned banks and other financial institutions.  
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The  market-enhancing  view  is  the  new  emerging  variant  on  the  state  as  an 
interventionist for development. It was primarily developed by Aoki et al. (1998), who 
suggest the state uses policies to facilitate or complement private-sector coordination. 
Unlike the developmental state view, the market-enhancing view suggests the role of the 
state is  not  to be a substitute for but  facilitator for private-sector coordination.  The 
importance of the market-enhancing view is made clear firstly by recognising the ability 
of the private sector to coordinate a large fraction of economic activity, while at the 
same  time  recognising  the  potential  for  the  state  to  facilitate  the  development  of 
private-sector  institutions.  Thus  the  state  and  the  private  sector  are  not  rivals  in 
competing for control over economic activity. In this view public policy is not aimed at 
introducing  a  substitute  mechanism  for  resolving  market  failures,  but  rather  at 
increasing the capabilities of private-sector institutions to do so. Although this view has 
been criticised for lacking clear operational guidelines, it should be noted that a more 
nuanced approach to development policies may be necessary to fit individual country 
specifics (de la Torre et al 2007). 
Table 4.2: Roles of the state in different perspectives of development theories 






State‘s position  An exogenous 
player 
An endogenous 
player (part of 
market system)   
An exogenous player 
Neutrality of 
the state 
Neutral  Not neutral  Neutral 




Market system is 
the best mechanism 
to solve 
coordination 





State can solve the 
coordination problem 
and overcome market 
failure 





Not a substitute, but 
facilitates, 
complements and 
enhances the private 
sector. 
Synergy of market and 
state, links between 
public and private sector, 
embedded autonomy 
Source: Author compiled from Aoki et al (1998)  
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The differences between the developmental state view and the market-enhancing view 
are at least threefold. Firstly, the former considers the state as a neutral, omnipotent 
agent  exogenously  attached  to  the  economic  system  with  a  mission  to  resolve  its 
coordination failures. The latter views the state as an integral part of the market system, 
i.e.  an  endogenous  player.  Secondly,  unlike  the  developmental  state  view,  which 
considers the state to have better information and judgment than the private sector, the 
market-enhancing  view  recognises  that  private-sector  institutions  have  important 
comparative  advantages  vis-à -vis  the  state,  in  particular  the  ability  to  provide 
appropriate incentives and to access local information. Thirdly, the developmental state 
view highlights the direct intervention of government departments, such as a ministry of 
commerce.  The  market-enhancing  view  postulates  that  the  role  of  the  state  is  to 
facilitate the development of private-sector institutions (Aoki et al 1998). The private 
sector is the engine of growth while the public sector plays the role of a facilitator of 
development and ensures that the socio-economic objectives of the nation are achieved 
(Wee 2002). Table 4.2 lists the role of the state in different perspectives of development 
theories.   
In  general,  the  role  of  the  state  has  oscillated  between  laissez-faire  and  state 
interventionist  in  development  theories  (Brett  2009).  At  one  end  of  the  scale,  state 
interventionism  calls  for  large-scale  state  interventions  to  solve  problems  of  market 
failure; at the other end, neoliberalism calls for the unfettering of the market, with the 
invisible hand spontaneously leading to growth and prosperity.   
These differences can be understood by variations in the structures of different states. 
According  to  Evans  (1995),  states  vary  dramatically  in  their  internal  structures  and 
relationships to society. Different kinds of state structure create different capacities for 
action, which has a direct impact on the range of roles of the state. As Brett (2009) put it, 
the  outcome  of  interventionist  or  neo-liberal  policies  depend  on  contextual 
circumstances and produce changes in the social, economic and political capital in each 
country that will determine the success or failure of policies. 
While  developed  countries  have  ―kicked  away  the  ladder‖  (Chang  2002), 
late-developing countries need to put the ladder back up. Considering that the financial 
industries in developing countries are lagging far behind those in Western industrial  
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countries, it is critical that the state plays an active role in the promotion of growth and 
transformation. It is also notable that the literature on development studies is primarily 
concerned with the industrialisation and structural reform in developing countries. They 
are either general propositions or confined to manufacturing industries. After all, we 
should  acknowledge  that  there  are  stark  differences  between  the  financial  and 
manufacturing industries. 
The Speciality of Financial Sector 
First of all, the financial sector not only creates high-valued output by itself, but also 
provides capital and financial services to support other industries, e.g. manufacturing 
industry.  In  any  economy,  almost  all  individuals,  enterprises  and  governments  need 
finance and the ubiquity of finance places it in a central role in the allocation of scarce 
resources (Lawrence 2001). In one sense, the financial industry is connected with every 
aspect of social and economic activity.   
In addition, the financial sector requires different endowments to develop. In contrast to 
manufacturing  industry,  which  is  often  dependent  on  hard  infrastructure  (e.g.  raw 
materials, energy and equipment facilities), the financial industry is more concerned 
with soft infrastructure (e.g. regulation, culture, urban amenities) and human capital. 
Therefore,  the  role  of  the  state  in  improving  the  quality  of  immigration,  tertiary 
education, entertainment facilities and global linkage should be examined.   
Furthermore, financial services are more mobile than manufacturing activities in terms 
of technologies and business characteristics. This implies that the financial sector is 
more volatile, risky and difficult to manage, particularly for late-developing countries, 
where all of the important institutions are underdeveloped. According to Shin (2005, 
p.382),   
The possibility that large amounts of money can move across borders at a touch of button is 
threatening the management of national economies. Therefore, financial industry, in many 
developing countries remained principally as a domestic industry under heavy government 
regulation.   
After  considering  the  differences  between  financial  and  manufacturing  industries,  it  
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turns out that the current literature on the role of the state is insufficient to explain the 
IFCs‘ development in late-developing countries. Given that IFCs‘ development is a very 
complicated,  multi-faceted  subject,  there  is  a  need  for  an  alternative  interventionist 
approach to explain the role of the state. 
4.3 Conceptualizing Financial Statism Approach 
4.3.1 Conceptual Model 
Financial  statism  mainly  draws  on  certain  insights  from  the  recently  emerging 
market-enhancing approach
24  (Aoki et al. 1998; Hellmann et al. 1998; de la Torre et al. 
2007).  It encompasses  a broad set of policies and measures deliberately applied by 
central  and local governments to govern the market at  various  stages  of  an  IFC‘s 
development. The key components of financial statism policies are: 
  The state‘s ownership within the financial system, e.g. state banks 
  Financial  restraint  policies,  including  interest  rate  controls,  restricting 
competition in the financial markets etc (Hellmann et al., 1998) 
  State control over capital mobility across borders 
It is also notable that financial statism approach points to large, fast-growing emerging 
economies rather than entrepot ones (e.g. Dubai and Singapore). Figure 4.1 describes a 
conceptual model of financial statism and its mechanisms in the development of IFCs in 
late-developing countries. This model has the following three defining features: 
1.  Financial  statism  is  a  market-enhancing  approach.  While  this  thesis  is 
conceptually grounded in the recently articulated market-enhancing perspective 
(Aoki et al. 1998; Hellmann et al. 1998), there is an analytical focus on a broad 
set of interventionist policies and measures applied by state or city managers to 
promote  IFCs  at  an  early  stage  of  development.  Financial  statism  approach 
acknowledges  the  primacy  of  market  forces  at  their  economic  best  but  also 
                                                 
24  The market-enhancing view is also referred to as ―Pro-market activism‖ (de la Torre et al 2007)  
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recognises  the  institutional  weaknesses  and  market  deficiencies  in 
late-developing countries. Therefore, it contends that well-designed direct state 
intervention might be necessary to facilitate the formation of market institutions 
at an early stage of IFC development, e.g. state-ownership in commercial banks, 
contingent rents
25  or capital controls. In this way, the state managers  employ 
financial statism policies to accelerate structural reform s; to support physical 
infrastructure development; and to facilitate the fostering of market institutions 
that lay the necessary foundations for long-term IFC development. 
2.  Financial statism is often a sub-optimal approach. In the real world, the state 
managers need to strike a balance among the different policy objectives of social 
stability, political sovereignty and economic efficiency. Due to the institutional 
weakness  and  market  deficiencies,  socially  efficient  does  not  in  most  cases 
equate to Pareto Optimal (see Barth et al 2006). When these objectives conflict, 
state managers often choose well-designed direct intervention as a suboptimal 
approach and prioritise social stability and political sovereignty over economic 
efficiency. To put it another way, financial statism is not always an economically 
efficient approach. 
3.  Financial statism is a dynamic approach. Its policy design differs from previous 
counterparts (e.g. developmental-state view) with regard to sustainability, time 
limits, governance and mechanics. Furthermore, it is more open and transparent. 
It  emphasises  that  the  approach  that  determines  the  evolution  of  IFCs‘ 
development  is  shaped  by  constraints  derived  from  the  past  and  the 
consequences  of  innumerable  incremental  choices  of  state  authorities,  which 
continually modify those constraints. This will be discussed further in Chapter 9. 
   
                                                 
25  Aoki et al. (1998) introduced the concept of ―contingent rents‖, which are different from direct 
state  subsidies  since  they  are  not  fixed.  Rather,  they  are  performance-based,  often  through 
productivity-enhancing contests.  
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Figure 4.1: The conceptual model of financial statism in IFCs development for LDCs 
 
Source: Author 
State-ownership in Financial System
26 
The naive belief that all that is required for developing countries to boost their financial 
sectors is to change ownership structures is specious. According to Farazmand (1999), 
the pervasive wave of privatisation in developing countries under neoliberalism is not 
considered economic policy but rather a ―global ideological strategy of capitalism‖. He 
                                                 
26  The main focus of this paper is on state-owned banks rather than nonbank financial institutions. 
The  choice  to  focus  primarily  on  state  banks  is  driven  by  the  dominance  of  banking  sector  in 
developing world and greater availability of data on banking rather than nonbanking institutions.  
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points  out  that  one  of  the  probable  consequences  of  privatisation  for  developing 
countries  would  be  the  erosion  of  national  territorial  sovereignty  and  the  total 
dependence on foreign capital. This would reduce the capacity of their leaders to make 
independent  policy  decisions,  bringing  the  consequent  risks  of  further  eroding 
competitiveness in the world economy (Farazmand 1999, p.555). 
Nolan  and  Wang  (1999)  argue  that  privatisation  in  many  cases  has  caused  more 
problems than it has solved. In Eastern Europe and Latin America, bank privatisation 
gave  rise  to  government  bailouts  or  outright  re-nationalisation,  which  were  then 
followed  by  another  round  of  privatisation  (Feldstein  2003;  Ocampo  2001).  For 
late-developing-countries, privatisation has become a major setback for states in guiding 
their  economies  and  destroyed  the  indigenous  basis  of  their  economic  systems 
(Farazmand 1999, p.564). Andrianova et al. (2008) also provide a theoretical model as 
well as empirical evidence that show privatising state-owned banks when institutional 
quality is at relatively low levels is at best unnecessary and at worst detrimental.   
Some might argue that state-owned financial institutions (SFIs) do not have any direct 
links  to  the  IFC,  since  an  IFC  hosts  various  banks,  securities  firms,  insurances 
companies, etc. regardless of their ownership. In Singapore and Hong Kong, we can see 
a large number of banks and financial firms – whether state-owned or privately-owned - 
carrying  out  business  that  has  little  impact  on  the  status  of  these  two  cities  as 
international financial centres. However, this is not the case for a developing country 
where financial markets are underdeveloped. 
At certain stage, state banks could be an effective substitute for weak institutions. First 
of  all,  state  banks  could  play  an  active  role  in  development  intervention,  i.e.  with 
targeted  efforts  to  catch-up with  advanced economies  in  strategic industries.  Marois 
(2013)  argues  that  state  banks  could  facilitate  the  mobilization  of  savings  and  the 
allocation of those savings toward strategic sectors with long-term beneficial effects on 
an  economy.  In  addition,  state  banks  may  also  enjoy  an  advantage  over  private 
counterparts in terms of coordinating externality-rich activities because a private bank 
might not identify or internalize the benefits (see Barth et al 2006, p.207).   
These  justifications  are  coupled  with  arguments  that  state-ownership  facilitates  
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economic sovereignty and planned development. For late-developing countries, state 
ownership in  financial system is  a necessary counterweight to  foreign ownership to 
maintain  economic  sovereignty.  It  could  also  allow  the  state  to  obtain  valuable 
information on the financial industry and a way for direct government participation via 
state-owned financial institutions. In these ways, the state control of financial ownership 
can have a significant impact on macro-economic conditions of a host country, and thus 
the progress of IFCs‘ development in late-developing countries.   
State banks could also do a better job in improving the infrastructure necessary for 
financial  development,  facilitating  the  agglomeration  of  financial  institutions  and 
maximizing social justice. Moreover, the recent global financial crisis underscored the 
countercyclical role of the state banks in countervailing the credit crunch from private 
banks (World Bank 2012). 
Although state-owned financial institutions have many merits for LDCs particularly at 
the early stage of development, widespread evidence in practice shows that they have 
generally been very inefficient in allocating credit (World Bank 2012). Among other 
things, special attention should be paid to reforming the governance of SFIs to ensure 
that adequate risk management processes are in place.   
Financial Restraint Policies 
In the framework of financial statism, I borrow ―financial restraint‖ from Hellmann et al. 
(1998) to specify a set of interventionist policies over financial markets to promote IFCs‘ 
development.  According  to  Hellmann  et  al.,  financial  restraint  can  provide  some 
incentives  for  financial  deepening  through  state  intervention  in  most  developing 
countries, or those in transition, where fully functioning financial institutions are either 
nonexistent or in their infancy. These policies include deposit rate controls, restricting 
competition in the financial markets and adopting policies to curb asset substitutability. 
By using these financial policies, the state aims to create ―rent opportunities‖, which 
may  provide  incentives  for  banks  to  monitor  private  firms  and  promote  economic 
development. This is particularly important, as these ―rent opportunities‖ are contingent 
on the performance of financial intermediaries.    
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Financial restraint provides incentives for financial deepening in the following ways: 
Firstly, financial restraint  can reduce costs,  allowing  banks  to  absorb  more savings. 
Capital  inadequacy  can  undermine  the  franchise  value  of  banks  and  entices  moral 
hazard among banking managers. Moreover, dearth of capital can greatly jeopardise the 
functions  of  financial  systems  as  drivers  of  economic  growth.  Financial  restraint 
policies are able to bring down the costs of deposit absorption and provide banks with 
more capital and profits. The increased cash-flow can thus help to accumulate capital 
and edge up its franchise value.   
Secondly, financial restraint can foster a system dominated by financial intermediaries. 
It is noteworthy that financial restraint co-exists with limited market competition. Under 
financial restraint, banks can acquire more rents provided that they obtain more deposits, 
provide more loans and open more branches and subsidiaries. Meanwhile, the state also 
establishes barriers to entry to help those early entrants enjoy temporary monopolistic 
power to gain rents to offset start-up costs. This could increase capital efficiency and 
develop  a  virtuous  circle  between  households  and  banks.  However,  if  market 
competition  is  too  intense,  the  ―contingent  rents‖  obtained  by  the  banks  would  be 
diminished  and  incentives  to  expand  their  business  would  also  be  weakened.  For 
example, a foreign Bank A is introduced into a certain area with the potential to be an 
IFC.    Bank A has to invest in office space, training staff, cultivating new clients etc. If 
other similar banks B, C, D, and E were also permitted to enter this market within a 
short period, Bank A would lose incentives because its franchise value would not cover 
its costs. Andersen & Tarp (2003) advocated the adoption of a more cautious approach 
to financial sector reform. They believe increased competition in the banking sector 
after  financial  liberalisation  is  likely  to  erode  franchise  values,  which  may  in  turn 
generate an unstable banking environment. These problems can be aggravated before 
appropriate regulation to curb bad banking behaviour has been established. 
Moreover,  in  the  early  stage  of  financial  development,  restricting  bond  and  stock 
markets might prove to be an efficient policy, especially when a banking system is still 
at an early stage of development. During this time, the stock market will compete with 
the banking sector for deposits, which will deprive it of some of its more profitable 
potential business and cause the loss of franchise values and rents for banks. Augier & 
Soedarmono  (2010)  suggest  that  developing  countries  should  develop  financial  
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intermediation (e.g. a bank-based financial system) before developing a market-based 
financial system, because a bank-based financial system is less costly than a financial 
market-based system. In short, the role of the state should focus on the framework of 
broad macroeconomic policies as well as active intervention in nurturing mechanisms 
that enable the funnelling of savings into high value-added industries. Policy objectives 
such as IFCs‘ development could be effectively implemented because a central state 
administration controls credit and could intervene in industrial sectors (see Chapter 6).   
Capital Control   
One of famous theoretical approaches to explain capital control is the Mundell-Fleming 
paradigm (Mundell 1962, 1963, 1964; Fleming 1962). It basically argues that three key 
policy objectives cannot be achieved simultaneously:  exchange rate stability, private 
capital mobility and domestic monetary independence. As a result, many developing 
countries  seeking  to  develop  international  financial  centres  still  exercise  stringent 
controls  on  capital  mobility  and  currency  convertibility  so  as  to  maintain  monetary 
sovereignty and economic stability. These courses of action seemingly conflict with the 
neo-liberal  model of  IFCs,  which advocates deregulation,  liberalisation and the free 
flow of capital across borders. In effect, capital and the state do have conflicting goals 
that cannot be achieved simultaneously (Block 1994, quoted in Yeung 2000, p.139). The 
lifting of capital controls and full convertibility of currency should not be based on 
ideological commitment to an idealised conception of markets. 
For late-developing countries, capital-account convertibility can incur massive risks. A 
hasty opening up of the capital account and overdependence on private capital inflows 
imposes  a  number  of  constraints  on  the  autonomy  of  developing  countries  in  the 
conduct  of  macroeconomic  policies  (UNCTAD  2012).  When  the  prospects  for  a 
domestic economy are positive, the influx of hot money will give rise to an economic 
bubble.  Conversely,  when  the  economic  situation  is  poor,  speculative  money  will 
decamp and cause problems for the international balance of payments, particularly in 
large, fast-growing emerging economies. Since the 1980s, the developed world has put 
considerable pressure on developing economies to open up their financial markets to 
foreign  competition.  Financial  liberalisation  usually  leads  to  ―speculation-led 
development‖  which  in  turn  almost  invariably  ends  in  currency  and  banking  crises  
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(Chang  and  Grabel  2014).  Developing  countries  should  thus  be  wary  of  financial 
liberalisation when its institutions are underdeveloped. The financial system has the 
capability  of  self-adjustment,  but  it  has  its  limitations.  Unrestricted  currency 
convertibility creates the potential for currency depreciation and collapse, capital flight 
and  financial  instability.  Conversely,  restriction  of  convertibility  ameliorates  the 
problems  (Chang  and  Grabel  2014).  When  external  forces  are  exceeding  their 
limitations,  the  financial  system  will  be  ruined.  Instead,  state  control  over  capital 
mobility can often consolidate state capacity, build up financial markets and institutions 
gradually and eventually sharpen the competitive advantage of domestic players in the 
global market. 
Meanwhile,  developing  countries  should  be  beware  of  the  assertion  that  efficient 
financial intermediaries automatically lead to the rise in societal welfare after capital 
liberalisation.  Alessandria  and  Qian  (2005)  use  a  model  of  endogenous  financial 
intermediation and demonstrate that a welfare loss may occur in an open economy when 
a country accesses global capital markets at high interest rates. It is argued that the entry 
of foreign institutions has mixed results. The foreign capital may help to raise welfare 
through  low  interest  rates  and  the  introduction  of  increased  competition  but 
simultaneously it could also generate more risky behaviour through lower lending rates, 
which will lessen welfare. Furthermore, the presence of foreign banks may decrease the 
government‘s control of the economy. Weiss (1999, p. 127) observes the tensions of 
openness:   
On the one hand, countries are often told they must open up to the world for fear of being 
left behind. On the other, opponents of openness urge putting up the shutters -- re-imposing 
capital controls and trade protection -- for fear of letting in a socially and economically 
destructive virus.   
Therefore,  different  countries,  in  different  situations,  should  balance  these 
considerations differently (see Stiglitz et al 1993). Only when a financial market is deep 
enough can the LDCs resist the impact of volatile capital flows. As a matter of fact, 
most  of  the  world‘s  industrialised  countries  did  not  maintain  unrestricted  currency 
convertibility until their economies were strong and stable and hence could withstand 
the pressures of currency volatility. Therefore, in the early stage of transition, when  
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deposit  mobilisation  is  essential  to  economic  transition,  imposing  restrictions  on 
speculation  and  capital  mobility  is  a  sensible  option.  This  is  the  reason  why 
capital-account  convertibility  is  viable  in  Western,  mature  economies,  while  it 
jeopardises financial stability in emerging economies. 
4.3.2 Motives and Benefits   
In this section I try to illustrate why financial statism might be helpful for developing 
countries  in  facilitating  IFCs‘  development.  To  understand  financial  statism  as  an 
approach in IFCs‘ development, the underlying characteristics of a financial sector in 
late-developing-countries need to be taken into consideration. Herein I would argue that 
the  financial  sector  in  late-developing  countries  has  its  idiosyncrasies,  notably 
institutional weaknesses, market incompleteness (i.e. threshold effects), vulnerability to 
crises and lacking of expertise.   
Firstly, financial development in developing countries is characterised by lack of proper 
market  institutions.  Financial  markets  cannot  exist  without  effective  legal, 
administrative, regulatory and other institutions. These variegated institutions provide 
the  certainty  and  predictability  necessary  for  facilitating  efficient  financial 
intermediation. von Mettenheim (2009, p.120) argues that there are stark differences 
between developing and advanced economies with respect to the maturity of markets 
and  institutions.  Developing  countries  usually  suffer  from  institutional  weaknesses, 
market imperfections and volatility due to lack of well-established institutions and a 
mature private sector necessary for the effective running of a market economy (Wee 
2002; HPEC 2007). Those neo-liberals who claim the market is everything ignore the 
background highlighted by the literature on developing countries: many, if not all of 
them, lack sound institutions for financial development. For those developing countries 
in transition, market mechanisms are all the more deficient because of central-planning 
economic traditions. Conversely, advanced economies have longstanding consolidated 
institutions and deeply embedded and effective markets. Mishkin (2006) writes,   
Good institutions, however, need to be home grown…The development of good institution 
in  the  advanced  countries  took  hundreds  of  years  as  they  grew  and  adapted  to  local 
conditions. Poor countries must ultimately develop their own institutions, and the citizens  
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of these nations must feel they have ownership of those institutions or else the institutions 
will be ineffective and short-lived (2006, p.13). 
The  mainstream  laissez-faire  approaches  such  as  neo-liberalism  fail  in  developing 
countries owing to institutional failure. When a market system is not established and the 
private sector is still not competitive at world stage, the privatisation of a financial 
sector  poses  great  risks,  jeopardising  the  stability  of  the  society  and  its  economic 
development. Developing countries with weak institutions would lapse into a ―financial 
globalisation  trap‖  if  they  inappropriately  promoted  capital  account  openness  and 
mobility (Cassimon et al 2012, p.75). In a situation in which there are many deficiencies 
to prevent the fulfilment of market mechanisms, financial statism may help to deal with 
institutional weaknesses, lessening the risks of the financial industry in a globalised 
world.  Djankov  et  al.  (2003) have  claimed that  a fundamental  issue of institutional 
design  is  to  reach  a  trade-off  between  a  controlling  dictatorship  and  disorder.  The 
general point is that financial liberalisation should be considered in light of its own 
institutional possibilities, rather than as some dogmatic views of a few rich capitalist 
countries. 
The  second  issue  of  financial  sector  in  developing  countries  is  that  the  financial 
development  is  often  thwarted  by  the  threshold  effect,  which  is  instrumental  to  the 
finance-growth nexus. Recent findings in academia establish that any level of financial 
development can produce a threshold effect (Augier and Soedarmono, 2010). Financial 
development  cannot  support  economic  growth  unless  its  initial  stage  exceeds  this 
threshold value. Consequently, if income levels are lower than the threshold value it 
means people cannot afford financial services and financial intermediaries and markets 
will not emerge. The threshold effect suggests a nexus between market formation and 
economic development. 
Greenwood and Smith (1997) highlight that market formation is endogenous, which 
suggests  it  must  follow  some  period  of  real  development.  Markets  open  when  an 
economy is wealthy enough to support them. Meanwhile, there are important fixed costs 
associated with opening and operating markets (Greenwood and Smith 1997, p.149). 
The  formation  and  growth  of  financial  markets  are  not  free  of  cost.  Investment  in 
institutions and infrastructures is also costly. For this reason, those who want to use  
- 93 - 
specialist and sophisticated financial services have to pay a portion of fixed cost (i.e. 
―threshold value‖).  If capital stock is not large enough to meet the threshold value, 
financial institutions will not emerge. 
There is some evidence of various kinds of ―threshold effect‖. For instance, it is stated 
that  the  glaring  deficiencies  in  Mumbai‘s  urban  infrastructure  have  impeded  IFCs 
development (HPEC 2007). As the report describes, Mumbai‘s deficiencies include: 
[C]rumbling  housing  in  dilapidated  buildings  pervading  the  city;  poor  road/rail  mass 
transit … poor quality of airports, airlines and air-linked connections domestically and 
internationally; poor provision of power, water, sewerage, waste disposal, as well as a 
paucity of high-quality residential, commercial, shopping and recreational space that meets 
global standards of construction, finish and maintenance (HPEC 2007, p.xxi). 
Financial  statism  provides  a  useful  approach  to  overcoming  the  threshold  effect, 
particularly for developing countries. For example, the state (either central or local) 
could  make  a  lump-sum  payment  to  upgrade  infrastructure  and  create  financial 
institutions and markets in one fell swoop. Financial statism would allow the LDCs to 
accumulate physical and human capital more rapidly. In other words, financial markets 
could emerge before the income level reaches the threshold value. As such, the financial 
sectors  in  developing  countries  should  thrash  out  a  way  either  to  reduce  certain 
thresholds or resort to raising capital elsewhere to spur economic growth. This can take 
place when the ownership of major financial institutions is dominated by the state.   
The  third  point  that  justifies  financial  statism  is  that  LDCs  are  more  vulnerable  to 
economic crisis and financial shocks. The financial sector is a strategic industry which 
is closely associated with national interests. Taking the banking sector as an example, it 
attracts  deposits  from  households  and  corporations.  However,  the  homogeneity  of 
banking business is vulnerable to the chain effect of a run on banks spreading from one 
individual bank to others (World Bank 2012). Bank A‘s problem can quickly become 
that  of  Bank  B  and  Bank  C.  Financial  meltdown  can  propagate  very  quickly  in 
developing countries if confidence is lost in these privately held banks. When a large 
number of such banks suffer runs at the same time, a financial crisis will occur with 
potentially devastating consequences for the national - or even the greater regional – 
economy.  In  such  cases,  state  banks  are  effective  in  bolstering  confidence  for  the  
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depositors as the government is the last resort and credit guarantor, especially when 
effective  market  institutions  (e.g.  deposit  insurance  system)  are  not  established  in 
late-developing countries.   
Moreover, the risks and uncertainty in an economy arise due to the volatility of financial 
markets. In the new context of economic globalisation, the developing countries with 
deficient and underdeveloped financial systems are deeply vulnerable to international 
money speculators (Chang et al 1998). The Asian financial crisis in 1997, for example, 
was caused by hedge funds whose strategy was to attack loopholes within the financial 
and economic system in developing countries. Since the 1990s, developing countries 
have frequently suffered huge losses in these attacks, such as Mexico in 1994, Russia in 
1998, Brazil in 1999 etc. Nevertheless, developing countries would be able to set a 
firewall to guard against these attacks through financial statism so as to maintain the 
stability of their domestic economies. China was unscathed in the Asian financial crisis 
in 1997, which is largely attributable to its capital control regime (see section 6.2.3). 
Financial statism could also play an active role in maintaining economic stability in the 
downturn of a business cycle. When a country‘s economy is on the way to recession or 
depression, or affected by unusual incidents, private capital or foreign capital will lose 
the incentive to stay as it battles with pessimistic expectations on returns or declines in 
investment capability. By the time this happened, financial statism would be able to 
maintain  economic  stability  and  kick-start  private  capital  investment.  Following 
economic revival or a return to prosperity, the private sector would boom and foreign 
capital would flood back in; denationalisation could occur and the state sector could 
then exit. Von  Mettenheim (2009, p.131) suggests that state banks  were the critical 
agents in the provision of counter-cyclical credit to help Brazil get out of its economic 
slump in 1999-2000. During global financial crisis, the state banks are also able to lend 
counter-cyclically to offset the credit contraction from private banks (World Bank 2012; 
Marois 2013).   
Therefore, to maintain  macroeconomic stability and social welfare, a strong state is 
fundamental  to  efficient  intervention.  In  his  book  -  State-building:  governance  and 
world order in the 21st century, Francis Fukuyama (2004) states that the root cause of 
many serious problems in the contemporary world is a weak or failed state. He thus  
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calls for a re-engineering of the concept of state-building. Wang (1991) defines state 
capacity as an indicator to measure the effectiveness of state intervention. In practice, 
the concept has interpreted as the capability of the state to mobilize and guide social and 
economic resources toward the ends identified by the political leaders. Financial statism 
suggests that plentiful financial resources in the hands of the state are one of the key 
ingredients of state capacity.   
Last but not least, it is worth noting that IFCs development in developing countries is 
confronted with intense competition not only from advanced economies, but also among 
emerging  economies  (e.g.  Jarvis  2011;  Young  et  al  2009;  Lannoo  2007).  Financial 
statism would allow late-developing countries to learn from the rest of the world. Chang 
(2006)  uses the  Gerschenkronian  ―catching-up‖ framework in  exploring institutional 
development  in  the  developing  countries.  In  his  view,  they  could  emulate  similar 
institutional models from the developed countries without incurring the same set-up 
costs.    This coincides with the ―advantage of backwardness‖, suggested by Lin (2004)
 
27. In essence, developing IFCs in developing countries is a ―catch-up‖ process. The 
phenomenon of ―catch-up‖ should be understood as a process in which the state plays a 
strategic role in taming domestic and international market forces and harnessing them to 
national ends (Onis, 1991 p.110). 
It is acknowledged that the development of IFCs in late-developing countries should 
learn from advanced countries in terms of advanced technology and management skills. 
During  this  process,  financial  statism  would  enable  state  investment  in  the  cost  of 
learning that is too expensive for the private sectors to withstand.  Financial statism 
would thus be able to develop some ―national champions‖ through various adaption, 
imitation and trial-and-error behaviour. Apart from this, financial statism could also help 
to develop a modern financial market and introduce effective financial services and a 
management structure. It is also worth mentioning that the learning process should be 
subject to buy in by late-developing countries, rather than being imposed upon them by 
                                                 
27  Lin (2004) suggests that developing countries can borrow advanced technology and management 
skills from the developed countries.  
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developed countries. 
In sum, financial sectors in late-developing countries were significantly inferior to those 
in  advanced  economies.The  LDCs  are  confronted  with  various  problems,  such  as 
institutional failure, the threshold effect, multiple risks and knowledge gaps. All of these 
suggest  that  IFCs‘  development  in  developing  countries  cannot  duplicate  the 
laissez-faire  models  advocated  by  the  current  advanced  economies.  Conversely, 
financial  statism  approach  could  reinforce  national  sovereignty,  promote  financial 
deepening  and  preclude  exogenous  risks  in  LDCs,  at  least  at  early  stages  of  IFCs 
development.   
4.3.3 Limitations and Challenges 
While  financial  statism  presents  some  opportunities  in  IFCs‘  development,  it  also 
involves  some  limitations  and  challenges.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  financial  statism, 
specifically dominant state-ownership in banking, state intervention in financial markets 
and  capital  control  policies,  has  long  been  criticized  by  commentators  in  Western 
academia.   
Some  commentators  believe  state  ownership  tends  to  politicize  resource  allocation, 
soften budget constraints, and otherwise hinder economic efficiency (Kaufman 1999; La 
Porta  et  al.  2002).  These  defects  are  theoretically  ascribed  to  the  principal-agent 
problem and soft budget constraints. In the public ownership scenario, since it was hard 
to  discriminate  whether  losses  are  derived  from  policy  loans  or  operational  costs, 
management have no incentive to improve its performance. In particular, a number of 
conflicts-of-interests arise between the role of the state as the regulator, owner and/or 
borrower of financial system (World Bank 2012). Besides, it is also claimed that the 
state-ownership  may  generate  perverse  incentives  for  government  to  diminish 
competition, through protecting the survival and profitability of state banks at any costs 
(HPEC 2007).   
In a similar manner, interest rate controls also lead to a distortion in resource allocation 
and drive down the efficiency of investment. Moreover, guaranteed interest rate margins 
give rise to excessive investment in capital-intensive industries. With the underpriced  
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capital, the profitability of projects would be distorted by these implicit subsidies from 
the state.   
Critics also cast doubt on entrepreneurship by the state-owned financial institutions – 
―creative destruction‖.  It is argued that the state sector is possessed with monopoly 
powers and therefore has little incentive for innovation crucial to the competitiveness of 
IFCs‘  development.  Rather,  monopolistic  interest  groups  are  prone  to  resist  market 
reform, competition and opening up (Lien and Chen 2009). 
Perhaps the biggest challenge to financial statism lies in the fact that in certain respects 
its  main  practices  conflict  with  the  key  factors  of  IFCs‘  development  identified  in 
Chapter 3. In particular, figure 3.1 shows that, at a meta-level, an IFC should have free 
capital flows across borders and full convertibility of currency in order to link to the 
global network. However, the capital control regime defined in financial statism entirely 
contradicts this. So, how can late-developing countries develop an IFC using financial 
statism? To address these questions, let us first investigate the case of Shanghai in the 
development  of  IFC since the 1990s and then  we will  have a  further  discussion in 
chapter 9 on the validity of financial statism approach.   
 
    




5.1 Epistemological Stance 
5.1.1 Realism as Research Epistemology   
It  is  vitally important  to introduce  the  epistemological  stance prior to the empirical 
study on the development of an IFC. Epistemology is basically a theory of knowledge, 
which reflects one‘s view of what one can know about the world and how one can know 
it. Marsh and Furlong (2002) classified epistemological approaches into three categories: 
positivist,  realist  and  interpretivist.  Positivists  contend  that  the  world  exists 
independently of our knowledge of it. They argue that natural science and social science 
are similar and the world is not socially constructed. Therefore direct observation can 
serve as an independent test of the validity of a theory. Interpretists argue the direct 
opposite. They contend the world is socially or discursively constructed, which means 
social phenomena are affected by our interpretation or understanding. One corollary of 
the interpretivist position is that objective analysis is impossible and the proposition of 
the research is heavily affected by the researcher‘s subjectivity, comprising cultural, 
ideological,  political,  religious  or  ethnological  bias.  Realism  shares  the  views  of 
positivism and contends that the world exists independently of our knowledge of it. 
However,  realists  disagree  with  positivists  that  all  social  phenomena  are  directly 
observable. They maintain there are subliminal structures that cannot be observed and 
what can be observed may offer a false picture of these phenomena/structures and their 
effects  (Marsh  and  Furlong  2002).  In  this  way,  they  have  more  in  common  with 
interpretists.   
In development studies, realism is instrumental in helping us to distinguish between 
reality and appearance. In order to reveal underlying structures of reality, we need to 
look  below  the  surface.  In  fact,  underlying  structures  are  more  durable  than  the  
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appearance they create. Realists argue that underlying structures can sometimes conflict 
with appearances (Collier 1994). Hence, we need to identify and understand both the 
external ‗reality‘ and the social construction of that ‗reality‘ if we are to explain the 
relationship between social phenomena (Marsh and Furlong 2002).   
Realism has clear methodological implications. It suggests there is a real world ―out 
there‖, but emphasises that outcomes are shaped by the way in which this world is 
socially  constructed  (Marsh  and  Furlong  2002).  As  such,  it  would  acknowledge 
methodological pluralism, i.e. the adoption of both quantitative and qualitative methods.   
5.1.2 A Dialectic Approach to “Structure-Agency” Relationship 
A  closely  related  issue  in  epistemology  is  the  debate  on  the  ―structure-agency‖ 
relationship. In effect, the relationship between structure and agency is one of the most 
important issues affecting the way we undertake development studies. In this study, we 
often ask the following question: ―Which one is more important in the process of IFCs‘ 
development, market-driven or state-led?‖ Essentially, this question is associated with 
the ―structure-agency‖ relationship.   
Fundamentally, the [structure-agency] debate concerns the issue of to what extent we as 
actors have the ability to shape our destiny as against the extent to which our lives are 
structured in ways out of our control; the degree to which our fate is determined by external 
forces.(McAnulla 2002, p.271) 
Here  agency  is  conceptualised  as  ―conscious,  reflexive  and  strategic‖  (Hay  2001). 
Agency  generally  refers  to  individuals  or  groups  that  can  affect  their  environment. 
Structure usually refers to contexts and material conditions which define the range of 
actions available to them (McAnulla 2002, p.271). As regards the ―structure-agency‖ 
debate,  there  are  two  positions  at  opposite  ends  of  the  spectrum.  One  prioritises 
structure  (the  ―structure-centred  approach‖)  and  the  other  prioritises  agency  (the 
―agency-centred  approach‖).  I  prefer  a  position  which  gives  crucial  roles  to  both 
structure and agency; a dialectical approach.   
The  reason  why  I  favour  a  dialectical  approach  is  that  the  ―structure-agency‖ 
relationship is essentially determined by the ontological and epistemological stances. In  
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other  words,  there  are  different  solutions  to  structure-agency  problems  when  the 
researcher  holds  different  epistemological  assumptions  (Hay,  2001).  Modern  critical 
realism  acknowledges  two  points.  Firstly,  although  social  phenomena  exist 
independently of our interpretation of them, our interpretation/understanding of them 
affects the outcomes. Therefore structures do not determine; rather they constrain and 
facilitate. Social science involves the study of reflexive agents who interpret and change 
structures. Secondly, our knowledge of the world is likely to make errors, since our 
interpretation  of  social  phenomena  can  only  be  understood  within  the  context  of  a 
specific theory (Marsh and Furlong 2002).     
A dialectical approach is perfectly consistent with the perspective of modern critical 
realism.  In  the  work  of  Colin  Hay  (1996)  and  Bob  Jessop  (1990),  they  suggest  a 
dialectical  approach  towards  the  structure-agency  relationship.  In  this  approach, 
structures do not determine outcomes and agents are not simply ―bearers‖ of structures. 
Rather,  structures  constrain  and  facilitate  agents  whose  actions  configure  and 
reconfigure the structures. As such, actions take place within a pre-existing structured 
context  that is  strategically selective; one that  favours  certain  strategies  over others 
(McAnulla, 2002). For example, the existence of the interest groups who are able to 
benefit from industrial transformation give rise to the state managers and bureaucrats 
who advocate industrial policies. In parallel, these state officials and their policies can 
also make the industrial transformation successful and generate new interest groups. 
Meanwhile,  Jessop  (1990)  also  stresses  the  ability  of  agents  to  alter  structural 
circumstances  through  an active process of strategic learning:  ―agents  are  reflexive, 
capable of reformulating within limits their own identities and interests, and able to 
engage in strategic calculation about their current situation‖ (quoted in McAnulla, 2002, 
p. 281).   
This could be also true when we explore the evolution of international financial centres. 
In this  thesis,  I intend to explore the  IFCs‘  development  by analysing the interplay 
between structure (e.g.  market institutions)  and agency (e.g. state managers).  In the 
process of interplay, the agential force represented by various actors is often active, 
intentional and reflexive. Most of the time these actors may behave deliberately in an 
attempt to realise their attentions and preferences. They are also presumed to be capable 
of monitoring the longer-term consequences of their actions. Furthermore, the agential  
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force is also dynamic; it responds to changing contexts. These actors can also reform 
their preferences and perceived interests and determine their course of action over time 
given changes in structure and material circumstance (Hay 2001). Taking account of the 
―structure-agency‖ relationship in a dialectical way helps us understand that the role of 
the state in IFCs‘ development is not a straightforward matter. 
It is also important to identify different levels of analysis when we look at the role of the 
state in the IFCs‘ development. For instance, in the domestic market, the individuals and 
the state can be conceived as a set of structure-agency relationship; while in the global 
market, the individual state and the rest of the states across the world be another set of 
structure-agency relationship. At the different level of analysis, the state might play a 
different  role,  either  agency  or  structure.  In  that  sense,  the  state  is  essentially  an 
amalgamation  of  agencies  (i.e.  state  managers)  and  institutional  structures  (Skocpol 
1985, p.28). Therefore, we should not fall into the trap of focusing solely on one level of 
analysis. Moreover, we should also keep in mind that the structure-agency debate is 
more  suitable  for  consideration  as  an  analytical  device  rather  than  an  empirical 
generality (Hay 2001). 
5.2 Research Method: Single Case-Study 
Creswell (1994, p.12) provides a good account of case study definition:   
[Case  studies]  explore  a  single  entity  or  phenomenon  (the  case)  bounded  by  time  and 
activity  (a  program,  event,  process,  institutions,  or  social  group)  and  collects  detailed 
information by using a variety of data collection procedures during a sustained period of 
time. 
Indeed, the case study is a valuable method of research, with distinctive characteristics 
that make it ideal for many types of investigations, including exploratory, explanatory 
and  descriptive  research  (Tellis  1997).  Exploratory  case  studies  are  suitable  for 
theoretical development. This type of study often involves fieldwork and a survey prior 
to a definition of the research question and hypothesis. Explanatory case studies are 
used  for  causal  inferences  to  help  identify  a  causal  chain  between  different  social 
phenomena or events. Descriptive cases are capable of testing a well-formulated theory. 
Under these circumstances, a case study that can confirm all of the conditions is also  
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able to challenge and expand the theory.   
There is a clear distinction between case studies and statistical studies. The latter often 
neglect all of the contextual factors and intervening variables, except those selected for 
measurement (George and Bennett 2005). In contrast, case study method is better suited 
to investigating complex social phenomena when boundaries between phenomena and 
contexts  are  often  blurred  (Yin,  2008).  As  previously  noted,  IFCs‘  development  is 
influenced  by  a  broad  set  of  factors  such  as  institutional,  structural  and  ideological 
legacies from the past. The role of the state on IFCs‘ development should be examined 
based on the contextual settings. The capabilities and incentives of the state are greatly 
influenced by the initial conditions as well as the external circumstance in which they 
are  embedded  (Lau  1998).  Brett  (2009)  notes  that  the  models  of  ―best  practice‖  in 
developed countries are constantly evolving in response to new political, economic and 
environmental crises. The developing countries should adapt these theories in relation to 
their own settings, since the prescription of the ―neo-liberal model‖ has played a crucial 
but ambiguous role in producing both success and failure. 
Using case study methodology, we can look at a large number of intervening variables 
and inductively observe any unexpected aspects of the development mechanism for an 
IFC. George and Bennett (2005, p.45) identify four strengths of case study methods: 
their potential for achieving high conceptual validity (to define a concept in a specific 
context); their strong procedures for fostering new hypotheses (revision of hypothesis 
during a survey); their value as a useful means to closely examine the hypothesised role 
of causal mechanisms in the contexts of individual cases (considering the specialty of an 
individual case); and their capacity for addressing causal complexity.   
A frequent criticism of case study methodology is that its dependence on small number 
of cases renders it incapable of providing a generalising conclusion (Tellis 1997). Yin 
(2008) stresses that we need to discriminate ―analytic generalisation‖ from ―statistical 
generalisation‖. Case studies conducted under certain contexts with all sorts of variables 
and conditions may not be representative.    However, the case study method is valuable 
for  expanding  and  generalising  theories,  which  implies  that  it  is  applicable  to  a 
theoretical  proposition.  That  is  to  say,  the  goal  of  a  case  study  is  to  generalise  an 
analysis  rather  than  a  particular  object  or  event  (Gomm  et  al.  2000;  Yin  2008).  
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Generalisations do matter but are best understood if careful attention is paid to their 
setting and scope. In other words, we cannot generate nomothetic laws that are always 
universally  applicable  (Byrne  &  Ragin  2009,  p.9).  Lincoln  and  Guba  (1985)  have 
reconceptualised the notion of generalisability. They argue the contribution of a case 
study is more about transferability than generalisability.   
[T]he  degree  of  transferability  is  a  direct  function  of  the  similarity  between  the  two 
contexts,  what  we  shall  call  ‘fittingness‘.  Fittingness  is  defined  as  the  degree  of 
congruence  between  sending  and  receiving  context.  If  context  A  and  Context  B  are 
‘sufficiently‘ congruent, then working hypotheses from the sending originating context 
may  be  applicable  in  the  receiving  context.  (Lincoln  and  Guba,  1985,  p.124;  cited  by 
Donmoyer 2000) 
In this thesis, I employ the single-case study method to develop theories (hypotheses). I 
am not attempting to develop a grand theory that can be used in all types of countries. 
Rather, I expect to identify the conditions under which a range of variables interacted 
with each other to  promote  IFC development  in  China. As  David  Dessler (cited in 
George  and  Bennett  2005,  p.147)  has  argued,  there  are  two  approaches  to  the 
explanation  of  events:  a  generalising  strategy  (to  show  the  event  as  an  instance  of 
certain  type  of  events)  and  particularisation  (detailing  the  sequence  of  happenings 
leading up to an event, without necessarily placing it in a larger class). For the current 
study,  I  have  chosen  particularisation.  John  Friedman‘s  (2005)  recent  overview  of 
―China‘s urban transition‖ reflects a common reluctance on the part of China scholars to 
generalise. He provides a good account of particularity with regard to China.   
China cannot be fitted neatly into the narrative of any grand theory, whether that be the 
narrative  of  modernization  or  globalization,  urbanization  or  national  integration  – 
certainly not yet (because the future is so rapidly being made) and perhaps never (because 
China is not just another country, but a civilization that deserves to be understood on its 
own terms).
 (see Logan 2008, p.2) 
Therefore,  in  this  thesis  I  concentrate  on  searching  for  necessary  condition  or 
intervening variables for IFCs‘ development in China instead of duplicating the same 
conditions in other countries. 
Another  common  critique  of  case  study  methodologies  is  that  they  are  inclined  to  
- 104 - 
―selection bias‖ (George and Bennett 2005). Selection bias refers to studies that appear 
to show researchers deliberately choosing their samples based on the values of their 
dependent variables. This can be a severe problem in statistical studies, since it always 
understates  the  strength  of  the  relationship  between  independent  and  dependent 
variables. The selection of cases on the basis of the value of their dependent variables is 
sometimes appropriate as this can help identify sufficient conditions for the selected 
outcome  (George  and  Bennett  2005).  This  is  understandable  since  case  study 
researchers are keen to find the specific conditions that underlie a given phenomenon, 
rather than the frequency of occurrence of a given outcome (Bennett, 1997). However, 
in some circumstances this selection bias can understate or overstate the relationship. To 
some degree, this could be considered a primary weakness in qualitative single-case 
studies such as mine. Despite this, a solid analytical framework such as process-tracing 
is helpful in safeguarding against selection bias.     
5.3 Research Questions, Analytical Framework and Hypothesis   
The core issue of this thesis is to investigate the inter-relationship between financial 
statism in China and the development of an international financial centre in Shanghai. 
The main research question is:   
Has China‘s financial statism (notably dominant state-ownership in the 
financial  sector,  financial  restraint  policies  and  capital  controls) 
promoted or hampered Shanghai‘s IFC development since the 1990s?   
The study also identified three sub-questions:   
a)  What was the impact of China‘s financial statism on Shanghai‘s IFC 
development at macro, meso and meta levels? 
b)  How successful has Shanghai been in developing into an IFC under 
financial statism since the 1990s?  
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c)  Were  there any changes taking place in  China‘s  financial statism 
given the new contextual conditions? If so, what were the underlying 
reasons for these changes? 
For  the  case  study  method,  there  are  different  analytical  techniques  linking  data  to 
propositions. Process-tracing is particularly useful for uncovering the evidence of causal 
mechanisms and obtaining an explanation for deviant cases; those that have outcomes 
not predicted or explained inadequately by existing theories (George and Bennett, 2005). 
One  of  the  most  common  patterns  of  process-tracing  takes  the  form  of  a  detailed 
narrative  or  story  presented  in  the  form  of  historical  chronicle.  In  this  thesis,  the 
financial system is not static, but variable. The evolution of  a financial system is a 
dynamic process. Hence, process-tracing is a useful mode of analysis in exploring SIFC 
development. As a means of examining complexity in detail, case studies also require 
substantial process-tracing evidence to document complex interactions. The analytical 
framework of the study is divided into three phases. 
Phase One: Identifying different variables   
At the onset, we need to identify a range of variables that were correlative in the process 
of SIFC development. The independent variable in this thesis is obviously direct state 
intervention in IFCs‘ development, which I have labelled financial statism. This means 
the independent variables include the scale of state control in financial ownership, the 
extent  of  financial  restraint  policies  and  the  degree  of  state  constraints  on  capital 
mobility.   
The dependent variables are certainly the outcome of IFC development in Shanghai. As 
stated in the preceding chapter, an IFC is an agglomeration of various financial markets 
and institutions in a certain place. This can thus be measured through the breadth and 
depth  of  financial  markets  and  institutions  at  the  micro-level.  Furthermore,  the 
efficiency and innovativeness of the IFC need to be examined. Although the dependent 
variables can be observed and assessed, there seems no theoretical link that directly 
connects the dependent and independent variables.     
To facilitate a better understanding between the dependent and independent variables, I  
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have introduced a set of intervening variables (Figure 5.1). As previous discussed in 
Chapter 3, the agglomeration of financial markets and institutions (the micro-level) are 
subject to other factors, such as the urban and business environment (the meso-level), 
macro-economic conditions (the macro-level) and connectivity to the global network 
(the  meta-level).  Meanwhile,  these  variables  have  direct  causal  relationship  with 
financial statism (see Chapter 4). In this thesis, those factors with regard to meso, macro 
and meta levels are chosen as the intervening variables affecting the formation of an 
IFC.   
Figure 5.1: The analytical framework of the study 
 
Source: author   
Phase Two: Examining causal Relationships 
The analytical model of process-tracing is primarily applied in this phase. I retrace and 
document the key measures or policies that were taken by China‘s central and local 
governments  to  promote  Shanghai‘s  IFC  development  over  the  past  20  years  in 
chronological order. Then I analyse to what extent these interventions have affected the  
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SIFC‘s  development.  Moreover,  I  also  consider  how  the  state  converted  financial 
statism  following changes in contextual factors, such as  the occurrence of financial 
crises and China‘s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001. From these, I 
seek to demonstrate the ways financial statism affected SIFC development and to look 
into the causal relationships between independent and dependent variables.   
Phase Three: Refining hypotheses and the summation 
It  is  possible  evidence  from  the  empirical  study  would  not  be  consistent  with  the 
hypotheses delineated at the outset. At this stage, it is desirable that new hypotheses can 
be  generated  on  the  basis  of  events  observed  inductively  in  case  studies.  It  is  also 
crucial  to  identify  other  factors  such  as  historical  analysis  to  underpin  the  research 
findings, as the formation of an IFC is also path-dependent.   
George and Bennett (2005) also identify two key constraints on process-tracing. Firstly, 
process-tracing requires a continuous, uninterrupted causal path linking putative causes. 
When  data  is  unavailable,  process-tracing  can  only  draw  provisional  conclusions. 
Secondly, there may be more than one hypothesised causal mechanism consistent with 
any given set of process-tracing evidence. In that case, ―parallax‖ may arise due to 
different interpretations. 
Based upon the above analytical framework, the thesis seeks to examine the following 
hypotheses. 
(1) Financial statism policies generally boosted the promotion of Shanghai into 
a domestic financial centre (agglomeration of financial markets, services 
and human capital) during the early stages of SIFC‘s development, while 
the country enjoyed a high degree of state intervention at macro, meso and 
meta-levels during its economic transition.   
(2) However, financial statism restricted Shanghai‘s connectivity to the global 
network,  which  impaired  its  transformation  into  a  genuine  international 
financial  centre.  Given  the  enhanced  institutional  strength  of  the  market 
system, the state managers needed to withdraw financial statism during the 
latter stages of the SIFC‘s development.    
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(3)   Overall, China‘s financial statism can be viewed as ―invisible scaffolding‖ 
in the SIFC‘s development.   
5.4 Fieldwork and Data Collection 
Before carrying out this PhD study, I had served as a research fellow in the Shanghai 
Development Research Centre (SDRC) for nine years. The SDRC is a think-tank funded 
by the Shanghai Municipal Government, whose mission is to conduct policy studies on 
Shanghai‘s development in partnership with other government departments, universities 
and research institutions. One distinct function of the organisation is that most of the 
research projects undertaken were commissioned by the mayor of Shanghai and other 
city  leaders,  and  thus  have  a  heavy  influence  on  policy  making.  While  working  at 
SDRC, I participated in a number of projects related to Shanghai‘s IFC development. 
The Table 5.1 lists part of relevant research projects carried out at SDRC between 1997 
and 2006.   
The  experience  of  participating  in  these  project  studies  has  provided  invaluable 
information  and  resources  for  this  study.  More  importantly,  as  an  active 
participant-observer  in  this  process,  I  was  in  a  better  position  to  understand  the 
policy-making  mechanisms  in  the  city‘s  government  and  their  interaction  with  the 
central  government  in  various  reforms  and  policy  initiatives  regarding  the  IFC‘s 
development. 
It is also notable that Shanghai‘s IFC development is an ongoing project. I conducted 
several field trips to Shanghai from 2008 to 2013 while I was carrying out this PhD 
study. The most important goal of the fieldwork was to obtain information regarding 
updated policies and contextual conditions. This involved the collection and review of 
relevant  documentation  on  the  study.  Relevant  data  includes  unpublished  reports/ 
records, published reports (research studies/ case studies and so on), newspaper articles, 
other  media  coverage,  information  accessed  through  the  internet,  academic  research 
papers, official records and government dossiers from key government agencies, e.g. 
Shanghai  Financial  Service  Office  (SFSO),  Shanghai  Development  Research  Centre 
(SDRC), and any other authentic available documented sources of information.     
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Table 5.1: Relevant research projects sponsored by the SDRC 
Year  Project Partners  Project Topics 
1998  Shanghai University of 
Finance and Economics 
The  Study  on  Shanghai‘s  Fund  Market 
Development 
2000  PBoC, Shanghai Branch  Comparative  Study  of  IFCs  between  Tokyo, 
Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai 
2001  Fudan University  The  Feasibility  Study  of  Developing 
Privately-owned  Financial  Intermediaries  in 
Shanghai 
2002  Development and Reform 
Commission, SMG 
The Development of SIFC as a National Strategy 
2003  Shanghai Institute of 
International Finance 
Using Commodity Futures Market as a Strategic 
Initiative to Promote SIFC Development 
2003  Shanghai University of 
Finance and Economics 
The Study of Corporate Governance on China‘s 
Security Holding Companies   
2003  Shanghai Financial Service 
Office 
The Action Plan on the Development of SIFC 
2004  Shanghai Pudong District 
Government 
The Study on Industrial Clustering Development 
in Pudong   
2004  Shanghai Jiaotong 
University 
The Study on Key Policy Initiatives to Promote 
SIFC 
2004  Shanghai Institute of 
Pudong Economic 
Development 
The  Study  on  CBD  Development  in  Pudong, 
Shanghai   
Source: Author, SDRC reports 
Furthermore, China‘s economic transition and development have been analysed in depth 
by both Chinese and foreign scholars. The literature on China‘s economic growth is 
voluminous. I also draw heavily on this literature in describing the role of the state and 
transformation. These documents serve to corroborate the evidence from other sources. 
In  the  evaluation  of  the  IFC  development  in  Shanghai,  I  also  examined  several 
competitive  rankings  and  indices  produced  by  several  prestigious  institutions  and 
consultancy  companies,  such  as  the  City  of  London  Corporation,  the  Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange Group and Roland Berger Consulting Co. Ltd. etc (see Section 7.3  
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for details).   
According to Yin (2008), triangulation is helpful in improving reliability in single case 
studies. This involves the use of two or more different methods in studying the same 
phenomena on the grounds that no single method is infallible (Rose 1982). I began my 
research  with  ―secondary  evidence‖,  supplemented  by  a  variety  of  government 
documents  and  statistical  evidence.  In  the  meantime,  I  have  also  used  anecdotal 
evidence  to  analyse  tendencies  and  trends.  I  have  examined  histories,  archival 
documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process 
the  study  hypothesises  or  implies  is  in  fact  evident  in  the  sequence  and  values  of 
intervening variables.   
Apart from that, I also acknowledge that primary information is significant to the case 
study.    I conducted dozens of interviews with experts, scholars and senior executives in 
person or by telephone via semi-structured questionnaires (see Appendix 6 & 7 for 
details). The interviewees are chosen from the central bank, local government and other 
relevant organisations, including The People‘s Bank of China (Shanghai Headquarters 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE)，Shanghai Financial Service Office (SFSO), Shanghai 
Development Research Centre, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences and Shanghai 
Jiaotong University.     
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6. China’s Financial Statism: The 
Underlying Impact on SIFC Development 
 
If large institutions live globally but die nationally, can we afford to bail out big banks that 
dwarf national treasuries and private sector savings, as happened in Iceland and Ireland? 
---Mainelli and Giffords (2009, p. 27). 
 
Financial statism is one of the defining features of China under its massive economic 
transition during past decades. In this chapter, I intend to address the following question: 
What has been the impact of China‘s financial statism on SIFC development at macro, 
meso and meta levels? This chapter is organised as follows: firstly, I briefly introduce 
the  key  characteristics  of  China‘s  financial  statism;  then  I  anatomise  the  impact  of 
financial statism at macro, meso and meta levels; finally, I discuss several risks and 
challenges facing China‘s financial statism.   
6.1 A Glimpse of China’s Financial Statism   
Dominant Financial Ownership 
There were two manifest features in the Chinese financial system during the early 1990s. 
Firstly, a large banking sector played a major part and secondly, the dominance of state 
ownership (Allen et al 2011). Since the foundation of the People‘s Republic of China in 
1949, the country had embraced the Soviet model of central planning and virtually all 
the private companies and institutions were nationalised until 1956. Between 1956 and 
1978, China had a very limited banking system because of the deficiencies of market 
competition.  Without  a  frontier  between  central  and  commercial  banks,  the  whole 
banking system in the country was composed of a mono-bank, The People‘s Bank of 
China  (PBoC),  which  handled  almost  all  financial  transactions.  In  the  1980s,  this 
unitary banking system was transformed by the    establishment of the four specialist  
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banks - the ―Big Four‖, notably the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC)
28, 
the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC)
29, China Construction Bank (CCB)
30  and Bank 
of China (BOC)
31. During that period, the ―Big Four‖ were state-owned.   
Table 6.1: Market share of banking sector assets by types of bank (1983-2000) 























1983  397  397  100  0  0  0  0  0  0 
1990  2,896  2,789  96  107  4  0  0  N.A.  0 
1995  6,422  4,436  69  485  8  65  1  159  3 
1996  7,903  5,227  66  662  8  214  3  248  3 
1997  95,01  5,890  62  688  7  274  3  312  3 
1998  11,042  7,041  64  1,185  11  372  3  284  3 
1999  12,323  7,926  64  1,461  12  452  4  264  2 
2000  13,548  9,296  69  1,513  11  N.A.  N.A.  288  3 
Note:     
SOB: State-Owned Banks     
JSB: Joint Stock Banks      
UCB: Urban Commercial Banks   
FB: Foreign Banks 
Source: China Financial Statistical Yearbook, Wang (2008) 
In the early 1980s, China started to carry out top-down market  reform. Despite the 
substantial growth of the private sector in other industry sectors, China‘s financial sector 
was still dominated by the SFIs. As shown in Table 6.1, from 1990 to 2000, the total 
assets of state banks increased substantially from RMB2.8 trillion to RMB9.3 trillion 
while  the  share  of  state  bank  assets  declined  from  96  percent  to  69  percent.  This 
                                                 
28  The  Industrial  and  Commercial  Bank  of  China  was  formed  in  1984,  which  was  primarily 
responsible for urban industrial and commercial credit. 
29  The Agricultural Bank of China was set up in 1979 to deal with all banking business in rural areas 
30  The China Construction Bank was established in 1954. It was responsible for fixed investment 
credit in the medium and long term.    However, under the planned economy in the 1960s and 1970s, 
all the sources of its credit came from government appropriation. It was not able to accept household 
deposits until 1980. 
31  The Bank of China was originally established in 1912 as a private bank and  nationalized after 
1949. It specialised in foreign currency related transactions. It was given the mandate to specialize in 
transactions relating to foreign trade and investment.  
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suggests that the falling share of state banks was not due to shrinkage but to the growth 
of new types  of banks, such as  joint-stock banks,  urban commercial banks,  foreign 
banks etc. In particular, it should be noted that the share of foreign banks‘ assets levelled 
off at three percent during that period so the money was not channelled in that particular 
direction.   
Table 6.2 Financial firms overseen by Shanghai municipal government 
Banks 
1. Shanghai Pudong Development Bank   
2. Bank of Shanghai 
3. Shanghai Municipal Union of Rural Credit Cooperatives 
Comprehensive Financial Companies 
4. Shanghai International Trust and Investment Co. 
5. Shanghai Aijian (AJ) Trust & Investment Co. 
Securities Companies 
6. Guotai Junan Securities 
7. Haitong Securities 
8. Shenyin & Wanguo Securities 
9. Orient (Dongfang) Securities 
10. Shanghai Aijian (AJ) Securities 
11. Shanghai Securities 
12. Shanghai Evergreen (Jiulian) Securities 
Fund Management Companies 
13. Hua An Fund Management 
14. Guotai Asset Management 
15. Fullgoal (Fuguo) Fund Management 
Insurance Companies 
16. China Pacific (Taipingyang) Insurance 
17. China Pacific Property Insurance 
18. China Pacific Life Insurance 
19. Da Zhong Insurance 
Source: Adapted from Heilmann (2005, p.658) 
The expansion of state banks at central level coincided with the growth of state-owned 
financial assets at local level. In early 1990s, under the banner of SIFC development, 
the Shanghai Municipal Government lobbied the central government for the green light 
for new licences for banks and non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs)
32. In 1993, when 
                                                 
32  Before the 1990s, banks and financial firms were generally not allowed to be owned by local 
government directly.  
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Shanghai‘s first local bank - Shanghai Pudong Development Bank (SPDB) - officially 
opened, the municipal government was so pleased it even presented the new bank an 
office  building  in  Bund  for  its  headquarters
33.  Since  then,  Shanghai‘s  Municipal 
Government  has  established  19  new  financial  entities,  including  three  banks,  two 
comprehensive  financial  companies  (similar  to  conglomerates),  seven  securities 
companies, three fund management companies and four insurance companies (see Table 
6.2). As of 2007, the total assets of these banks and NBFIs reached RMB 2.07 trillion 
and delivered RMB 61.4 billion of pre-tax income（Fang 2013, p. 213）.     
Financial Restraint Policies 
Apart  from  dominant  financial  ownership,  the  Chinese  state  also  took  control  of 
financial markets. Hellmann et al. (1998) postulated that financial restraint policies can 
provide incentives for financial deepening, especially for developing countries. In China, 
financial  restraints  are  generally in the  form  of directed  credit  and aggregate credit 
ceilings, floors for loan rates and caps on deposit rates as well as limited access for the 
private sector (Shi and Ye 2003). Among other financial mechanisms, directed credit 
and aggregate credit ceilings were largely directed for state-owned banks in the 1990s.   
China‘s interest rate system is basically composed of three categories: central bank rates 
(e.g.  reserve  rate
34, refinancing rate
35, etc.), wholesale market rates (e.g. inter -bank 
lending rate
36) and retail market rates
37. Since 1990, wholesale markets rates have been 
                                                 
33  The Bund is a waterfront area in central Shanghai, which housed the headquarters of the major 
financial institutions operating in China before the 1940s. After 1949, the buildings on the Bund 
were mainly for government use. They were returned to financial use by the government in the early 
1990s, motivated by the SIFC development.     
34  Reserve rate refers to the rate institutions receive for deposits at the central bank. 
35  Refinancing rate refers to the rate institutions can borrow at from the central bank. Sometimes, it 
is also called the discount rate. 
36  The inter-bank lending market rate refers to the rates at which commercial banks and NBFIs offer 
to each other in the wholesale (inter-bank) market, such as SHIBOR. 
37  The retail market rate is the rate at which commercial banks offer to their consumers for   
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gradually liberalised (see section 8.1.2 for details). The retail market rate, particularly 
the deposit and lending rates, is still under the guidance of the state rather than the 
market. In other words, the interest margins of the banks are still determined by the 
PBoC. 
Limited access to deposit markets accompanies these interest rate controls. As noted 
above, the state bank plays a dominant role in the deposit and credit markets. Compared 
to  more  mature  economies,  the  competition  in  China‘s  banking  sector  is  relatively 
unimportant.  According  to  Federal  Reserve  Economic  Data  (FRED)
38, in the early 
1990s, there were around 12,000 commercial banks in the United States, although the 
number has reduced sharply to around 6,000 in 2010 due to the financial crisis. In China, 
there were far fewer  due to tight regulation  governing  licensing. According to  the 
Commercial Bank Law of China,  the setting up of a new commercial bank should not 
only meet the minimal capital requirement
39, it also requires approval from the central 
bank. In other words, the law has allowed the central bank to prevent private investors 
from entering the deposit market. 
Capital Control 
Another important aspect of financial statism is the control of the state over capital 
flows across borders and currency convertibility. In 1996, China successfully realised 
current account convertibility, but the Renminbi is still practically inconvertible for the 
bulk of capital accounts in China. As China‘s control over capital transactions has been 
continuously altered over the past 20 years, table 6.3 chose December 31, 1996 as one 
particular point in time to illustrate the status of capital controls.   
   
                                                                                                                                               
deposits and lending. 
38  See http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/USNUM, accessed on November 5, 2013 
39  According to Commercial Bank Law, the minimal  capital requirement is RMB1 billion for a 
nationwide commercial bank, RMB100 million for an urban commercial bank and RMB50 million 
for a rural commercial bank.    
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Table 6.3 Controls on capital transactions as of December 31, 1996 
Controls on Capital and Money Market Instruments 
Capital Transactions  Non-residents  Residents 
Purchase/Sale 
locally 

































Derivatives and Other 
Instruments 






Controls on Credit Operation 




Needs approval by SAFE  Needs approval by SAFE 
Guarantees, sureties 
and financial back up 
facilities   
Needs authorisation  N.A. 
Controls on Direct Investment 
Direct Investment  Non-Residents  Residents 
Outward Direct 
Investment 




Needs approval by MOFTEC  Permitted 
Source: Adapted from Prasad and Wei (2007) 
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As  shown  in  the  table  6.3,  non-residents  were  generally  prohibited  from  issuing 
securities in the domestic Chinese marketplace, other than being allowed to purchase B 
shares
40.  Residents other than financial institutions permitted to engage in foreign 
borrowing  and  authorised  enterprises  or  groups,  were  not  permitted  to  purchase 
securities abroad. And yet, inward FDI was generally permitted except i n several 
strategic sectors. Therefore, China had a distinctive feature of selective opening, i.e. it 
was heavily in favour of foreign direct investment (FDI) yet it restricted its flows of 
portfolio investment across borders (Xiao and Kimball 2004; Prasad  and Wei 2007). It 
is  also  notable  that  since  2002,  capital  controls  have  somewhat  eased  with  the 
introduction of Qualified Foreign Institute Investors (QFII) and Qualified Domestic 
Institute  Investors  (QDII)  initiatives.  These  are  schemes  to  empower  quali fied 
institutions, residents or non-residents, to access restrictive portfolio investments on the 
basis of quotas (see also section 7.2).   
As such, we can see that financial statism has been one of the defining characteristics of 
China‘s  economic  and  financial  system  during  its  economic  transition.  These  three 
components of financial statism are inextricably connected. Financial ownership of the 
state lies at the centre of the regime, which is significant to strengthen state capacity and 
influence financial reform and policies at the macro, meso and meta levels. 
6.2  Implicit  Contributions  of  Financial  Statism  to  SIFC 
Development 
The  financial  sector  is  the  lifeblood  of  any  modern  economy.  According  to  the 
neo-classical literature, it is generally argued that the bid for an IFC is synonymous with 
deregulating, liberalising and globalising a financial system (see HPEC 2007). However, 
Shanghai‘s experience followed a radically different route. One distinctive feature of 
SIFC‘s  development  since  the  1990s  is  that  China  has  tenaciously  held  on  to  its 
                                                 
40  B share are shares issued by Chinese companies that are listed and traded in the Shanghai or 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. These shares are sold to and held by foreign investors. Starting in 2001, 
Chinese investors could also trade these shares.  
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financial statism to promote such a development. What is the underlying motivation for 
this? Is this a policy failure or viable strategy? To grapple with these questions, we will 
look into context of financial statism and its impact on the different levels - notably the 
macro, meso and meta levels - of SIFC‘s development.   
6.2.1 Macro-Level 
As noted in section 3.5, the rise and decline of an international financial centre rests on 
the economic growth and political stability of the country that hosts it. Therefore, the 
relationship between financial statism and its macro-level impact should be carefully 
examined. 
Mobilising Deposits 
To advance our understanding of the impact of financial statism, we should put SIFC‘s 
development in the context of China‘s economic transition in the 1990s. During that 
period, China simultaneously confronted two significant changes.. The first was how to 
transform a conventional agricultural economy into a modern industrial economy. The 
second was how to shift from a planned to a market economy. The former required huge 
investment and the latter involved huge transitional costs. 
Prior to 1980, the state sector was the key depositor and investor in China. Following 
market reforms, the competition from the non-state sector and price decontrol lowered 
the monopoly rents of SOEs, thereby reducing the tax and profit remittances to the 
government (Hofman 1998). At the same time, the household sector gradually replaced 
the state sector as the primary depositor. As shown in Figure 6.1, the ratio of budgeted 
revenue to GDP dropped radically from 31.1 percent in 1978 to 10.3 percent in 1995. 
One might argue that apart from budgeted revenues, the Chinese government could also 
obtain  extra-budgetary  revenues  from  various  administration  fees  and  public  funds 
before 2011
41. Yet even if extra-budgetary revenue is  taken into account, it does not 
                                                 
41  In  2011,  Chinese  Ministry  of  Finance  abolished  extra-budgetary  revenues  and  put  all  the 
government revenues under budgeted management.    
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affect the fact that the total fiscal revenue to GDP ratio fell from 40.6 percent in 1978 to 
14.2 percent in 1995 (Figure 6.1). During economic transition, the fall of fiscal revenue 
was prevalent. In central and eastern European countries, the huge fiscal deficits have 
given rise to deep, and in some cases, long-lasting recessions (Kotz 2004). In Russia, 
the state lost control of its financial sector and suffered severe hyperinflation in the 
1990s (Wang et al. 2008, p. 113). It seemed inconceivable that the Chinese government 
would not fall apart given the substantial decrease in fiscal revenues. Instead, China 
successfully contained inflation and kept price stability, which McKinnon (1993) terms 
the ―Chinese puzzle‖.   
Figure 6.1: China‘s fiscal revenue and its ratio to GDP (1978-2010) 
 
Note:   
BR: Budgeted Revenue 
EBR: Extra-budgetary Revenue   
BR/GDP: Budgeted-Revenue-to-GDP Ratio 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1996-2011, the Ministry of Finance website 
What was the magic formula? McKinnon (1993, pp.194-5) attributes China‘s success to 
its dual-track pricing system and gradual marketization. He is correct to highlight the 
―gradualist‖  approach,  but  understates  the  significance  of  China‘s  dominant 
state-ownership  of  its  financial  sector.  In  effect,  financial  statism  has  played  a 
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thereby avoiding financing government debts through printing bank notes.   
A  number  of  reasons  can  explain  the  effectiveness  of  the  state  bank  in  deposit 
mobilisation. Firstly, China‘s household saving rate soared throughout the reform period. 
The rate of household saving to GDP increased from six percent to 45 percent from 
1978 to 1994, and further grew to 66 percent in 2000 (Figure 6.2). As of 2010, the rate 
increased to 75 percent and household deposits  arrived at a total of some RMB 30 
trillion.  Secondly,  the  constraints  on  the  deposit  markets  and  the  ban  on  investing 
abroad suggest that household depositors have few options but to deposit in state banks. 
Moreover,  by  means  of  controlling  interest  rates  and  prohibiting  the  entry  of  new 
private banks, state banks retain a dominant position in creating ―franchise value‖. In 
this way, they have been able to capture new deposits by expanding their businesses 
through establishing new branches, e.g. in rural areas favourable to deposit mobilisation. 
This also partly explains the reason why the total assets of state banks surged in the 
1990s. 
Figure 6.2: China‘s household deposit and its ratio to GDP (1978-2010) 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1996-2011 
Has financial statism policies sacrificed ordinary depositors for the sake of enhancing 
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competitive interest return if there were no controls over interest rates and market entry. 
This might well be the case but it does not take account of the contextual setting of 
China during that period. Firstly, due to institutional weakness, the moral hazard in the 
private banks was extremely high. In that case, ordinary depositors would risk losing 
their entire deposits rather than gaining interest on them. Secondly, ordinary depositors 
were willing  to  deposit their savings  in  the state banks  since the state acted as  the 
implicit guarantor.   
Patronising SOEs’ Reform 
SOEs‘ reform is one of the most significant factors in China‘s economic transition. In 
1995, there were some 88,000 industrial SOEs with ―independent accounting systems‖ 
in China, of which 5,000 were classified as large SOEs, 11,000 were medium-sized 
SOEs  and  72,000  were  small  SOEs  (NSB  1996).  The  aim  of  SOEs‘  reform  is  to 
establish a ―modern enterprises system‖ (MES), characterised by ―clearly established 
property rights, well-defined powers and responsibilities, separation of the enterprise 
from the government and scientific management‖ (Zhang 2006). This included a broad 
set  of  reform  programmes,  including  IPOs  of  SOEs,  management  buyouts  of  small 
SOEs, and ownership diversification etc (Hofman and Wu 2009). In response to the 
criticism  from  neo-liberalism
42,  market  socialists  argue  that  the  introduction  of 
competition and management reform is a primary recipe rather than privatisation. In 
particular, they believe the joint-stock system is an ideal institutional arrangement for 
modern enterprise systems. As Wang (1994) argues, 
[E]nterprise managers could have sufficient autonomy to take whatever actions necessary 
for profit maximization, but at the same time their behaviours could be monitored by the 
state so that they would not be able to abuse their power for pursuing other goals.(p.16) 
                                                 
42  Neo-liberals argue that the state sector is less efficient than the private sector because of soft 
budget constraints, principal-agent problems, the monopolistic nature of the public sector and issues 
of corruption and nepotism. For a detailed introduction to China‘s SOEs‘ reforms see Hassard et 
al.( 2007), Zhang, L. (2006)  
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The  guidelines  for  SOE  reform  were  laid  out  by  Zhu  Rongji,  the  premier  from 
1998-2002 ―to restructure the major enterprises and relax control over the small ones‖ 
(i.e. ―Zhua Da Fang Xiao”). Zhu believed the state should concentrate control on a 
group of 1,000 large SOEs and release control over on some 90,000 small and medium 
SOEs. The reforms intended to relieve the burden of social services provision on SOEs, 
since  during  that  period  the  employment  and  related  social  welfare  system  such  as 
housing,  healthcare,  schooling  and  pensions  were  attached  to  them.  However, 
employees in these SOEs could no longer enjoy an ―iron rice bowl‖ after reform, which 
meant their jobs were no longer guaranteed. . 
However, one of the biggest challenges for SOE reform was that market institutions, 
such  as  unemployment  insurance,  housing  public  fund
43,  pension  plan and  social 
insurance, were still not in place at that period. This meant that the state had to carry out 
market reform on the one hand and rebuild the social safety net on the other. Since 1997, 
the SOEs‘ reforms have led to millions of workers being laid off every year (Hassard et 
al. 2007). If there was no immediate action taken by the government, social unrest and 
political upheaval would have ensued.     
In order to  maintain social stability, the state had to  bear  the  huge  costs of reform 
through  various  explicit  or  implicit  subsidies.  For  example,  in  1997,  the  central 
government made a special policy arrangement for the closure of insolvent SOEs: the 
proceeds from liquidation were used to settle down the laid-off employees
44, prior to 
paying off the loans of state banks. Until 2007, this policy  was applied to 4,251 
bankrupt SOEs and benefited 8.37 milli on people who had been made redundant  (Li 
2007).  In  1999,  the  central  government  announced  the  ―two  guarantees‖  policy: 
                                                 
43  Housing public fund is statutory deductions to which both employees and employers contribute. 
Since the 1990s, the welfare-based housing distribution has been replaced by pay-for-housing in 
China. Under the new system, employees can withdraw the balance of account or apply for credit 
loans from housing public fund when they purchase a property.   
44  To settle down the lay-offs means to provide them with basic pensions, unemployment  benefits 
and a subsistence allowance.     
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guaranteeing  that  laid-off  employees  receive  basic  living  allowances  and  that  SOE 
pensioners receive their pensions in full and on time (Huang 2013). Meanwhile, state 
banks  became  the  treasury  agents  for  SOE  reform.  They  were  required  by  the 
government to provide policy loans to those SOEs in financial distress. Such loans are 
conceptually equivalent to government funding, and are usually labelled as quasi-fiscal 
activities (Hofman 1998).   
Interest rate control is another important supportive policy for SOEs‘ reform under a 
regime of financial statism. In the early 1990s, China was experiencing an inflationary 
period. Although the typical monetary policy used to contain inflation was to increase 
interest rates, the state was reluctant to increase the burden on SOEs in the process of 
reform, since the SOEs were absorbing approximately 75 percent of bank credit. The 
central bank thus chose to keep the lending rate relatively low and increase deposit rates 
to prevent deposit withdrawals and illegal capital flight (Herr and Priewe 1999). As a 
result, it can be seen that the interest margin for one-year loans between 1990 and 1995 
was close to zero (Figure 6.3). In this manner, the state bank provided the SOEs with 
substantial low-cost funding even when the lending rates were lower than the Walrasian 
interest rate
45, which means it was not economic efficient. Yet this sort of arrangement 
enabled state banks to finance the SOEs with cheap loans during the economic 
transition.   
From 1996, the interest margin expanded as the base rate for deposits had been lowered 
further than that for lending  and stood at 3.6 percent a year by 1999 . According to 
Hellmann et al. (1997), financial restraint enabled the creation of rents for the banking 
sector through state control over the deposit and lending rates. In China, the rent 
incentives created from the controlled interest margins were actual ly being transferred 
to the SOEs in order to carry forward the SOEs‘ reform (see Hassard et al 2007). In this 
way,  China‘s  approach  was  different  to  that  of  Japan  and  South  Korea,  whose 
governments  has  intensively  supported  big  private  enterprises  such  as  Keiretsu  and 
                                                 
45  In neoclassical economics, Lé on Walras develops a general equilibrium macroeconomic model, in 
which prices of capital goods are the same whether they appear as inputs or outputs and in which the 
same rate of profits is earned in all lines of industry.  
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Chaebol through loans and favourable industrial policies (Baek 2005, p. 494). 
Figure 6.3: The evolution of interest margin set by the PBoC (1990-2010) 
 
Note: The interest rate was calculated based on the one-year deposit and lending rate set by the 
PBoC. 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1996-2011 
The third approach to facilitating reform through financial statism was by giving SOEs 
priority when it came to raising funds in the capital markets. After the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SSE) was incorporated in 1990 it was employed as an instrument to support 
SOEs‘ reform. At that stage, stock market listings were subject to strict administrative 
quotas, which stipulated the number of companies to be listed and the amount of funds 
to be raised. In December 1996, the China Securities Regulatory Commission released 
the Notice on Several Issues regarding Issuance of New Stocks, which stated that the 
priority for listing should be given to 300 key SOEs and 100 enterprises experimenting 
with  ―modern  enterprises  system‖  and  56  enterprises  that  were  experimenting  with 
conglomerates  (CSRC  1996).  The  notice  also  pinpointed  priority  sectors  for  stock 
issuance  such  as  agriculture,  energy,  transportation,  telecommunications,  major  raw 
materials and high-tech industries. Conversely, processing and commercial industries 
were categorised in unsupported sectors whilst the financial and real estate sectors were 
temporarily disregarded for the IPO. This implies, at that time, the stock market was 
used  primarily  to  raise  funds  to  support  SOE  reforms,  particularly  those  SOEs  in 
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Table 6.4: The share of SOEs
46  in the annual IPOs (1997-2006) 
  SOEs Share in 
numbers of IPOs   
  (%)   
SOEs Share in stocks 
issuance of IPOs 
  (%) 




1997  70.6  79.6  78.8 
1998  81.0  87.4  88.3 
1999  54.8  63.6  67.1 
2000  60.9  63.0  69.2 
2001  66.7  75.9  84.4 
2002  67.2  85.3  92.1 
2003  57.8  81.9  86.9 
2004  46.5  53.2  61.6 
2005  46.7  61.6  76.7 
2006  50.0  93.7  97.0 
Note:    1997- 2003: Shanghai Stock Exchange;   
2004-2006: Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange     
Source: Wu (2008, p.456) 
According to Table 6.4, SOEs retained a high share of stocks‘ issuance and fundraising 
between 1997 and 2006, even though a growing number of private companies were 
permitted to raise capital through the stock market. This table also shows that after joint 
stock reform, the performance of listed SOEs has markedly improved. In 2006, among 
all of the 753 companies listed on the SSE, the average return on equity (ROE) of SOEs 
was 8.46 percent and that of non-state company was 7.28 percent (Wu 2008). From this, 
we can see that the performance of listed SOEs is even better than those of non-state 
listed companies. It also suggests that the joint-stock reform has granted SOEs more 
autonomy and created a fairer playing field for them.  The public list  of SOEs thus 
provides sufficient information on managerial performance and ―makes the managers' 
incentives compatible with those of the state‖ (Lin et al 1998, p.422). Furthermore, 
these  SOEs  were  opened  up  to  competition  from  the  non-state  sector  and  even 
companies outside the country. As such, the state could no longer be held accountable 
for the failures of SOEs and could thus impose heavier budgetary constraints on them.   
                                                 
46  Provided that the largest shareholder (shareholder A) of the company is state-owned and the second and third 
largest shareholders (shareholder B and shareholder C) are private, if the total share of B and C is greater than that of 
A, we regard the company as a non-state company, and vice versa.  
- 126 - 
To some extent, these measures to champion SOEs matter. Financial statism has not 
only  provided  substantial  investment  in  the  process  of  industrialisation,  but  also 
shouldered much of the reform costs in China since the beginning of the reform era. 
China has now practically transformed the bulk of SOEs into independent economic 
entities and established a community-based social welfare system. The social welfare 
function was removed from the SOEs, and thus the government would no longer be 
entangled by policy-induced losses and operational losses in them.   
Stimulating Economic Take-off   
Since 1991, the Chinese economy has experienced unprecedented growth at an average 
annual rate of around 10 percent (Figure 6.4). Totalling RMB 40.12 trillion (USD 5.9 
trillion) in 2010, China‘s GDP has overtaken that of Japan (USD 5.5 trillion) and risen 
to be the second largest in the world.  In 2010, China‘s GDP comprised around 9.3 
percent  of  the  world  economy  against  a  mere  three  percent  in  1980  (World  Bank 
2011
47). According to the World Trade Organization China has risen to the top of the 
global league in terms of merchandise exports in 2010, accounting for 10.4 percent of 
world exports (WTO 2011). With respect to imports, China ranked second only to the 
United States. It is important to note that all of this stunning growth was made under 
financial statism, especially during the 1990s. So what was the logic underpinning this 
progress?   
China has long been criticised for i ts lack of efficiency and transparency in its legal 
system (Xu 2009, p.238). Some commentators (e.g. Allen et al. 2005; Lu and Yao 2009) 
are puzzled by the fact that China ‘s rapid economic growth is concomitant with an 
incomplete legal system and underdeveloped financial markets. Allen et al. (2005) argue 
that the most successful part of the Chinese financial system is not the state-owned 
banking sector or financial markets, but rather a sector of alternative financing channels, 
such as informal financial intermediaries, internal financing and trade credits etc. Lu 
and Yao (2009) suggest there is a ―leaking effect‖ by which means financial resources in 
                                                 
47  See http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf, accessed on 19
th 
June, 2014.    
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the state sector are channelled to the private sector. This mechanism allows for informal 
financing intermediaries to support private sector growth. There is probably some truth 
in  these  propositions,  but  in  my  opinion  they  do  not  identify  the  key  reasons  for 
economic growth in China. 
Figure 6.4: China‘s foreign reserve, imports & export and GDP growth rate (1990-2011) 
 
Source: State Administration of Foreign Exchange website, www.safe.gov.cn , Chinese Statistics 
Yearbook 2011 
I  would  argue  that  growth  in  China  has,  in  the  first  place,  been  driven  by  high 
investment and an export-oriented economy in which SFIs played a far more significant 
role than informal financial arrangements (also see Hofman and Wu 2011). Among large 
economies,  China  has  made  the  largest  proportion  of  investment  in  GDP  and  its 
investment  growth  rate  has  increased more than any other country  since the 1980s. 
China‘s financial statism was effective in raising the substantial funds needed for its 
capital-intensive growth. Using a very large micro-database of 1.3 million observations 
covering  the  period  1999-2005,  Demetriades  et  al.  (2008)  demonstrate  that  China‘s 
state-owned banking sector has supported the growth of both output and total factor 
productivity  in  manufacturing  enterprises.  Keidel  et  al.  (2009,  p.117)  also  provide 
evidence that China‘s financial system generates a reasonably good rate of return on 
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investment efficiency roughly equivalent to India‘s
48. On the face of it, this may not 
seem impressive but we need to remember that these large-scale investments funded by 
China‘s national development banks were primarily channelled to infrastructure, such as 
expressways, high speed rail links, airports, irrigation networks, grid systems etc. which 
private banks in the West might be reluctant to invest in. By the end of 2013, China had 
established the longest expressway network in the world, with a total length of 104,400 
kilometres.
49  According to the International Union of Railways (UIC 2013), the length 
of China‘s high speed rail in operation reached 9,867 kilometres in 2013, accounting for 
46 percent of the world‘s high speed rail lines. All of these are primary funded by the 
central  government  and  state  banks.  In  contrast,  India  had  not  developed  a  single 
high-speed railway by then. All of these infrastructural developments are critical to the 
sustainable growth of the Chinese economy.   
The state-dominated financial system is also the main source of technological progress, 
productivity growth and structural change. Credit loans were granted to technological 
transformation  projects,  especially  in  large  and  medium-sized  SOEs.  The  state  also 
actively interfered with capital markets by directing loans or stock listings to certain 
promising  industrial  sectors  such  as  high-tech,  high  value-added  industries  while 
discouraging others (Boyreau-Debray and Wei 2005). World Bank (2013, p.28) states,   
The  current  system,  characterized  by  dominance  of  state-owned  banks,  strong  state 
intervention, and remaining controls on interest rates, has been remarkably successful in 
mobilizing  savings  and  allocating  capital  to  strategic  sectors  during  China‘s  economic 
take-off. 
In the eyes of some commentators, China‘s current economic achievements demonstrate 
the failure of the state-led development and success of ―Washington Consensus‖(Irwin 
                                                 
48  Keidel  (2009,  p.118)  uses  the  incremental  capital  to  output  ratio  (ICOR)  as  the  indicator  to 
measure investment effectiveness. For the 5-year period 2001-2005, China‘s ICOR is 3.9. For India, 
the ICOR is roughly 4.1 for 2001-2006.   
49  See http://www.moc.gov.cn/zfxxgk/bnssj/zhghs/201405/t20140513_1618277.html, accessed on 
19
th June 2014.  
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2004).  However,  they  have  confused  state-led  development  with  the  previous 
centrally-planned,  Soviet  model.  There  is  no  denying  that  the  non-state  sector  and 
market system have contributed to China‘s rapid economic growth in the past decades, 
which  has  made  the  whole  economy  more  dynamic  and  innovative.  Nevertheless, 
Western  academics  have  often  misinterpreted  the  role  of  the  SFIs.  As  previously 
mentioned, the SFIs has served as an important stabilising force on the economy and 
society, particularly  at  the early stages  of  transitional  development. For this  reason, 
China did not privatise its sizeable state-bank sector along with SOEs‘ reform, which 
prevented rents moving to a few oligarchic money capitalists during China‘s economic 
transition (see Zhang 1998).   
To  summarise,  financial  statism  has  made  China‘s  economic  transition  a  source  of 
growth,  namely  mobilising  deposits  from  the  household  to  the  strategic  sector, 
championing  SOEs‘  market  reforms  and  stimulating  economic  take-off  at  the  early 
stages of market development. Far from being a policy failure, China‘s financial statism 
has acted as an ―unsung hero‖ in safeguarding economic transition and kick-starting its 
dramatic  economic  growth  over  recent  decades.  Based  on  these  special  policy 
arrangements,  China  successfully  realised  remarkable  economic  growth  in  the  past 
decades, which has laid a solid groundwork for further financial development.   
6.2.2 Meso-Level 
In this section, I address the impact of financial statism at the city level and explore how 
it  can  modernise  urban  infrastructure  and  foster  financial  markets  and  institutional 
facilities in Shanghai. 
Lump-sum Payment for Upgrading Infrastructure 
To attract global financial institutions and to thrive in the financial industry, Shanghai 
should first improve its infrastructure to support international financial business. Before 
Shanghai‘s  municipal  government  earmarked  the  Lujiazui  area  in  Pudong  (―East  of 
Shanghai‖) as a new Central Business District in the early 1990s, it was an area full of 
shabby buildings or warehouses. No one could have imagined that this dilapidated place 
would house the headquarters of top banks and financial institutions from around the  
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world. Nevertheless, within ten years, this area of 28 square kilometres was filled with 
state-of-the-art  office  buildings,  advanced  conference  facilities,  five-star  hotels, 
brand-new shopping malls and a large number of green areas (see Figure 6.5).   
How did this come about? In the early 1990s, most private and foreign investors were 
reluctant to participate in land development in the Lujiazui area due to the high risks. 
Chen (2007, p.113) comments:   
Uncertainty about the future of Pudong, the sizeable gap between plan and reality, the lack 
of  adequate  infrastructure  and  experience  with  collaboration  between  local  public 
companies  and  development  companies,  all  contributed  to  the  risks  considered  in  the 
feasibilities studies conducted by private sector organizations.   
Financial statism was central to making lump-sum payments towards the infrastructural 
upgrades.  In  1992,  the  Shanghai  Lujiazui  Development  Company  (SLDC)  was 
established by the Shanghai Municipal Government (SMG). When the SDLC was set up, 
the SMG invested 93.7 percent of the total capital of this company. Although the initial 
capital investment from the municipal government was not enough to develop the entire 
area,  financial  statism  also  ensured  the  SLDC  was  given  privileged  access  to 
low-interest loans from the ―Big Four‖. The building of the SIFC was considered part of 
a national strategy and so the loans were perceived as ―more a political gesture than a 
matter of commercial calculation‖ (Chen 2007, p.202).   
Furthermore, thanks to the central government‘s preferential policy of allowing stocks 
to be issued to support the Pudong development, the SLDC was listed on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange in both A-share and B-share markets in 1993 and 1994 respectively. 
The IPO helped the SLDC to raise much-needed capital to develop infrastructure in 
Lujiazui.  Records  show  that  by  2010,  it  had  developed  an  area  of  11.07  square 
kilometres, relocated 28,000 residential households and 750 business and enterprises to 
allow the creation of the Lujiazui Financial City. 
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Figure 6.5: The evolution of Lujiazui Financial City in the 1990s 
(i)  Overview 
 
 
(ii)  Central district of Lujiazui 
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(iii)  Central green land 
 
(iv)  Lujiazui Downtown area 
 
(v)  Zhuyuan commercial neighbourhood 
 
Source: Official website of Shanghai Lujiazui Financial and Trade Zone Development Ltd.
  50     
   
                                                 
50  See http://www.ljz.com.cn/about_ljzImg.aspx, accessed on 12 November, 2013  
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In addition to the SLDC, the Shanghai City Development and Investment Company 
(SCDIC)  was  another  example  of  corporate  commissioning  by  the  municipal 
government to develop the infrastructure for the city. Established in 1992, the SCDIC 
was  designated  to  fund  the  city‘s  basic  infrastructure  such  as  clean  water,  sewage 
disposal, tunnel and bridge building and environmental protection. Similar to the SLDC, 
the SCDIC also enjoyed huge support from the state-owned banking sector. In 2007, its 
credit lines from 16 state banks and two foreign banks totalled RMB 170 billion (Kong 
and  Xin,  2009).  Moreover,  SCDIC  also  used  various  financing  vehicles  such  as 
corporate bonds and short-term financial bills to fund infrastructural development. By 
2010, SCDIC had raised RMB 18.8 billion by issuing Pudong Development Bonds, a 
special  corporate  bond  based  on  favourable  policies  granted  by  central  government 
(Kong and Xin 2009).   
Did these massive investments on infrastructure through credit loans from state banks 
incur bad debts for the municipal government? My interview with an official from the 
Shanghai  Financial  Service  Office  (SFSO)  suggests  the  opposite:  these  loans  were 
profitable for state banks. As he commented: 
The municipal government has not forced them to provide loans through administrative 
command;  state  banks  are  keen  to  do  this  kind  of  business  because  the  municipal 
government is buoyant and least likely to default. The land premium and housing prices 
have soared in recent years. In general, these banks are in favour of funding infrastructure 
projects, which are high-return and low-risk. Personally I think it is a win-win position – 
both for state banks and the municipal government (Interview 10, translated by author).   
This  suggests  a  new  mechanism  for  raising  capital  and  reinvestment  for  the  city: 
massive state investment in infrastructure pushed up land values and in turn generated 
further  premiums  from  land  leases  (see  Wu  2000).  With  the  improvement  of  the 
investment  environment  in  the  1990s,  there  was  a  virtuous  interaction  between 
infrastructure investment and financial development. 
As such, we can see that financial statism helped overcome the threshold effect through 
lump-sum investment from the state banks and capital markets. The threshold effect 
suggests  financial  markets  will  not  emerge  before  income  levels  reach  a  particular 
threshold value. Under financial statism, the Shanghai municipal government invested  
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in a large number of infrastructure development projects, such as public transport, office 
spaces, telecommunications and IT facilities, and even sea ports. In this process, SFIs 
have been in the forefront of infrastructure development, particularly after the SIFC 
development became part of the national strategy. It is also noteworthy that the lending 
supports allowed state banks to mobilise deposits from households at relatively low 
interest rates. In this regard, financial statism should be given credit for its pivotal role 
in the remarkable advancement of infrastructure in Shanghai within such a short period. 
Although government funding and credit loans from state banks are not the only reasons 
for the massive infrastructure investment, it is evident the state-led development was the 
catalyst for the thriving financial markets in Shanghai. The advances of infrastructure in 
the city prompted subsequent foreign direct investment and I will elaborate on this in 
the next section.   
Nurturing Financial Markets and Institutions 
Functional financial institutions are imperative for a successful international financial 
centre. This set of institutions embodies various financial firms (e.g. banks, security 
firms,  insurance  companies  etc),  markets  (e.g.  foreign  exchange,  stock  exchange), 
associations,  cooperatives,  as  well  as  rules,  norms  and  regulations.  In  the  case  of 
Shanghai,  it  is  evident  financial  statism  was  successful  in  adopting  selective 
interventionist policies to boost the development of various financial institutions.     
The most direct momentum of financial agglomeration derived from dominant state 
ownership.  After  the  central  government  announced  the  strategic  plan  for  the  SIFC 
development in 1992, a number of state banks such as the Bank of China, the Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China, the China Construction Bank, the China Investment 
Bank and other state-owned insurance companies took the lead in relocating their office 
buildings  to  Lujiazui.  In  1995,  the  central  bank  also  transferred  its  new  branch  to 
Pudong
51. Four years later,  the  Shanghai Stock Exchange installed its new office 
                                                 
51  In 2005, the Shanghai Branch, PBOC was upgraded to be the second headquarters of the central 
bank.  
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building in Lujiazui. In 2001, the Bank of Communication, the fifth largest bank in the 
country,  relocated  its  headquarters  to  Pudong  as  well.  Other  newly-established 
exchanges and financial markets, including the Shanghai Futures Exchange, the China 
Financial  Futures  Exchange  and  bank  regional  headquarters  are  now  also  situated 
around this area. While the decision to invest may have been based on expected profits 
and calculated risks, there is no denying political pressure from the state also played a 
part. 
Another important driving force was the privileged access to restricted financial markets. 
Although the state banks and financial institutions responded to government pressure to 
relocate their offices to Lujiazui, this would have been far less likely in the case of 
foreign institutions. In this case, financial restrictions played a significant role. In the 
1990s, a broad set of preferential policies were granted by the central government to 
support the development of the SIFC. One of these was permission for foreign investors 
to buy into tertiary industries (including finance, retail and trading) in Pudong. This 
form of investment was banned in other parts of the country. In particular, only the 
foreign  banks  registered  in  Lujiazui  were  allowed  to  engage  in  Renminbi  business. 
These  policies  appealed  to  foreign  banks  seeking  to  secure  market  share  in  the 
rapidly-growing  Chinese  market.  In  1996,  four  foreign  banks  operated  in  Lujiazui: 
Citibank, HSBC, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, and The Industrial Bank of Japan. These 
were the first to receive approval to engage in Renminbi business, i.e. to open accounts, 
attract Renminbi deposits etc. Moreover, the central government also gave the green 
light to setting up Sino-foreign joint venture insurance companies in the Pudong Area. 
By doing so, these financial firms were able to generate profits to offset marketing costs 
and  potential  risks.  This  led  to  the  successful  agglomeration  of  foreign  financial 
institutions  in  Pudong  during  the  1990s.  As  of  2004，at  least  74  foreign  financial 
institutions, including the five regional headquarters of foreign banks, were operated in 
Pudong. This  demonstrates that selective intervention of financial restraint  policy is 
effective in attracting foreign investment (Zeng and Si 2008). 
Thirdly, Shanghai‘s municipal government managed to promote financial agglomeration 
by  awarding  direct  fiscal  funds.  In  August  2009,  Shanghai  set  up  a  financial 
development  fund,  which  included  preferential  treatments  for  new  entrants,  such  as  
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office lease subsidies, tax refunds and executive training programmes. The special fund 
allowed the municipal government to provide one-off subsidies to overseas institutions 
that had locally incorporated their subsidiaries or set up their regional headquarters in 
Shanghai. For instance, multinational companies that established regional headquarters 
in Shanghai were granted RMB 5 million by the municipal government. If the annual 
turnover of these multinational companies exceeded RMB 1 billion, the grants would 
increase  to  RMB  10  million  (SMG  2008).  As  of  2009,  Shanghai  was  host  to  707 
regional headquarters of multinational companies, more than any other city in mainland 
China. 
Apart from the agglomeration of financial firms, the legal and regulatory environment is 
considered vital for financial institutions. Under financial statism, the state endeavoured 
to build a legal infrastructure that met international standards. After continuous efforts 
over two decades, a legal framework had taken shape, including the Company Law, the 
Securities Law, and the Securities Investment Fund Law, Enterprises Bankruptcy Law, 
Property  Law  and  Insurance  Law  (see  Herd  2010).  These  were  supplemented  by  a 
number  of  regulations  and  administrative  rules,  such  as  Provisional  Regulations  on 
Public Offering and Trading and Provisional Regulations on Futures Trading, as well as 
over 300 departmental rules, guidelines, and codes (Neftci et al. 2007, p. 31).   
Meanwhile, Shanghai‘s municipal government also promulgated a series of regulations. 
The landmark legislation - Provision on Promoting the Development of International 
Financial Centres in Shanghai - was enacted on 1
st August 2009, in an effort to create 
an internationally competitive environment. This is the first provincial-level legislation 
in the country with respect to financial centre development. Table 6.5 lists some major 
administrative rules and regulations developed by the SMC since 1990 concerning the 
development  of  the  SIFC.  These  regulations  (in  conjunction  with  state-level  laws) 
provide a comprehensive legislative framework to promote the SIFC‘s development. 
Furthermore, to ensure expeditious and effective resolution of disputes, a special court – 
The Shanghai Court of Financial Arbitration- was established in 2007.     
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Regulations on Foreign 
Debts 
05/08/1990  Specifies  approval  procedures  and 
management  regarding  the  activities  of 
borrowing foreign debts.   
Interim Provisions of 
Shanghai Municipality 
on the Administration of 
the Lujiazui Finance and 
Trade Centre Zone  
01/08/1998  Specifies comprehensive management of the 
Lujiazui zone covering transportation, road 
facilities, green land, building, construction 
etc. 
Administrative Measures 
to Promote Financial 
Institutions to Develop in 
Shanghai   
28/05/2002  Sets  up  Shanghai  Development  Fund;  to 
provide  tax  exemptions  for  staff  of 
newly-established financial firms etc. 




01/02/2004  Specifies  investigation,  collection  and 
management  of  individual  credit 
information 
Measures of Reforming 
and Developing Capital 
Markets 
01/07/2004  Specifies objectives and measures to speed 
up capital market development in Shanghai, 
covering securities markets, futures markets 
and equity markets etc. 
Implementation of 
Administrative Measures 
for MNCs to Set up 
Regional Headquarters in 
Shanghai 
15/11/ 2008  Provides  rewards  and  subsidies  to 
newly-established  regional  headquarters  of 
MNCs;  provides  facilities  to  fund 
management,  overseas  expatriates  and 
customs‘ clearance. 
Provision of Promoting 
the Development of 
International Financial 
Centres in Shanghai 
01/09/2009  The  first  local  legislation  to  promote  the 
SIFC‘s development. 
Source: Compiled by Author 
Consolidating Synergies among Different Parties 
The development of an international financial centre involves a number of different 
parties. The central-local government relationship is one of the most important factors 
in  any  state-led  IFC  development.  It  is  worth  highlighting  that  China‘s  reform  and  
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policy  measures  in  further  opening  and  marketization  are  not  in  the  hands  of  the 
Shanghai Municipal Government and the city cannot take such initiatives on its own. 
On the other hand, a blueprint cannot turn into reality without the involvement of local 
government. Central and municipal governments might have different policy priorities 
and these sometimes conflict.    This is one of the differences between Shanghai and 
other city-state financial centres like Singapore. For it to succeed, Shanghai needed to 
make extra efforts to coordinate with the central government and other neighbouring 
provinces to ensure the plan was widely accepted and was given national and regional 
support (Chen 2007).   
Against this background, the coordination and incentive mechanism between central 
and local government were crucial. With dominant state ownership in financial assets, 
the bureaucrats from local and central government are not only able to collaborate for 
government goals, but also motivated by the appreciation of state-owned assets. In this 
way, financial statism is advantageous in coordinating central and local government in 
the  course  of  SIFC‘s  development.  For  instance,  every  five  years,  there  was  a 
development plan that clarified major objectives, policy measures and action plans for 
the SIFC‘s development. Planning for the SIFC entailed interaction between the central 
and municipal government, which usually involved regular and ongoing consultation 
with  relevant  stakeholders  to  facilitate  a  top-down  and  bottom-up  process.  This 
continues to this day. There are also various seminars, workshops or fieldwork surveys 
jointly held by government officials and financial practitioners from time to time. Some 
of  these  now  enjoy  a  worldwide  reputation,  e.g.  the  Lujiazui  Forum
52.  Such 
communication and dialogue have not only resolved problems and bottlenecks but also 
served to provide feedback on a wide range of issues.   
One particular feature of financial statism is the preferential access the state  managers 
have to financial information. This is useful when the state managers are responsible for 
                                                 
52  The  Lujiazui  Forum  was  created  in  2008  as  a  high-level  global  platform  for  influential 
government  officials,  world  financial  leaders  and  prestigious  scholars  to  discuss  and  foster 
international financial cooperation. Named after the financial district of Shanghai, China‘s financial 
capital, the Forum also symbolises Shanghai‘s vision of becoming a leading IFC.  
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formulating industrial policies and promoting IFCs‘ development. This is at odds with 
some developed countries, such as the United Kingdom and United States, where the 
financial industry is primarily dominated by the private sector. In China, the central and 
local authorities own a large number of financial assets, including commercial banks, 
securities firms, insurance companies, fund management companies etc (see Table 6.2 
for example). The government is therefore in a better position to collect information and 
formulate feasible plans and policies. Applying policy measures or development plans 
does not mean the government can override the decisions of individual banks and firms. 
These measures belong to the industrial sphere, which means they are accessible to all 
financial companies, whether state-owned or foreign. What I tend to emphasise here is 
that financial statism, to some extent, has strengthened the capacity of the Chinese state 
in managing the reform agenda. 
In 2009, China‘s cabinet - the State Council - unveiled a landmark document - Plan on 
promoting  Shanghai  to  accelerate  the  development  of  modern  service  industry  and 
advanced  manufacturing  industry  through  building  an  international  financial  centre 
and international shipping centre (aka The Double Centre Plan). The State Council 
formally stated that by 2020 Shanghai would be built into an international financial 
centre  compatible  with  the  country‘s  economic  strength  and  the  Renminbi‘s 
international status. In the document, the state pledges to transform Shanghai from a 
domestic  financial  centre  to  an  international  one,  although  the  authority  was  still 
cautious in defining the date of full liberalisation for the Renminbi. According to the 
Double Centre Plan, Shanghai would establish an international financial centre by 2020, 
which must have: 
  A multi-functional and highly internationalised financial market system   
  A pool of internationally competitive financial institutions 
  A pool of financial professionals 
  A compatible system of taxation, credit, regulation and law 
In response to the Double Centre plan, Shanghai‘s municipal government released The 
Implementation Guideline to Develop an International Financial and Shipping Centre 
by 2020, which includes a broad set of comprehensive measures to promote the SIFC‘s 
development (see Appendix 3 for details). The guidelines cover a wide range of issues  
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including the expansion of the breadth of financial markets, promoting further opening 
up  of  financial  markets,  boosting  the  development  of  various  financial  institutions, 
improving  modern  financial  support  systems,  accelerating  financial  innovation  and 
business development etc.   
Table  6.6  Key  measures  to  support  the  SIFC‘s  development  by  the  municipal 
government 
  Develop Shanghai into a national clearance centre for bills exchange. 
  Introduce new futures products such as crude oil, gasoline, diesel oil and asphalt etc. 
  Develop over-the-counter markets for non-listed companies in the Yangtze River 
  Develop the re-insurance market 
  Encourage the set-up of a qualified foreign limited partnership scheme 
  Boost  the  development  of  various  debt  instruments,  e.g.  corporate  bonds, 
asset-backed bonds, revenue bonds, foreign currency bonds, etc. 
  Develop  various  financial  derivatives,  e.g.  stock  index  futures,  Treasury  bond 
futures, foreign exchange futures, stock index options, and gold ETF etc. 
  Pioneer pilot programmes for tax-deferred pension products. 
  Expand the types of financial services, e.g. IPR pledge financing, insurance policy 
credit financing, SMEs network joint guarantee loans, etc. 
  Establish a cross-border payment and clearance system for Renminbi-denominated 
trading 
  Expand  issuance  of  Renminbi-denominated  bonds  by  international  development 
agencies, foreign incorporated banks and other qualified overseas institutions 
  Encourage the development of private equity and venture capital companies 
Source: Adapted from Shanghai municipal government, SMG (2009) 
Moreover, state-ownership of financial institutions provides an important linkage that 
binds the state banks to the municipal government. For example, a series of memoranda 
were signed between the Shanghai municipal government and the five largest national 
banks  (notably  ICBC,  BOC,  CCB,  ABC  and  Bank  of  Communication)  to  establish 
strategic  partnerships  in  promoting  the  SIFC‘s  development.  According  to  the 
memoranda,  these  state  banks  expressed  an  intention  to  strengthen  collaborative 
relationships with Shanghai‘s municipal government and to foster financial markets and 
new institutions in Shanghai (interview 6).   
In  summary,  financial  statism  has  been  effective  in  modernising  infrastructure  and 
improving  the  investment  environment.  It has  boosted the  agglomeration  of  various 
financial institutions and markets in Shanghai. Furthermore, financial statism has laid a  
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sound  foundation  for  collaboration  between  the  central  and  local  government  in 
promoting the SIFC. 
6.2.3 Meta-Level 
At the meta-level, the relevant components of financial statism have been its restrictive 
measures on capital accounts and currency convertibility. It is widely recognised that 
capital controls are the underlying reason China remained unscathed amid two financial 
crises, notably the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 and the global financial crisis of 
2008(e.g. Zhou 2000; Gu and Sheng 2005). 
In the Asian financial crisis countries such as Thailand, The Philippines, South Korea 
and Malaysia were severely damaged and their currencies were considerably devalued, 
with  a  commensurate  spread  of  bankruptcies  and  economic  catastrophes.  However, 
China‘s economy was barely touched by the crisis. Some commentators attributed this 
to  China‘s  capital  controls  and the  absence of  currency convertibility (Lardy, 2000; 
Baek 2005, p.486). In particular, Gu and Sheng (2005) describe capital controls as the 
―Great Wall of Chinese Economy‖ and summarise three merits for national economic 
interests:   
  Capital controls preserve domestic savings for domestic use, facilitate the taxation of 
investment  income,  and  block  capital  flight  during  economic  recession,  political 
turbulence or social turmoil   
  Capital controls protect domestic underdeveloped industries from foreign competition 
before they grow to an efficient scale to compete in the world market 
  Capital controls provide the least disadvantageous solution to the destabilising effect 
of capital flows on poorly regulated financial systems 
The  Asian  financial  crisis  in  1997-98  had  a  profound  impact  on  the  development 
process of the SIFC. The crisis prompted the need for better regulatory and supervision 
systems in the financial sector across a globalising world. In Shanghai, government 
think  tanks,  such  as  the  Shanghai  Academy  of  Social  Science  and  the  Shanghai 
Development Research Centre (SDRC), carried out a range of studies on the origins of 
the Asian financial crisis and its impact on the SIFC (Zhou 2000). These studies reveal 
that undue capital liberalisation was one of the reasons behind the crash. In particular,  
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some victim countries such as South Korea, introduced high-risk derivative products 
without prudential regulation and supervision. This led to huge market volatility and 
became a major source of the crisis.   
Thereafter, there was a growing consensus that the pace of financial liberalisation in 
China  should  be  aligned  with  the  country‘s  macroeconomic  fundamentals  and  the 
strength of its financial system (Zhou 2000). Hasty capital account liberalisation can be 
extremely risky before a well-managed banking system and a prudential supervision 
framework are in place (Cooper 1999). In other words, the capital account can only be 
fully  liberalised  after  achieving  macroeconomic  stability,  ensuring  that  the  banking 
system is strong and competitive. If a country gives up capital controls prematurely, 
financial liberalisation would harm rather than benefit the national economy. Thereafter, 
China‘s political leaders became more alert to the dangers of financial liberalisation and 
so continued their imposition of restrictions on foreign equity investments as well as 
portfolio investments. The mainland stock exchanges remain closed to foreign investors 
to preclude international speculation. As Prasad and Wei (2007) observed: 
The idea of capital account liberalisation by 2000 disappeared, and in its place rose the 
notion  that  the  higher  the  level  of  foreign  exchange  reserves,  the  better  the  chance  of 
avoiding painful crises (p.453). 
Following China‘s entry to the WTO in 2001, its exports have increased rapidly and the 
country has experienced a massive surplus in its current account (Luo 2012). Its foreign 
reserves have also increased considerably. At the end of 2011, Chinese foreign reserves 
reached USD 3.18 trillion - China held the world‘s largest foreign reserves and was the 
US government‘s largest creditor. During the global financial crisis in 2008, the Chinese 
economy  showed  strong  resilience  and  has  been  expanding  at  an  impressive  rate. 
Whereas the rest of the world economy shrank by 0.6 percent in 2009, China reported 
growth of 8.7 percent (Subacchi and Huang 2012).   
Financial statism  provided a unique situation for China‘s economy  and the nation‘s 
economic policies. The study demonstrates that it played an active role in mobilising 
savings, streamlined structural change and averted carnage in the wake of the Asian 
financial crises over the past two decades. Under financial statism China has succeeded 
not only in avoiding a severe transitional crisis, but also managed to ―make transition a  
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source  of  growth‖  (Herr  and  Priewe  1999).  This  also  suggests  perhaps  that  our 
knowledge of transition processes should not be restricted to conventional theories and 
concepts. 
6.3 The Disadvantages of Financial Statism 
While financial statism presents many opportunities, it also involves some risks in the 
long run. Lardy (1998) claims China has suffered serious problems due to resource 
misallocation resulting from the dominant state ownership of the financial sector. He 
argues that credit loans from state banks were not determined by the profit generated 
from the project but the social benefits it created. Profit maximisation was replaced by 
societal welfare maximisation.    If the SOEs could always obtain cheap funds from the 
state banks, it would be a disincentive for the former to improve performance and the 
latter would eventually collapse. In his own words: A high degree of state ownership is 
not only associated with poor lending decisions but also frequently is accompanied by 
overstaffing, overdevelopment of branch networks, and other practices that contribute to 
relatively high operating costs (Lardy 1998, pp.16-17). Given the scale and scope of 
political and economic interests involved, this would lead to costly bailouts by the state 
while the latter would act as the ―last resort‖. 
The state banks are keen to make loans to the SOEs. This has led to investment-driven 
development model – the preference to use capital rather than labour and technological 
innovation has produced excess demand for credit and over-investment, particularly in 
capital-intensive industries (Lardy 2012). In the long run, this will increase the liability 
of the SOEs, entailing high-risk exposure to asset bubbles and resource misallocation. 
Since commercial banks are able to obtain stable profits from interest margins, they 
have been reluctant to support riskier non-state sectors, especially SMEs and high-tech 
firms. The crowding-out effect makes it difficult for the non-state sector to access loans 
from state banks. Hence, the controlled interest  rates have undermined the long-run 
competitiveness of the national economy. As part of the Global Competiveness Report 
2010-11  published  by  the  World  Economic  Forum,  a  questionnaire  survey  was 
undertaken, which found that access to finance was the most problematic factor in doing 
business in China (WEF 2010b, p.128).  
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In  reality,  the  financial  conditions  of  state  banks  have  deteriorated  due  to  the 
responsibility of making such ―policy loans‖. It is no exaggeration to say that China‘s 
state banks were on the edge of bankruptcy in the late 1990s. In 2001, the ―Big Four‖ 
were  saddled  with  enormous  non-performing  loans  (NPLs):  29.8  percent  for  the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, 27.5 percent for the Bank of China, 42.1 
percent for the Agricultural Bank of China and 19.4 percent for the China Construction 
Bank  (Table  6.7).  A  People‘s  Bank  of  China  survey  on  the  causes  of  state  banks‘ 
non-performing loans estimated that 70 per cent fell into the categories of policy and 
relationship loans
53. The capital asset ratio of these banks was below zero. According to 
Xie (2008), the capital-asset ratio for the Bank of China was  -2.02 percent in 2003, 
which was still the best among the ―Big Four‖. 
Table 6.7: The rate of non-performing loans in the ―Big Four‖ (2001-2006) 








2001  29.78  27.51  42.12  19.35 
2002  25.52  22.37  30.07  15.36 
2003  21.65  18.07  30.65  11.90 
2004  21.16  5.12  25.61  3.92 
2005  4.69  4.62  26.17  3.84 
2006  3.79  4.04  23.55  3.29 
Source: CBRC website, Annual Report of ICBC, BOC, ABC and CCB 
Furthermore, interest rate controls had also created an unfair market environment. As 
the  interest  margins  were  specified  by  the  central  bank,  state  banks  as  well  as 
newly-established joint-stock banks and even foreign banks could benefit from a free 
                                                 
53  According to the survey, 30 percent of the NPLs were the result of lending in response to state 
planning and administrative intervention; 30 percent resulted from defaults by state enterprises after 
state banks provided financing based on state policy; 10 percent were write-offs caused by structural 
adjustments that led to closures, the suspension of operations, mergers and relocation. ; 10 percent of 
delinquent loans stemmed from poor legal environment and weak law enforcement, while 20 percent 
was due to inappropriate internal management (Zhou 2004). This provided a basis for addressing the 
NPLs and designing the blueprint for state commercial bank reform.  
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ride – even though the latter two categories had never taken any responsibility for policy 
loans. Meanwhile, the guaranteed margin of interest rates to banks, which would make 
it difficult to evaluate bank performances, ran the risk of a new type of soft budget 
constraint problem. Besides this, under specified interest margins, household depositors 
were  likely  to  lose  interest  earnings  as  they  were  precluded  from  choosing  their 
favoured financial instruments based on their preferences for risks and profits because 
they had to deposit their savings in the state banks passively. 
Lardy‘s (1998) points are well-taken in the sphere of neo-classical economics. When 
capital is allocated by administrative forces, market forces will be repressed. However, 
if we put it in a more comprehensive framework from an interventionist perspective, the 
conclusion  might  be  different.  In  the  early  1990s,  when  Shanghai  proclaimed  the 
development of the IFC, the country was confronted by a number of challenges amid 
economic  transition,  including  institutional  failure,  market  deficiency,  infrastructure 
weakness  and brain drain etc. In these circumstances, political stability and societal 
welfare were of paramount importance for social and economic transition in China. 
Zhang (2010, p.5) argues that the large policy loans from state banks should be regarded 
as  a special form  of long-term treasury bonds  issued by the state. The interest  rate 
margins were a designated policy devised by the state to compensate state banks, as the 
latter were  funding the  country‘s transitional reform  (Zhang 2011, p.15). Therefore, 
non-performing loans in state banks were actually the costs that the state had to bear 
during this process. In this way, financial statism served as a mechanism for ensuring 
social stability and welfare.   
In  effect,  China‘s  political  leaders  persisted  in  their  belief  that  political  and  social 
stability were paramount for economic growth in the course of market transition. In this 
regard, China‘s financial statism has parallels with North‘s verdict (1981, 1992a). He 
argued that the state usually specifies rules that provide a structure of property rights to 
maximise profits accruing to the ruler (or ruling class/party), even though this may lead 
to lower efficiency. Financial statism has sacrificed economic efficiency to a certain 
extent for the sake of maintaining high levels of political and social stability. 
The conditioning at macro, meso and meta levels thus laid strong foundations for the 
SIFC‘s development at micro-level. Moreover, China‘s financial statism also led to the  
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segmentation of home and foreign markets due to stringent capital controls. This has led 
to the financial market in Shanghai being isolated from the global market, which has 
had a profound impact on Shanghai‘s transformation into an IFC. I will elaborate this in 
more detail in the next chapter.   
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7. The Performance of the SIFC under 
Financial Statism: A Micro-level Assessment 
 
The complete formulation of our economic policy is to give full play to 
the  basic  role  of  market  forces  in  allocating  resources  under  the 
macroeconomic guidance and regulation  of  the government.  We have 
one important piece of experience from the past thirty years, which is to 
ensure that both the visible hand and invisible hand are given full play in 
regulating market forces.   
--- Wen Jiabao
54   
 
This chapter provides an assessment of Shanghai‘s  IFC development at micro-level, 
focusing  on  the  advancement  of  financial  markets,  institutions  and  professionals  in 
Shanghai since the 1990s. Section 7.1 evaluates the depth and breadth of Shanghai‘s 
financial  markets,  covering  the  equity  market,  the  fixed  income  market,  the  futures 
market,  the  foreign  exchange  market,  derivatives  and  others.  I  will  then  discuss 
Shanghai‘s progress in the agglomeration of financial institutions, human capital and 
financial services and specify its strengths and weaknesses.  Section 7.3 provides an 
overall  picture  of  the  competitiveness  of  the  SIFC  in  comparison  with  other  IFCs 
worldwide as well as several major peer-cities elsewhere in China, e.g. Beijing and 
Hong Kong. The final section will summarise these discussions.   
   
                                                 
54  The  quotation  is  taken  from  Wen  Jiabao,  Premier  of  P.  R.  China  (2003-2013),when  he  was 
interviewed by CNN‘s Fareed Zakaria in September 2008  
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7.1 Development of Financial Markets: Depth and Breadth 
The building of Shanghai as an international financial centre began in earnest in the 
1990s. Since then, this city‘s financial sector has witnessed rapid progress. Figure 7.1 
shows Shanghai‘s financial service output has maintained relatively stable growth since 
1990. In 2012, Shanghai‘s financial service sector generated added value of RMB 245 
billion, which was 35 times its 1990 total. The weight of financial services‘ output in 
total  GDP  terms  also  increased  from  nine  percent  in  1990  to  12  percent  in  2012. 
Although the development of the financial industry was relatively slow between 1999 
and 2005, with its weight declining from 13.8 percent to 7.3 percent
55, it recovered and 
experienced strong growth again after 2005.   
Figure 7.1:  Shanghai financial services output and its share of GDP (1990-2012) 
 
Source: Shanghai Statistics Yearbook 2011 
                                                 
55  There are two reasons that can explain the falling weight of financial services in total GDP terms 
between 1999 and 2005: Firstly, after the Asian financial crisis, Shanghai‘s municipal government 
stepped up its efforts to develop advanced manufacturing industry, fearing the city might suffer a 
―hollowing-out‖ effect without the support of a ―real‖ economy. Secondly, the central government 
also tightened its regulation and management of the financial sector to reduce systematic risks and 
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Indeed, it was a challenging task for the Shanghai municipal government to develop an 
international financial centre when the city was a bridgehead of planned economy in the 
early 1990s. One of Shanghai‘s tactics for IFC development was to become a gathering 
point for various financial markets in the country. Between 1990 and 2006, Shanghai 
developed a stock market, a bond market, a foreign exchange market, a commodity and 
financial futures market, a gold and diamond exchange and an equity over-the-counter 
(OTC)  market  (Table  7.1).  This  enabled  the  emergence  of  robust  and  integrated 
financial markets, which in turn became the catalyst for the agglomeration of a critical 
mass  of  financial  institutions  and  professionals.  Shanghai  thus  became  the  de  facto 
domestic financial hub in mainland China.   
Table 7.1: The development of major markets in Shanghai 






including stocks and 
bonds 
1990  National market share 69% in 







1994  National headquarters 
National Inter-bank 
lending centre 
Money Market  1996  National headquarters 
National Inter-bank 
Bond Trading Centre 




market include copper, 
zinc, rubber etc. 








Spot market for gold, 
silver and platinum 




Spot market for LPG, 
LNG   
2006  The only petroleum spot 





2006  The only financial futures 
exchange in the country 
Source: compiled by author 
In  addition,  the  market  capitalisation,  turnover  and  variety  of  products  traded  in 
Shanghai‘s financial markets have all increased substantially in recent years. As of 2010, 
the turnover of Shanghai‘s financial market totalled at RMB 386.2 trillion (excluding  
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the foreign exchange market): the securities market turnover totalled RMB 39.8 trillion; 
the futures market RMB 123.4 trillion; the inter-bank market RMB 179.5 trillion
56; and 
the gold market RMB 2.02 trillion (PBoC 2011). The growth of the financial markets 
has  become the key strength  in  Shanghai‘s  ascendance  to  an  international  financial 
centre.   
Equity Market 
The incorporation of the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) in 1990 marked the start of 
equity markets in China. In one sense, it was also the launching pad for the SIFC‘s 
development. In 1992, the market capitalisation of the SSE only amounted to RMB 56 
billion (see Table A8 in Appendix 2). Since then, we have witnessed momentous growth 
in Shanghai‘s equity market.   
Table 7.2: A comparison of the largest stock exchanges in the world (2011) 




  Exchanges  Value of 
Share Trading 
USD   
billion 
1  NYSE Euronext (US)  11,796  1  NYSE Euronext (US)  18,027 
2  NASDAQ OMX (US)  3,845  2  NASDAQ OMX (US)  12,724 
3  Tokyo Stock Exchange    3,325  3  Tokyo Stock Exchange    3,972 
4  London Stock 
Exchange   
3,266  4  Shanghai Stock 
Exchange 
3,658 
5  NYSE Euronext 
(Europe) 
2,447  5  Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange 
2,838 
6  Shanghai Stock 
Exchange 
2,357  6  London Stock 
Exchange 
2,837 
7  Hong Kong Exchange  2,258  7  NYSE Euronext 
(Europe) 
2,134 
8  TMX Group  1,912  8  Korea Exchange  2,029 
9  BM & FBOVESPA  1,229  9  Deutsche Borse  1,758 
10  Australian SE  1,198  10  TMX Group  1,542 
  Source: WFE (2012) 
                                                 
56  The inter-bank market includes overnight lending (RMB 27.9 trillion), bonds‘ trading (RMB 64 
trillion) and repos (RMB 87.6 trillion).  
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Figure 7.2: Market capitalisation of the SSE (1992-2011) 
 
Source: Yearbook of Shanghai 1996-1997, Yearbook of China‘s Securities and Futures Market 2011, 
Year book of Shanghai Stock Exchange 
Figure 7.3: Fund raised through shares in the SSE (1995-2011) 
 
Source: Yearbook of Shanghai 1996-1997, Yearbook of China‘s Securities and Futures Market 2011, 
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According  to  the  SSE  Statistical  Yearbook,  at  end-2011  Shanghai  had  nearly  1,700 
listed securities (including shares, bonds, funds and warrants) and 931 listed companies, 
of which 39 were new listings. Listed stocks had a market capitalisation of RMB 14.8 
trillion,  representing  69  percent  of  national  share.  In  terms  of  fundraising,  the  SSE 
generated RMB 320 billion through the issue of new stock offerings during 2011 (see 
Figure 7.3). By the end of 2011, the SSE had over 87 million investor accounts, with a 
total turnover of RMB 45.4 trillion, of which the value of stock trading totalled RMB 
23.8  trillion.  Within  only  two  decades,  the  SSE  has  grown  to  be  the  sixth  largest 
exchange in the world in terms of market capitalisation. The turnover of stock trading 
has surged to fourth in the world (Table 7.2). In addition, in 2011 Shanghai also became 
the sixth largest IPO market in the world.   
How  could  this  surge  happen  in  such  a  short  period?  During  the  early  stage,  state 
intervention played a significant role in jump-starting the stock market development. 
From 1993 to 2000, stock issuance was managed by the central government through 
administrative measures based on a quota system. This created incentives for provincial 
government officials to screen companies at the IPO stage (Pistor and Xu 2005). This, 
in turn, encouraged local bureaucrats to pick better-performing SOEs in the region for 
public listing as they would then be rewarded with more stock issuance quotas from 
central government (Du and Xu 2006). In the meantime, priority was given to SOEs in 
accordance with the policy guidance adopted by the government agencies (see Section 
6.2.1). As a result, the bulk of shares listed on the market were owned by the state, as 
most of the firms going public were former SOEs. 
In the meantime, in order to fund the SOEs while maintaining state control, pre-existing 
shares prior to an IPO were designated non-tradable; only the new shares that issued 
during an IPO or a follow-on offering were tradable. In this way, the shares in listed 
companies were segmented. By 2005, 62 percent of the SOE shares were owned by the 
government and were legally non-tradable (Allen et al 2007). However, in practice, the 
coexistence of tradable share and non-tradable shares created some adverse effects. The 
most serious drawback was that the holders of tradable and non-tradable shares had  
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divergent rights and interests. For example, the major shareholders with non-tradable 
shares  tried  to  maximise  the  book  value  of  their  companies  by  issuing  more 
non-tradable shares in order to exploit the liquidity premium
57  (Chan et al 2007). For 
another, non-tradable shareholders were unable to sell their shares when the stock price 
was going up. Some high-performing private enterprises thus sought to list on overseas 
exchanges,  such  as  the  NYSE,  NASDAQ  and  HKSE  (Fang  2013).  In  2005,  the 
authorities decided to carry out reform s to convert non-tradable shares into tradable 
ones and thereby make management more accountable to shareholders. These reforms 
were completed in 2007, leading to the surge of Shanghai Composite Index peaking at 
6,124 on 16
th October.   
Despite  rapid  expansion,  there  are  still  a  number  of  problems  in  Shanghai‘s  stock 
market. First of all, it is overly volatile and entails an element of high risk. In 2007, the 
Shanghai Stock Composite Index jumped 96.7 percent and market capitalisation soared 
by 302.7 percent higher than the year before; yet from October 2007 to June 2008 the 
index dropped 55 percent - the market resembled a roller-coaster ride. Poor regulation 
and a lack of institutional investors (i.e. insurance companies, mutual funds, pension 
funds or hedge funds) increased the likelihood of speculation. The industrial structure of 
listed companies in China was another reason for the volatility. In the SSE, the top three 
listed industrial sectors are finance, real estate and energy, all of which are cyclical and 
sensitive to the money supply. This contrasts with the situation in the United States, 
where  the  top  listed  sectors  are  less  cyclical,  such  as  healthcare  and  information 
technology (Interview 9). Given that the industrial structure cannot change overnight, 
high volatility will likely remain a factor for some time to come.   
Secondly,  the  equity  market  has  yet  to  function  effectively  as  a  vehicle  for  capital 
relocation. The stock price can not reflect the performance of listed companies and 
macro-economic conditions, but is sensitive to policy change. Since the bulk of listed 
                                                 
57  Liquidity premium refers to the price difference between the market value of the tradable shares 
and book value of non-tradable shares (Chan 2007). Although non-tradable shares could not be 
traded at the Stock Exchange directly, they could still transfer through agreement or auction.    
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companies were SOEs, the soaring stock market has often been attributed to ―the low 
costs of direct financing, underdeveloped performance control on listed companies and 
the small burden of dividends‖ (Baek 2005, p. 490). Apart from that, the stock market 
remains  restricted  in  available  instruments,  legal  structures  are  still  deficient  and 
transparency is rather limited. 
Thirdly,  the  equity  markets  remain  largely  closed  to  outside  investors.  Foreign 
investment in securities firms is even more restrictive than in the banking and insurance 
sectors. It has created an A-share and B-share market, with the former for domestic 
investors and the latter for foreign investors. This structure has been created to protect 
domestic firms from foreign control because the central government continues to restrict 
the free flow of capital in the capital account (Chan et al 2007). In effect, A-shares play 
the  central  role  in  the  stock  market  development,  overshadowing  the  much  smaller 
foreign  currency  B-share  market.  Consequently,  the  liquidity  of  B  share  markets  in 
China  was  very  poor.  Although  in  2001  Chinese  authorities  changed  the  rules  and 
allowed domestic investors to use foreign currency to invest in B shares, the market still 
seems unsustainable. In 2013, China International Marine Containers (CIMC) became 
the first company to  convert its Shenzhen-based B shares into Hong Kong-listed H 
shares (Noble 2013).   
For the reason of capital control policies, the development of Shanghai‘s equity market 
has lagged behind other leading Stock Exchanges, such as New York and London. In 
2010, there were 816 foreign companies listed in New York, making up 16 percent of 
total listed companies. The number of foreign companies listed in London was 604, 
accounting for around 20 percent of the total (SFPI 2011). However, foreign companies 
are still not allowed to be listed in mainland China‘s stock exchange. The sheer scale of 
stock trading in Shanghai was mainly achieved domestically and the rate of foreign 
investors  in  Chinese  capital  market  has  been  very  low.  Due  to  the  low  degree  of 
internationalisation,  Shanghai‘s  stock  market  has  little  influence  in  the  Asia-Pacific 
region, let alone globally.   
Fixed Income Market 
In China, the bond markets consist of an inter-bank market (i.e. an OTC market) and an  
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exchange market. China‘s inter-bank bond market was developed in 1997 when the 
central bank declared that commercial banks were prohibited from trading bonds in the 
exchanges.  Alternatively,  they  were  allowed  to  trade  through  the  China  Foreign 
Exchange Trading System (CFETS) in Shanghai. In 1999，other financial institutions 
such as securities firms and fund management companies were permitted to participate 
in the inter-bank bond market. The inter-bank bond market thus became a national bond 
trading market mainly for large institutional investors. In contrast, the exchange bond 
market was an order-driven market brokered by securities companies. The bonds listed 
in the exchange market include treasury-bonds, corporate bonds and repos. In contrast 
to the inter-bank market, the major players in the exchange market were primarily small 
investors and individuals. The SSE was the most important bond exchange market in the 
country, making up over 90 percent in terms of trading value (Figure 7.4). 
Figure 7.4: The value of bond trading in Shanghai Stock Exchange (1996-2011) 
 
Source：  Yearbook of China‘s Securities and Futures Market 2011 
It is noteworthy that the role of the bond markets in China - whether the inter-bank 
market or the exchange market - were rather limited before 2005. In 2004, bond trading 
turnover in the SSE stood at RMB 5 trillion, while that of interbank trading was valued 
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under financial statism the SOEs could attain funding from state banks at preferential 
interest  rates.  There  were  no  incentives  for  them  to  raise  funds  through  the  bond 
markets  (interview 9).  Coincidentally,  SOEs were not  financially constrained before 
corporate reforms
58, which meant they would face  few adverse consequences if they 
defaulted on their debts or filed for bankruptcy. As a matter of fact, in the early 1990s 
SOEs issued excessive bonds and m ost of them ended up in default (Huang and Zhu 
2009). These defaults led to increases in non-performing assets on the balance sheets of 
state-owned banks, the major holders of  such securities. The central government thus 
decided to tighten the regulations and close down the corporate bond market. Therefore, 
compared with government-issued bonds, the size of  the corporate bond market was 
minuscule (Allen et al 2007). The low-volume of corporate bonds have constrained 
efficient pricing in the secondary market and hindered growth. Another reason  for its 
beleaguered growth is institutional weakness and deficiencies relating to bond issuance, 
such  as  the  absence  of  a  credit  rating  system,  a  sound  accounting  system  and 
information disclosure mechanisms (Zhou 2005). In a speech  to China‘s bond market 
development summit, the governor of the PBoC, Zhou Xiaochuan contended:   
Compared with other financial instruments … China‘s corporate bond market has been 
developing very slowly and its role in economic growth has been rather limited. Such lack 
of  development  has  also  distorted  the  financing  structure  and  produced  considerable 
implicit risks, whose consequences may be grave for social and economic development. 
(quoted in Walter and Howie, 2010) 
Surprisingly, China‘s bond markets have experienced rapid growth since 2005. In the 
interbank bond market, the turnover jumped dramatically from RMB 2.5 trillion in 2004 
to the peak of RMB 64 trillion in 2010, representing a 25 times-plus increase in only six 
years (Figure 7.5). The trading value of the bond exchange market had totalled RMB 
                                                 
58  The  corporate  reforms  of  SOEs  refer  to  establish  a  ―modern  enterprises  system‖  (MES), 
characterized  by  ―clearly  established  property  rights,  well-defined  powers  and  responsibilities, 
separation  of  the  enterprise  from  the  government  and  scientific  management‖  (also  see  section 
6.2.1).  
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21.6 trillion by the end of 2011 and the SSE accounted for 97 percent
59  of this figure. 
The listed number of bonds increased from 24 in 1996 to 680 in 2011.  Trading value 
surged to RMB 21 trillion; almost three time that of 2010. 
Figure 7.5: The turnover in Shanghai‘s inter-bank bond market (2002-2011) 
 
Source: Yearbook of China‘s Securities and Futures Market 2011 
There are a number of reasons for the rapid growth of the bonds markets since 2004. 
Firstly, corporate bonds are increasingly seen as an alternative source of capital that may 
transform  China  away  from  a  bank-driven  credit  economy.  For  example,  the  State 
Development Bank has taken over part of the policy lending from the state banks and 
financed it through  bond issues,  which is  viewed as  ―replacing non-interest  bearing 
money with interest bearing debt‖ (Hofman 1998). Meanwhile, the number of investors 
in  the  bond  markets  soared  after  2005.  At  the  end  of  2010,  there  were  10,235 
participants  in  the  inter-bank  bond  markets,  an  increase  of  44.3  percent  over  2007. 
Besides, the participants in the inter-bank bond markets were becoming more diverse; 
with  new  entrants  including  commercial  banks,  insurance  companies,  mutual  funds, 
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credit cooperatives, non-bank financial institutions and securities companies (KPMG 
2011). A number of qualified international institutions are now also permitted to trade 
on the inter-bank bond markets. 
Secondly, both the central government and the municipal government stimulated growth 
in the domestic bond markets by promoting new issues. The inter-bank bond market, for 
example, has gradually become the main platform for allocating capital and conveying 
monetary policies (KPMG 2011). Since 2000, the state has allowed the bigger SOEs to 
issue bonds and these can be invested by institutional investors (mainly large banks and 
other  financial  institutions)  through  the  inter-bank  market  (interview  9).  Companies 
have also become more sensitive to cost of capital and have been looking for alternative 
ways of financing themselves (Huang and Zhu 2009). With the expansion of markets in 
breadth and depth, a yield curve for the inter-bank bond market has been established 
and provides a basis for the pricing of financial products in China. Furthermore, the 
regulatory  agency  also  took  measures  to  facilitate  bonds‘  application.  In  2010,  the 
CSRC shortened the application duration to 30 days for new bond issuance applicants 
providing they met certain criteria
60  (SFPI 2012).   
The third point relates to the introduction of new fixed income products. Between 2005 
and  2010,  the  central  government  launched  short -term  bonds,  corporate  bonds, 
medium-term  notes  and  SMEs‘  collective  notes  (KPMG  2011).  In  addition,  trading 
mechanisms have also diversified from spot transaction and collateralised repos to such 
as  outright  repo,  bond  forward  transactions,  interest  rate  swaps  and  forward  rate 
agreements. In November 2011, the local government was also permitted to launch a 
pilot scheme to issue bonds on the inter-bank bond market.   
The money market is another important component of the fixed income market, which 
provides a short-term (usually of less than one year) lending and savings option for 
commercial  banks  and  other  financial  firms.  This  is  in  marked  contrast  to  capital 
                                                 
60  The applicants can simplify the application process if they meet certain criteria. They must have: 
(1) over 10 billion in net assets; (2) a AAA credit rating; (3) be institutional investors; (4) invest 
bonds with a duration of one to three years.        
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markets, which provide long-term funding underpinned by stocks and bonds. The core 
business of the money market is inter-bank lending and bond repurchasing (i.e. repo). 
As shown in figure 7.6, the turnover in inter-bank lending market hovered at RMB 1.5 
trillion between 2002 and 2006. Then it grew dramatically to RMB 10.7 trillion in 2007. 
In 2011, turnover reached RMB 33.4 trillion, nearly three times the 2007 figure. The 
turnover of bond repos has increased even more quickly than the inter-bank lending. In 
2002, the turnover of repos stood at RMB 10.2 trillion – by the end of 2011, it had risen 
sharply to RMB 99.5 trillion(Figure 6.6).   
Figure 7.6: The turnover of interbank lending and repos in Shanghai‘s money market 
(2002-2011) 
 
Source: PBoC, The Report on China‘s Monetary Policies, 2002-2011 
It  is  noteworthy  that  while  China‘s  bond  market  has  become  more  open  and 
market-oriented,  it  lags  behind  other  developed  markets  by  a  significant  margin.  In 
particular, the corporate bond market is dominated by a small number of issuers, mostly 
state-owned entities, while the vast majority of private companies and SMEs have yet to 
fully participate in it.   
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foodstuffs, petroleum, cereals & oil, chemical materials and building materials. In 1999, 
these  exchanges  were  merged  into  the  Shanghai  Futures  Exchange  (SFE).  In  2008, 
Shanghai ranked first in the world in the futures trading of rubber and second in copper, 
aluminium  and  zinc  behind  the  London  Metal  Exchange  (LME).  According  to  the 
Futures  Industry Association (FIA), the trading value of China‘s commodity futures 
markets (including Shanghai, Dalian and Zhengzhou) in 2010 was RMB 226.99 trillion. 
Shanghai‘s commodity futures market totalled RMB 123.4 trillion, accounting for 54.4 
percent of the total value in the country (see table A10 in Appendix 2). In terms of 
volume of commodity futures traded in 2010, Shanghai ranked 11
th among all futures 
exchanges in the world. Meanwhile, the scope of commodities traded on the SFE also 
increased rapidly. As can be seen from Table 7.3, there were only three items traded on 
the exchange in 2003 - aluminium, copper and natural rubber. Since 2004, the SFE has 
introduced fuel oil, gold, zinc, steel rebar, steel wire rod, plumbum and silver. As of 
2012, there were ten commodities traded on the SFE.   
On  8th  September  2006,  the  government  launched  the  Shanghai  Financial  Futures 
Exchange. Investors were granted access to stock index futures in April 2010. Shanghai 
became the first centre in the country to launch a stock index futures exchange, which 
not only helped to curtail stock exchange risks, but also provided the necessary pricing 
function. From the outset, the government imposed a relatively stringent set of rules 
including a threshold of RMB 500, 000 as the minimum deposit for a single trading 
account. By the end of 2011, 50.4 million contracts had been traded. The total value of 
trades in stock index futures in 2011 reached RMB 87.5 trillion. The introduction of 
stock index futures is another sign of the maturity of capital markets in China, which 
means investors are able to profit from both the rises and falls in the market through 
more sophisticated investment instruments.    
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Table 7.3: The commodities traded on the Shanghai Futures Exchange (2000-2012) 
Year  AL  CU  RU  FU  AU  ZN  RB  WR  PB  AG 
2000  √  √  √               
2001  √  √  √               
2002  √  √  √               
2003  √  √  √               
2004  √  √  √  √             
2005  √  √  √  √             
2006  √  √  √  √             
2007  √  √  √  √  √  √         
2008  √  √  √  √  √  √         
2009  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √     
2010  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √     
2011  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √   
2012  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Note:   
AL: Aluminium;    CU: Copper;    RU: Natural Rubber;      FU: Fuel Oil 
AU: Gold;      ZN: Zinc;      RB: Steel Rebar;      WR: Steel Wire Rod 
PB: Plumbum     AG: Silver 
―√‖ indicates commodity being traded in the exchange 
Source: Shanghai Futures Exchange website 
Nevertheless,  Shanghai‘s  futures  market  is  still  in  its  infancy.  The  market  price  of 
commodities can only reflect supply and demand in the domestic market, which remains 
largely segregated from the outside world (interview 9), as it is not yet open to foreign 
investors. Furthermore, the commodities traded in the futures exchange are relatively 
limited compared with other futures exchange in developed countries. As seen from 
Table 7.3, there were only 10 items traded on the SFE in 2012, while there were 815 
items traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and the Chicago Board of 
Trade (CBOT) (SFPI 2011). The limited variety of products traded in the futures market 
is also connected to tight approval procedures by regulatory bodies. As an interviewee 
commented: 
The government was overly concerned about the risks of trading derivative products in the 
futures  market.  Actually,  there  were  misunderstandings  about  futures  trading  among 
government officials. Shanghai, as an international financial centre, should take the lead to 
dispel undue misgivings surrounding derivatives. This would, to a large extent, contribute 
to the prosperity of China‘s futures market (interview 8).  
- 162 - 
Foreign Exchange Market, Derivatives Market and Others   
The foreign exchange market is a leading and broad indicator of the status of an IFC. Its 
volume of business generally rests on the presence of a sufficient number of banks, 
openness to foreign trade and a large international business base (Young et al., 2009 p. 
82). The development of Shanghai‘s foreign exchange market was closely associated 
with China‘s capital control regime and foreign exchange policies. In 1988, Shanghai 
was the first city in the country to set up a foreign exchange swap market, which can be 
regarded as an embryonic form of foreign exchange market. However, it had several 
deficiencies.  Firstly,  the  foreign  exchange  rate  under  the  swap  market  regime  was 
two-tiered; there was an official rate and a swap market rate. Secondly, the swap market 
was not unified throughout the country - other cities such as Fuzhou, Shenzhen, Xiamen 
and Beijing established their own swap markets. (Lou and Gao 2008)   
In April 1994, following exchange rate reform, the China Foreign Exchange Trading 
System  (CFETS)  was  created  in  Shanghai  and  it  operated  on  a  membership  basis 
(Neftci et al. 2007, pp.120-1) This changed the then two-tiered exchange-rate system, 
which  was  integrated  into  one  official  rate  (USD  1.00  =  RMB  8.70).  Moreover,  a 
unified foreign exchange market was established in Shanghai. Regulations concerning 
foreign exchange were also relaxed in 1995 when the Chinese government moved from 
an ―earn to use‖ to a ―buy to use‖ foreign exchange policy (Buckley et al. 2007; Luo et 
al. 2010, p.75). Between 1995 and 2005, China adopted a single, US dollar-pegged, 
managed  floating  exchange  regime.  The  exchange  rate  was  relatively  stable, 
appreciating only five percent cumulatively from 8.70 to 8.27 during that period. This 
exchange regime played an important role in boosting China‘s foreign trade during the 
Asian financial crisis and thereafter its accession into the WTO. In 2005, the central 
government further allowed the Renminbi to appreciate by 2.1 percent against the US 
dollar, with the PBoC announcing that the Renminbi would be decoupled from the US 
dollar and switched to a new exchange rate regime with reference to a basket of other 
currencies (Luo 2012, p.28).   
With the establishment of the CFETS in Shanghai, the turnover of foreign exchange 
transactions developed rapidly. As can be seen from Table 7.4, the turnover of spot 
transactions increased from USD 32 billion in 1999 to USD 3,554 billion in 2011. After  
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August 2005, the CFETS also started to trade outright forwards. The trading value of 
outright forwards amounted to USD 214.6 billion in 2011, growing from USD 14 billion 
in 2006. After that, the CFETS also introduced foreign exchange swaps and options in 
2006 and 2011 respectively. Meanwhile, CFETS membership was also growing. In 2011, 
the total number of members was 318; comprising 73 forward trading members; 71 
swaps traders, 27 options traders, 26 spot transaction dealers and 20 forward market 
dealers (SFPI 2012). 
Table 7.4: The growth of trading values and products in the foreign exchange market 
(1999-2011) 












1999  32    --  --  -- 
2000  42    --  --  -- 
2001  75    --  --  -- 
2002  97    --  --  -- 
2003  151    --  --  -- 
2004  209    --  --  -- 
2005  581  --  --  -- 
2006  1,162  14.1    50.9    -- 
2007  2,290  22.4    314.6    -- 
2008  2,470    17.4    440.3    -- 
2009  2,940    9.8    801.8    -- 
2010  3,050  32.7    1,283.8    -- 
2011  3,554    214.6    1,771.0    1.01 
Source: China‘s Yearbook of Banking and Finance 2007; PBoC, The Report on China‘s Monetary 
Policies, 2002-2011, Shanghai Financial Association. 
In recent years, the CFETS has also introduced more derivatives. Since 2006, interest 
rate swaps and bond forwards have been introduced and traded through the exchange. 
The  transactions  in  derivatives  markets  in  Shanghai  surged  in  2010  and  2011.  The 
trading value of interest rate swaps roared from RMB 461.64 billion in 2009 to RMB 
1500.34 billion in 2010 and further to RMB 2675.96 billion in 2011. Other derivatives 
such as bond forward and forward rate agreement instruments also traded in a stable 
fashion (Table 7.5). These derivatives provide diversified options for commercial banks 
and financial firms for short-term financing.    
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Table 7.5: The development of interest rate derivatives (2006-2011) 




Forward Rate Agreement 
RMB billion 
2006  35.57  66.45  -- 
2007  218.69  251.81  1.1 
2008  412.15  500.55  11.4 
2009  461.64  655.64  6.0 
2010  1500.34  318.34  3.4 
2011  2675.96  103.01  0.3 
Source: PBOC, The Report on China‘s Monetary Policies 2011 
It is also important to note that Shanghai‘s gold spot market has become the largest of 
its kind in the world, despite only launching as late as 2002. From 2007 to 2011, the 
total trading value of gold increased from RMB 316 billion to RMB 2,477 billion (see 
Figure 7.7). In 2010, the total trading volume of gold reached 6,051.5 tonnes, silver 
73,614.96  tonnes  and  platinum  54.69  tonnes  (SGE  2010).  Meanwhile,  gold  leases, 
mortgage  business  and  gold  trading  in  bulk  also  developed  rapidly.  In  2010,  the 
Shanghai Gold Exchange had 163 members, including large state owned banks, foreign 
financial institutions and other related firms.   
Figure 7.7: Turnover of gold trading in Shanghai Gold Exchange (2007-2011)
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Table  7.6  Selected  targets  and  actual  development  in  the  11
th  Five  Year  Plan 
(2006-2010) 
Note: 
a. Direct fundraising includes IPO, treasury bills, corporate bonds and short-term financial bills etc   
b. The actual data refers to banking assets only 
c. The actual data refers solely to the stock market 
Source: PBoC (2011), SFPI (2012), SMG (2006) 
The  central  government‘s  11th  Five  Year  Plan  (2006-2010)  detailed  a  three-phase 
development strategy to grow Shanghai into an international financial centre
63.  It is 
interesting  to  note  that  the  selective  quantitative  objectives  set  by  the  Shanghai 
Municipal Government were primarily related to financial markets‘ development (Table 
7.6). By 2010, Shanghai had nearly met the main targets set out in the plan. Furthermore, 
actual  turnover  has  substantially  exceeded  the  forecast  targets  for  the  size  of  the 
financial  market.  Shanghai  has  made  remarkable  progress  and  become  the 
                                                 
61  The insurance penetration rate is measured as the ratio of premiums underwritten in a particular 
year to the GDP. 
62  Insurance density is calculated as the ratio of total insurance premiums to the total population. 
63  The first phase of the three-phase development strategy was successfully completed by 2005. Its 
goal was to set up the foundations for a financial industry and consolidate Shanghai as a domestic 
financial  centre.  The  second  phase,  2006 -2010,  sought  the  establishment  of  a  fundamental 
framework of an IFC, focusing on financial services, instruments and products denominated in 
Renminbi. The third phase was to develop Shanghai into one of the major IFCs in the Asia-Pacific 
Region by 2020.     
Indicators  Target (2010)  Actual (2010) 
The  national  share  of  direct  fundraising  from 
Shanghai financial markets 
a 
25%  21.7% 
Total financial market trading turnover (RMB)  80 trillion  386.2trillion 
The national share of financial assets located in 
Shanghai 
10%  7.4% 
b 
Trading turnover in money market (RMB)  40 trillion  115.5 trillion 
Capital marketisation in securities market (RMB)  7 trillion  17.9 trillion 
c 
Total deposits outstanding (RMB)  4.5 trillion  5.2 trillion 
Total lending outstanding (RMB)  3.2 trillion  3.4 trillion 
Insurance penetration rate
61  5%  5.2% 
Insurance density
62  (RMB per capita)  4,000  3,840  
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best-developed city in terms of financial markets and infrastructure in mainland China. 
7.2 Financial Institutions, Human Capital and Services Innovation 
Financial Institutions 
Along with the stunning growth of financial markets, Shanghai has become the hub for 
domestic  and  foreign  financial  institutions.  As  mentioned  previously,  the  city  hosts 
China‘s leading stock exchange, a unique inter-banking market, the headquarters of the 
country‘s  foreign  exchange  trading  system  (CFETS)  and  a  major  commodity  and 
financial futures exchange. Viewing the SIFC development as a golden opportunity, one 
after another the leading banks and other financial institutions have established their 
branches or regional headquarters in Shanghai. In particular, it has also become the 
country‘s  asset  and  wealth  management  centre  as  a  growing  number  of  Non-bank 
Financial  Institutions  (NBFI)  have  set  up  offices  there,  including  fund  management 
companies, insurance asset management companies, investment banks, trust companies 
and private equity firms etc（Fang 2013, p.185）. Within the past two decades, the 
numbers of financial firms and institutions in Shanghai have grown remarkably. By the 
end of 2010, there were 1,049 financial institutions in the city; including 140 banking 
institutions, 138 securities firms and 320 insurance companies.   
The strong presence of foreign financial institutions is essential for the re-emergence of 
Shanghai as an international financial centre. The city now hosts the largest number of 
foreign investment banks and financial firms in mainland China, surpassing Beijing (see 
Section 7.3.2). By the end of 2010, Shanghai housed 173 foreign financial firms, more 
than double the 71 located there in  2000.  There were 21 domestically incorporated 
foreign banks
64  headquartered in Shanghai. These accounted for 68 percent of the total 
number of such institutions in China and 85 percent of the assets (Table 7.7). In spite of 
this, the city is nowhere near saturation point when it comes to foreign presence. 
                                                 
64  Domestically incorporated foreign banks were independent legal entities, and were subject to 
same regulations as domestic banks in China. Their equity capitals were warranted by the law and 
cannot be transferred to overseas, even if their parent banks were affected by the crisis.    
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Although the number of foreign banks has continued to expand quite rapidly in recent 
years, the total market share remains relatively inconsequential. In 2008, the balance of 
foreign bank assets only accounted for 17% of Shanghai‘s total bank assets (Zhao 2009, 
p.286). This was partly due to capital control policies, which restricted the financial 
services  that  foreign  banks  were  able  to  provide.  Consequently,  the  foreign  banks 
primarily  provided  corporate  services  to  foreign-invested  companies  and  private 
banking to wealthy individuals in Shanghai.   
Table 7.7: The growth of foreign financial institutions in Shanghai (2006-2010)   








Total Financial institutions  706  1,049  343  48.5%  N.A. 






a  N.A. 
# Foreign financial firms 
operating in Shanghai 
110  173  63  57.2%      N.A.   
# Foreign incorporated banks  0  21  21  -  68% 
# Joint venture Securities Firms  4  5  1  25%  45% 
# Foreign insurance Co  14  19  5  35.7%  36% 
# Joint venture fund management 
Co 
16  22  6  37.5%  63% 
Note: 
a.  The data refers to 2011 
Source: SFPI (2011), Shanghai Statistics Yearbook (2007-2011) 
In order to bolster the city‘s international recognition and enhance its status as an IFC, 
the central bank (i.e. PBoC) set up its second headquarters in Shanghai on 10
th August 
2005.  Under  this  dual-headquarters‘  structure,  its  Shanghai  base  focuses  mainly  on 
activities such as promoting financial innovation and market development, conducting 
market information analysis and coordinating regional financial development (Xinhua 
2005). The launch of the second headquarters was regarded as a signal from the central 
government to promote SIFC development. Nevertheless, it is arguable its significance 
is  overrated.  As  an  interviewee  from  the  Shanghai  Academy  of  Social  Sciences 
commented:   
The role that the Shanghai headquarters played is far away from that of New York Federal 
Reserve. In general, everyone would assume that the second headquarters of the central  
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bank would be responsible for market regulation. However, the CSRC, CBRC and CIRC in 
Beijing  actually  take  those  functions,  which  leave  the  Shanghai  headquarters  in  an 
awkward position (Interview 3).   
China‘s  ―Big  Four‖  state  banks  have  decided  to  relocate  their  Renminbi  business 
headquarters to Shanghai in recent years. In March 2012, one of the ―Big Four‖ – the 
Bank of China – has taken the lead by establishing its Renminbi business headquarters 
in Lujiazui, Shanghai. The other three state banks - ICBC, ABC and CCB - also said 
they would follow suit. The reasons were basically twofold: firstly, it was a concrete 
measure to bolster Shanghai‘s status as an IFC, which is also one of their political tasks; 
Secondly,  the  relocation  could  also  benefit  them  as  it  allows  them  to  stay  close  to 
market information because Shanghai has become the hub for various financial markets.     
Human Capital 
Human  capital  was  often  considered  as  the  most  significant  aspect  for  IFCs 
competitiveness (e.g. City of London 2003). In terms of total numbers of employees in 
the financial sector, Shanghai has become closer to other major IFCs. The number of 
financial employees in Shanghai increased to 278,000 in 2011, from roughly 95,000 in 
1999. In 2010, New York had 436,000 financial employees, London 315,000 and Tokyo 
328,000 (SFPI 2011). As for the ratio of financial staff to total employees, Shanghai had 
3.3 percent - much lower than other leading IFCs. New York comprised 8.5 percent; 
Tokyo 7.4 percent; London 6.5 percent; and Hong Kong 5.5 percent (Eoyang et al. 2010, 
p.42).   
One of the biggest challenges facing the development of the SIFC lies in its ability, or 
otherwise, to attract human resources. According to a survey conducted by the SFSO in 
2006, the managements in foreign banks were quite satisfied with entry-level recruits 
from universities but found it difficult to recruit experienced candidates for management 
positions  (Fang  2013,  p.147).  Therefore,  they  had  to  hire  university  graduates  and 
provide training by themselves, which incurred significant costs. To make matters worse, 
these trainees tended to be headhunted by other banks or firms after a couple of years. 
The finding of the survey suggested the talent pool in the financial sector in Shanghai 
was not broad enough.    
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Another  survey  undertaken  by  the  Shanghai  Financial  Industry  Association  in  2010 
drew  a  similar  conclusion:  a  large  number  of  financial  employees  were  at  the 
operational level (e.g. customer service/market and entry-level staff) but the city was 
short of high-skilled financial professionals, such as management executives, product 
development managers, researchers, investment advisers, risk managers and traders. 
Figure 7.8: The supply of financial professionals by position in Shanghai (2010) 
 
Source: SFPI (2011) 
In view of this, central and local government have spared no effort in recent years to 
enhance the training of local financial talent. The Shanghai Municipal Government has 
invested in a number of educational projects. For example, in 2009, RMB 320 million 
was  allocated  to  build  the  Advanced  Institute  of  Finance  in  Shanghai  Jiaotong 
University,  with  the  aim  of  encouraging  students  to  choose  careers  in  finance.  The 
government has also encouraged cooperation with top universities across the world to 
provide professional training for young talent in Shanghai. In 2010, Harvard University 
in the United States set up a research and teaching centre in  Lujiazui. In 2011, the 
Shanghai Fengxian district government signed a memorandum with the University of 
Nottingham in England to build up a new campus there. In the same year, the East 
China Normal University and the University of New York also agreed to launch a joint 
university in Shanghai.    
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Furthermore, the city government has also managed to attract financial expatriates to 
work in the SIFC. Following the global financial crisis of 2008, the Shanghai Municipal 
Government dispatched expert groups to several leading financial centres, such as New 
York, Hong Kong and Singapore to recruit skilled professionals in an attempt to attract 
casualties of the crisis to Shanghai. The municipal government also pledged to provide a 
friendlier, cleaner and more amenable environment for expatriates living in Shanghai. In 
particular,  it  built  more  international  schools  and  English-speaking  clinics  for 
expatriates and their families to allow them easier access to high-quality education and 
healthcare services. 
Another obstacle to attracting financial talent was Shanghai‘s unfavourable tax regime 
compared  with  those  operating  in  Hong  Kong  and  Singapore.  Hong  Kong‘s  ‗One 
country, two systems‘ income tax rate is relatively low. The highest tier of individual 
income tax is 17 percent; the standard rate is 15 percent. In Shanghai, the highest tier of 
individual  income  tax  could  have  been  as  high  as  45  percent.  To  provide  a  more 
favourable tax environment, Shanghai‘s  government decided to  provide subsidies to 
financial employees who had worked at the regional headquarters of banks and other 
financial firms. This new tax regime went into effect from 1
st January, 2010. According 
to  SFSO,  the  government  would  refund  tax  levied  over  the  rate  of  25  percent  to 
financial professionals in the name of ―Financial Talents Award‖(Fang 2013). In effect, 
the government subsidies have lowered the individual income tax rate from 45 percent 
to 25 percent.   
Services Innovation 
During the process of the SIFC‘s development, Shanghai had acted as a ‗guinea pig‘ for 
China's financial reform. A number of pilot projects were sanctioned by the relevant 
central government supervisory authorities that allowed them to operate or transact in 
Shanghai for a certain period before they were formally approved. During this time the 
supervisory authorities could terminate these projects at any time if they exposed the 
system  to  unconscionable  risks  or  they  could  promote  them  if  they  went  well. 
Meanwhile, under financial statism, the relevant government bodies (e.g. the SFSO) 
would provide a range of guidelines as well as policy measures and SFIs often served as 
‗places  of  learning‘  or  ‗testing  grounds‘,  not  only  for  technical  skills,  but  also  for  
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managerial capabilities.   
Here I intend to highlight several selected financial schemes or products in China. They 
were characterised by the ways in which market participants overcame deterrents to 
financial markets through new innovations and instruments. From these examples, a 
managed  opening  can  be  deduced  involving  the  selective  targeting  of  particular 
transactions, countries and firms rather than wholesale cross-border liberalisation of the 
kind endorsed by some European countries in the 1960s. These schemes included QFII, 
QDII, QFLP and RQFII etc.   
The Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) program was a transitional measure 
to  partially  open  up  the  domestic  capital  market  to  foreign  investors.  The  Chinese 
government started to introduce the QFII scheme in 2002 to permit qualified foreign 
institutional investors to buy and sell domestic-listed stocks (A-shares) on China‘s stock 
market.  The  scheme  currently  licenses  over  100  foreign  institutions  including 
commercial banks, trust companies, insurers, asset managers, securities firms, sovereign 
wealth funds, pension funds and endowment funds. At the end of February 2012, the 
total  investment  quota  approved  by  the  State  Administration  of  Foreign  Exchange 
(SAFE) reached USD 22.4 billion
65. 
In 2006, the introduction of the Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) 
scheme allowed certain domestic financial institutions approved by the CSRC to invest 
in offshore markets such as securities and bonds. The QDII scheme approved by the 
Chinese authorities allows qualifying domestic institutional investors to invest in 
overseas financial products. Prior to this, Chinese residents were not allowed to invest 
in foreign equities. In the beginning, QDII funds were largely confined to investments 
in  overseas  fixed -income  products.  Given  the  combination  of  low  returns  from 
fixed-income investments and an appreciating Chinese currency (Fang 2013, p.100), the 
growth of QDII funds was relatively modest but they did provide an alternative way for 
Chinese residents to invest overseas under financial statism. 
                                                 
65   See  SAFE  website,  http://www.safe.gov.cn/model_safe/tjsj/pic/20120229172752544.pdf, 
accessed 4 March, 2012.  
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Table 7.8 Pilot schemes for capital markets‘ opening in Shanghai   
Pilot 








(Qualified Foreign Limited 
Partners) 
RQFII 
(Renminbi Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investors) 
Launch   
Year   
2002  2006  2010  2011 
Qualifying 
Candidates 
Foreign securities firms, 
foreign fund managers, 
Foreign banks, Foreign 
Insurers, others, e.g. 
pension funds, Sovereign 
Wealth Funds etc 
Domestic banks and 
financial companies, e.g. 
trust companies, fund 
management companies etc 
Foreign Private Equity (PE) 
Funds registered in large cities 
e.g. Shanghai and Beijing 
HK subsidiaries of Chinese 
securities firms and fund 
management companies 
Currency  Foreign currency 
converted into RMB via 
Chinese custodian banks 
Onshore RMB converted 
into foreign currencies 
Foreign currency converted 
into RMB 




USD 36.04 billion 
approved as of 
November 2012 (total 
quota USD 80 billion) 
USD 86.65 billion approved 
as of November 2012 
Shanghai: USD 3 billion 
Beijing: USD 3 billion 
RMB 63 billion approved as of 




Listed stocks (A share), 
listed bonds, ETFs, 
Warrants in mainland 
China 
Overseas listed stocks, 
ETFs, investment funds etc. 
Private equity and venture 
capital companies in mainland 
China 
Listed stocks, bonds, ETFs in 
mainland China 
Source: KPMG (2011), compiled by Author 
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The Renminbi Qualified Financial Investors scheme (RQFII) was  a variation of the 
original QFII scheme that allowed qualifying offshore financial institutions to invest 
their offshore Renminbi deposits in the mainland‘s onshore interbank bond market and 
equity markets. Shanghai hosts the largest stock and bond market in mainland China, 
while  Hong  Kong  has  a  base  for  overseas  investors.  The  launching  of  the  RQFII 
provided an attractive instrument to connect Hong Kong‘s international client network 
with Shanghai‘s investment opportunities. 
In  2010,  Shanghai  was  granted  approval  to  launch  the  Qualified  Foreign  Limited 
Partners (QFLP) scheme to allow a certain number of foreign private equity funds to 
convert their foreign currency capital into Renminbi and make equity investments in 
China.   Unlike  QFII,  which  only  permitted  foreign  investment  in  listed  stocks  and 
bonds in the securities market, the QFLP scheme allowed foreign investment in private 
equity and virtual capital companies in mainland China. As such, foreign private equity 
firms were permitted to convert foreign currencies into Renminbi within an approved 
quota and to invest in private equity fund companies. This had two implications: firstly, 
the  QFLP  brought  Renminbi  convertibility  a  step  closer,  although  the  total  quota 
remained under the control of regulatory agencies (e.g. SAFE). Secondly, the QFLP 
could enjoy national treatment on a par with local PE funds and could invest in certain 
sectors previously off-limits to foreign investors, including the media, internet business, 
investment banking etc. 
However, Shanghai continues to lag behind other leading financial centres, particularly 
in  the  capacity  and  capability  of  financial  innovation.  Most  financial  markets  and 
services  recently  introduced  in  Shanghai  have  been  operating  in  Western  advanced 
economies for many  years, including financial futures, options, ETFs, etc. Financial 
innovation originating in Shanghai is relatively rare. In this respect, Shanghai has yet to 
become a pre-eminent international financial centre. Some might argue that the scarcity 
of  innovation  is  the  consequence  of  financial  statism  –  that  state  control  over  the 
financial sector has restrained creativity. While I partially agree with this view it should 
also be acknowledged that China is still at the early stages of financial development 
despite strong economic growth in recent years and the primary function of the SIFC in 
its current incarnation is learning and catching-up by imitation.     
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7.3  General  Competitiveness  of  the  SIFC:  Strengths  and 
Weaknesses 
7.3.1 Benchmarking the SIFC on the World Stage 
To evaluate the general performance of IFCs is a time-consuming and complicated task. 
It is also beyond the scope of this thesis to carry out a first-hand study. Fortunately, 
there is a large body of academic and financial information available to enable some 
informed assessment. In this section, two sets of data sources are quoted in evaluating 
the competitiveness of the SIFC, namely the Global Financial Centre Index (GFCI) 
66and the International Financial Centre Development Index (IFCD)
67.   
The GFCI uses two different inputs: an online assessment questionnaire and an indicator 
system  comprising  many  instrumental  factors.  Instrumental  factors  are  viewed  as 
objective evidence of competitiveness derived from a wide range of comparable sources 
(see appendix 4 for details). Table 7.9 presents the rankings of IFCs between 2007 and 
2014. It posits that during that period, London, New York, Hong Kong and Singapore 
retained the top four spots in the world rankings. Shanghai‘s ranking moved upwards 
significantly from 24
th in 2006 to 5
th in 2011 at its peak before dropping down to 20
th in 
2014.  Despite  this,  we  can  see  from  the  table  that  the  ranking  of  Shanghai  is 
significantly higher than other cities from BRICs countries in 2014, such as Mumbai 
                                                 
66  The Global Financial Centre Index (GFCI)
66  was commissioned by the City of London. The 
GFCI has been published twice a year since 200 7. The instrumental factors used in the GFCI 1 5 
model are grouped into five key areas of competitiveness, i.e. human capital, business environment, 
financial sector development, infrastructure and  reputational and  general factors. A total of  103 
external indicators were used in the GFCI 15. 
67  China‘s  Xinhua  News  Agency,  a  top  state-run  media  group,  linked  up  with  the  Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange (CME) Group to launch the International Financial Centre Development Index 
(IFCD). The IFCD Index is published once a year and aims to reflect the developmental capacity of 
45 international financial centres around the world. Its indictor system values international financial 
centres on five grounds: financial market, growth and development, supporting industries, service 
levels and the general environment.  
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(76
th), Moscow (73
rd), San Paulo (38
th) and Johannesburg (50
th). 

































New York    1  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
London  2  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Hong Kong  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  4  4  3  3  3 
Singapore  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  3  3  4  4  4 
Shenzhen  18  27  38  32  32  25  15  14  9  5  -  -  -  -  - 
Shanghai  20  16  24  19  8  5  5  6  11  10  35  34  31  30  24 
San Paulo  38  38  44  48  50  49  44  44  40  42  54  52  53  49  -. 
Beijing  49  59  58  43  26  19  17  16  15  22  51  47  46  39  36 
Johannesburg  50  61  62  54  55  52  54  54  54  50  48  44  41  43  - 
Moscow  73  69  65  64  65  61  68  68  68  67  60  57  56  -  - 
Mumbai    76  72  66  63  64  64  58  57  58  53  49  49  48  41  39 
Source: GFCI (2007-2014) 
In  the  GFCI，each  financial  centre  is  measured  in  two  dimensions:  by  its  level  of 
connectivity and its level of financial breadth and depth. Connectivity is defined as ―the 
centre‘s level of interaction with other financial centres‖ and provides the criterion for 
its  classification  as  a  global,  transnational  or  local  financial  centre.  The  level  of 
financial breadth  and depth  is  also  classified into  four  sub-groups: broad and deep, 
relatively broad, relatively deep and emerging. As shown in Table 7.10, financial centres 
from mature economies, such as London, New York and Hong Kong are global leaders, 
being located in top left corner. This means they not only have a global reputation in the 
financial network but also can provide broad and special financial services and products. 
Financial  centres  from  emerging  economies  are  called  ―evolving  centres‖,  primarily 
located in lower right corner. According to the GFCI (2014), Shanghai is classified as a 
―transnational diversified centre‖, which suggests it shares comparable levels of market 
breadth to those of global leaders and its influence has already gone beyond country 
borders.  The  financial  centres  in  other  BRICS  countries,  such  as  Sao  Paulo, 
Johannesburg and Mumbai were labelled ―local‖, showing that their influence in finance 
was rather limited compared to others.     
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Table 7.10: International financial centres by level of connectivity, breadth and depth 







Global  New York (1) 
London(2) 




    Beijing (49) 
Moscow (65) 
Transnational  Tokyo (6) 
Sydney(23)   
Shanghai (20) 
 
   







Note:   
(1)  This only lists major financial centres in G7 and BRICS countries. 
(2)  The numbers in brackets indicate the ranking of IFCs in GFCI 15 
Source: GFCI (2014) 
Although  the  GFCI  rankings  are  quoted  by  numerous  researchers  to  show  the 
competitiveness  of various  international  financial  centres  (e.g. Subacchi and Huang, 
2012; Cheung 2010; Lai 2011; Young et al. 2009), some commentators have questioned 
its objectivity in evaluating the growth of IFCs in emerging economies (e.g. Chu et al. 
2010, p.369). For example, in the GFCI 6 report published in 2009, five cities in Greater 





nd and Taipei 24
th. It seems strange that Shenzhen had not even 
been included among the top 62 in the GFCI 5 report. Moreover, in 2009, the ranking of 
Shanghai had jumped from 35
th to 10
th within six months (from March to September, 
see Table 7.9). Presumably the global financial crisis in 2008-2009 had some impact on 
the  status  of  IFCs  across  the  world  but  it  is  still  unconvincing  that  Shanghai  had 
emerged as a competitive IFC within six months.  It is also odd that the ranking of 
Shanghai suddenly fell from 8
th to 24
th in 2012-13. One possible explanation is that the 
authors  of  the  GFCI  adjust  their  scope  and  methodology  from  time  to  time. 
Nevertheless,  the  apparent  anomalies  do  cast  some  doubt  on  the  acceptance  and 
interpretation of the results (Young et al. 2009, p.35). 
To  address  this  concern,  another  indicator  –  the  International  Financial  Centre 
Development  Index  (IFCD)  -  was  launched  in  2010.  It  was  developed  by  China‘s  
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Xinhua News Agency, a top state-run media group, in conjunction with the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange (CME) Group. The IFCD includes 17 level-2 indicators and 66 
level-3 indicators (see Appendix 5 for details). Table 7.11 presents the rankings of the 
IFCD index from 2010 to 2012. It shows that Shanghai was 8
th in 2010, going up to 6
th 
in 2011 and levelling out at 6
th in 2012, behind New York, London, Tokyo, Hong Kong 
and Singapore.   
Table 7.11: The IFCD ranking of key IFCs in developed and emerging countries (2010 
-2012) 












New York  1  87.27  1  87.69  1  88.43 
London  2  85.62  2  85.96  2  87.66 
Tokyo  3  72.93  3  85.81  3  85.55 
Hong Kong  4  72.18  4  82.18  4  81.01 
Singapore  5  64.11  5  74.53  6  70.06 
Shanghai  6  63.80  6  71.42  8  63.75 
Mumbai    30  34.64  34  35.68  40  31.5 
Moscow  31  34.58  35  35.40  35  34.2 
San Paulo  43  25.92  41  29.71  39  32.2 
Johannesburg  45  22.36  45  24.35  45  22.5 
Source: IFCD (2010-2012) 
Let us look at the similarities and differences between the GFCI and IFCD. Both are 
built  upon  a  comprehensive  evaluative  system,  covering  numerous  relevant  factors. 
However, closer scrutiny (Appendix 4 and 5) shows that the GFCI emphasises a ―soft 
environment‖,  such  as  the  availability  of  human  capital,  access  to  the  international 
market,  corporate  and  individual  tax  regimes,  the  regulatory  environment  etc.  In 
contrast,  the  IFCD  gives  more  credit  to  the  ―hard  environment‖,  such  as  economic 
power, growth rate of GDP, quality of infrastructure etc. These inherent differences in 
emphasis can explain why the IFCD ranking for New York surpassed London on the top 
list while Tokyo‘s ranking was higher in the GFCI.     
Another distinct characteristic of the IFCD is its emphasis on the IFCs from emerging 
economies. This is partially due to the fact that large, fast-growing developing countries 
like BRICS have paid more attention to IFCs‘ development in their countries. Therefore, 
each year IFCD conducts a special survey of five major cities from BRICS countries, i.e.  
- 178 - 
Shanghai,  San  Paulo,  Johannesburg,  Moscow  and  Mumbai,  to  ascertain  their 
developmental potential.  In 2012, the indicators  in  this  survey  were expanded from 
three to nine in the questionnaire (Table 7.12).   
Table 7.12: Rating of financial centres from BRICS countries in 2012 









Shanghai  3.76 (1)  3.45 (1)  3.48 (1) 
San Paulo  3.25 (2)  3.07 (4)  3.10 (2) 
Johannesburg  3.14 (4)  3.08 (3)  3.08 (3) 
Moscow  3.20 (3)  3.15 (2)  3.07(4) 
Mumbai  3.09 (5)  3.01 (5)  3.00 (5) 
  Level of 
Internationalisation 
(Ranking) 
Degree of Financial 
Innovation 
(Ranking) 
Level of Facilities 
 
(Ranking) 
Shanghai  3.34 (1)  3.35 (1)  3.29 (1) 
San Paulo  3.09 (2)  3.07 (2)  3.07 (3) 
Johannesburg  3.09 (2)  3.06 (3)  3.09 (2) 
Moscow  3.05(4)  3.02 (4)  3.04 (4) 
Mumbai  3.00 (5)  2.99 (5)  3.00 (5) 
  Level of 
Intermediary 









Shanghai  3.34 (1)  3.24(1)  3.17 (1) 
San Paulo  3.08 (3)  3.00(3)  2.92 (3) 
Johannesburg  3.09 (2)  3.04(2)  2.71 (5) 
Moscow  3.05 (4)  2/95(4)  2.95 (2) 
Mumbai  2.95 (5)  2.90(5)  2.84 (4) 
Source: IFCD (2012) 
Table 7.12 shows the following features of financial centre among BRICS countries. 
Firstly, Shanghai stands out among BRICS countries, ranking top in all nine indicators. 
San  Paulo  comes  second  in  four  indicators:  confidence,  talent  attraction,  level  of 
internationalisation and degree of financial innovation. Johannesburg also ranks second 
in  four  indicators:  level  of  internationalisation  (tied  with  San  Paulo),  facilities, 
intermediary  services  and  financial  environment.  Moscow  scores  second  in  capital 
attraction and international recognition of currency. Mumbai is at the bottom in eight 
indicators out of nine.  
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Secondly, the confidence in Shanghai as an IFC is significantly stronger than the other 
four cities. As far as the report is concerned, the rating of confidence index for Shanghai 
is as high as 3.76, which is 0.51 points higher than second-placed San Paulo. Yet the 
rating differences are negligible among other four cities. Among the nine indicators, 
Shanghai  scores  relatively  low  in  two:  financial  legal  environment  (3.24)  and 
international recognition of currencies (3.17). This indicates Shanghai still lacks a solid 
regulatory environment while the inconvertibility of Renminbi is also an obstacle to 
further integration to the world market.   
Thirdly, Shanghai‘s ratings in terms of internationalisation and international recognition 
of currencies are higher than four other countries. On the face of it, this appears strange 
given that the SIFC developed under a stringent capital control regime. This might be 
explained by two factors. China has gradually opened its capital markets through QDII, 
QFII and the internationalisation of the Renminbi in recent years (see section 8.1.3). 
The rating is  also  based on interviewees‘ responses in  emerging  countries and they 
indicate China is far from alone in having plenty of constraints in capital markets and 
currencies.     
Overall, both indices suggest some commonalities in the SIFC development. Firstly, 
Shanghai‘s competitiveness as a financial centre has been greatly enhanced in recent 
years, but its ranking on the world stage is still unstable. Secondly, Shanghai has greater 
potential to be an IFC, compared with other cities in emerging economies. Nevertheless, 
these findings still need to be viewed with scepticism. Although both indices provide a 
useful and systematic framework, some methodological limitations still exist. Firstly, 
the ranking and rating of IFCs can be quite arbitrary: it all depends on how any single 
‗quality‘  is  measured  and  how  components  are  then  combined.  Secondly,  the  final 
listing  tends  to  combine  different  factors  into  a  mono-dimensional  summary,  which 
tends to downplay niche financial centres  whose performance may not be strong  in 
general terms but very significant in their particular areas of strength (Young et al. 2009, 
p.35) . 
7.3.2 Positioning SIFC among Domestic Players 
The re-emergence of Shanghai as an IFC does not mean lack of competition in China  
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itself. Since 2005, a number of Chinese cities have launched plans to build financial 
centres, including Beijing, Shenzhen,  Guangzhou, Dalian and Tianjin. Among them, 
Beijing and Hong Kong are considered to be the most competitive rivals to Shanghai 
(Lai 2011; Jarvis 2011).   
In 2008, Beijing‘s municipal government formally announced it would build an IFC for 
the first time (BMG 2008). As it is China‘s political capital, Beijing holds incomparable 
political  and  administrative  resources.  Apart  from  hosting  the  country‘s  financial 
regulatory bodies - ‖One Bank, Three Commissions‖
  68  - Beijing is also headquarters to 
the  four  largest  state  banks  (―Big  Four‖)  and  the  largest  insurance  company  in  the 
country. Consequently, the banking assets managed by Beijing totalled RMB 72 trillion 
in 2011(Table 7.13), which is significantly higher than those of Shanghai (RMB 9.3 
trillion). In terms of insurance assets, Beijing is also far ahead. In this sense, it is already 
China‘s financial decision-making and management centre.   
Zhao  et  al.  (2004,  2005)  investigated  the  site  selection  of  multinational  companies 
(MNCs) headquarters in seven major Chinese cities. They argue that Beijing is closer to 
the centre of political power and is more convenient to access relevant information, 
which  are  the  key  reasons  for  MNCs  to  prefer  it  over  Shanghai  as  their  regional 
headquarters.  They  maintained  that  after  China‘s  entry  to  the  WTO,  Beijing  would 
replace  Shanghai  as  the  most  important  financial  centre  in  China.  Furthermore, 
Shanghai‘s ability to raise capital and funds is also relatively weak because more large 
financial institutions are headquartered in Beijing.   
   
                                                 
68  ―One bank, Three commissions‖ refers to China‘s current financial regulatory model, with the 
People‘s  Bank  of  China  (central  bank)  playing  the  central  role  and  CBRC  (China  Banking 
Regulatory  Commission),  CSRC  (China  Securities  Regulatory  Commission)  and  CIRC  (China 
Insurance  Regulatory  Commission)  in  charge  of  banking,  securities  and  the  insurance  sector 
respectively.    
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Table 7.13: Financial institutions: Shanghai versus Beijing in 2011 
Indicators  Shanghai  Beijing   
Assets of local banks (RMB, trillion)  9.3  72.1 
Assets of local insurance firms (RMB, trillion)  0.82  3.3 
Assets of local securities firms (RMB, trillion)  0.33  0.23 
Assets  of  local  fund  management  companies 
(RMB, trillion) 
1.43  0.64 
Number of foreign bank branches  71  44 
Number of foreign securities firms 
representative offices 
73  61 
Number of foreign insurance company branches  15  11 
Source: CDI (2013) 
I partially agree with Zhao et al. (2004)‘s argument that information is a critical factor in 
the  location  of  financial  institutions.  This  can  explain  why  the  ―Big  Four‖  and  the 
largest  insurance  company  did  not  relocate  their  headquarters  to  Shanghai  in  the 
1990s
69. However, I  question their  conclusion that Beijing w ill  eventually replace 
Shanghai as the most important IFC in China. There are several considerations here.   
Firstly, Shanghai is the only city in mainland China that has the endorsement of central 
government  to  be  an  IFC.  In  China,  poli tical  support,  in  particular  from  central 
government cannot be understated even if inter-city competition has invariably caused 
fragmentation in the regime. The announcement in the resolution of the 14
th CCP Party 
Congress
70  and the recent  ―Double-Centre Plan‖(see Section 6.2.2) suggest  that  the 
SIFC‘s development remains a serious political commitment from the central state.   
Secondly, Shanghai  has already become the hub of domestic financial markets. For 
modern IFCs, financial markets (capital markets in particular) are a central plank of 
                                                 
69  In fact, the Bank of China transferred Renminbi business headquarters to Shanghai in 2012 as 
mentioned in Section 6.2. 
70  In 1992, the 14
th National Congress of the Communist Party passed a resolution to build Shanghai 
as ―the dragon head and one of the international economic, financial and trading centres to drive the 
growth of the Yangtze River Delta and in turn the take-off of the whole economic region‖ (quoted in 
Wu 2003, p.1684).  
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being  considered  a  global  financial  centre.  An  official  from  the  SFSO  recently 
commented:   
Beijing  has  always  been  a  hub  of  financial  institutions;  in  effect,  Beijing  has  made 
considerable progress in attracting financial headquarters. Yet Beijing has been excluded as   
a candidate for global financial centre status due to the deficiency of financial markets 
(interview 10）. 
Information is critical to the formation of an IFC but this is not exclusively political. 
Under  financial  statism,  Beijing  has  key  strengths  in  policy  making  and  strategic 
planning. Yet with the further enhancement of the market system, market information 
will become more significant than political and the advantages of Beijing will therefore 
diminish.     
Finally,  Zhao  et  al.  (2004)  did  not  discriminate  financial  MNCs  from  others  (e.g. 
manufacturing)  in  their  analysis  and  the  former  are  more  closely  correlated  to  the 
formation  of  IFCs.  In  fact,  Shanghai  outpaces  Beijing  in  terms  of  numbers  of 
foreign-invested banks, securities firms and insurance companies (Table 7.13). 
Another  contested  issue  is  Shanghai‘s  relationship  with  Hong  Kong.  Why  did  the 
central government choose Shanghai rather than Hong Kong as China‘s international 
financial centre? Hong Kong was returned to China in 1997 and was already been an 
established international financial centre. Yet the central government‘s preference for 
Shanghai is attributable to the broad interests of the country. Fang (2013, p.160) gives 
five  reasons:  (i)  Geographic  location:  the  Yangtze  River  Delta  where  Shanghai  is 
located  is  the  most  powerful  economic  engine  for  China;  Shanghai  as  an  IFC  is 
beneficial for the country‘s economic growth as a whole. (ii) Financial security: as a 
free trade area, Hong Kong‘s market features foreign speculative capital and hot money, 
which increase the risks of economic instability and financial disturbance. (iii) Political 
consideration. Hong Kong is a special administration region (SAR) under ―one country, 
two  systems‖.  The  political  relationship  between  the  central  government  and  SAR 
remains  unsettled.  (iv)  Currency  issues:  Hong  Kong  has  its  own  currency  and 
independent financial regulatory system. Choosing Hong Kong would not be conducive 
to the Renminbi‘s aspiration to become a world currency on par with the US dollar and 
Euro. Further, it makes no sense that China‘s financial centre is not denominated in  
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Renminbi. (v) Monetary policies: it is easier for the central government to supervise and 
monitor monetary policies if Shanghai is an IFC. In order to maintain the effectiveness 
of monetary policy and financial security, the Renminbi onshore centre could only be 
positioned in Shanghai, rather than Hong Kong. 
Yet this does not mean Hong Kong‘s current status as an IFC is fading. Other than the 
tax regime mentioned above, Hong Kong has many strengths; inter alia, a sound legal 
system, a comprehensive regulatory framework, well-established infrastructure and a 
broad  talent  pool  of  financial  professionals.  Hong  Kong  nowadays  is  a  regional 
headquarters for many global financial institutions, including investment banks (Young 
et al. 2009). Whereas Hong Kong has been well connected to the international financial 
markets, Shanghai would still only have limited openness to foreign investment.   
Some commentators also argue that Shanghai, Hong Kong and Beijing should be more 
complementary,  rather  than  just  vying  to  become  ‗the‘  global  financial  centre.  For 
instance, Lai (2011,p.1) argues that Shanghai, Hong Kong and Beijing operate within a 
network of IFCs, in which ―Shanghai acts as a commercial centre, Beijing as a political 
centre and Hong Kong as an offshore financial centre, with all three financial centres 
performing distinctive and complementary roles within the regional banking strategies 
of foreign banks‖.   
7.4 Summary   
This chapter provides a detailed evaluation of Shanghai‘s financial sector development 
in the past 20 years. Indeed, Shanghai‘s financial development has been ―a process of 
institutional, regulatory and market design from the ground up‖ (Jarvis 2011), starting 
from the early 1990s. The study demonstrates that Shanghai has experienced remarkable 
growth in terms of agglomeration of financial markets, institutions and services (see 
Figure  7.9).  In  just  two  decades,  Shanghai‘s  financial  markets  have  made  such 
significant progress in depth and breadth that they parallel those of peer cities from the 
more  advanced  economies.  To  some  extent,  Shanghai  has  become  the  country‘s 
domestic financial centre; it has  outpaced Beijing and other peer cities in mainland 
China in terms of the density and diversity of financial markets.   
Nevertheless, the SIFC development still faces a number of problems and it should be  
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recognised that a domestic financial centre and an international financial centre are very 
different. Due to capital controls and Renminbi inconvertibility, Shanghai‘s financial 
market is still semi-closed. There are still no overseas firms listed on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange. The number of foreign financial institution operating in Shanghai is 
still not comparable with other leading global financial centres such as London, New 
York and Hong Kong. As for human capital, financial talent is inadequate and this too 
has weakened the aspiration of Shanghai to be an IFC. Therefore, it is far too early to 
conclude that Shanghai has become a genuine international financial centre. 
The  case  study  discovered  an  interesting  paradox.  China‘s  financial  statism  has 
successfully  channelled  the  funds  into  the  real  economy  and  supported  the 
macro-economic  growth  critical  to  maintaining a  stable  environment  for  the  SIFC‘s 
development.  However,  financial  statism  conflicts  with  the  liberalisation  of  interest 
rates and the full convertibility of the Renminbi, which are regarded as the sine qua non 
for  a  functional  international  financial  centre.  By  this  logic,  financial  statism  is 
conducive  for  the  development  of  a  domestic  financial  centre,  rather  than  an 
international  one.  Accompanying  the  rapid  advancement  of  Shanghai‘s  financial 
marketplace, Chinese authorities remain cautious in their attitudes to free capital flows 
and the full convertibility of the Renminbi. This shows the central government has its 
own agenda to promote the SIFC‘s development: the priority is economic growth and 
social stability at macro-level, rather than global connectivity, efficiency and innovation 
at  micro  and  meta-levels.  Therefore,  despite  certain  disadvantages  and  deficiencies, 
financial statism and the SIFC‘s development share a common motivation: to achieve 
the strongest economic growth and prevent social and political instability.    
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Figure7.9: The development of financial markets, services and institutions in Shanghai (1990-2012) 
 
Note:  ■  financial markets ♦ financial services ♣ financial institutions 
Source: Author 
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8. Shanghai from Domestic to International: 




Although China‘s financial statism is pinpointed as a defining feature of the SIFC‘s 
development, it would be reckless to assume it remained unchanged over the past 20 
years.  In  the  first  decade  of  21
st  century,  China  triggered  a  new  round  of  financial 
reforms.  In  this  chapter,  three  key  aspects  of  these  reforms  are  presented:  the 
commercialisation of its state banks through joint-stock reforms; the gradual loosening 
of  administrative  controls  over  interest  rates;  and  the  promotion  of  the 
internationalisation  of  the  Renminbi  after  the  global  financial  crisis  in  2008.  These 
reforms all suggest China is poised to withdraw financial statism because of changing 
contexts  internally  and  externally.  These  will  be  discussed  in  Section  8.2.  The 
penultimate section discusses the consideration of China‘s central government regarding 
its financial statism regime. The final section summarises the above. 
8.1Recent Withdrawal of Financial Statism in China 
8.1.1 Diversification of Ownership   
At  the  turn  of  21
st  century,  the  central  government  embarked  on  a  wide  range  of 
measures that aimed to commercialise state banks and improve their balance sheets. 
These reforms included recapitalising state banks, strengthening corporate governance 
and introducing new strategic partners from overseas. In 1998, RMB 270 billion of 
special treasury bonds were issued to recapitalise the state banks. One year later, four  
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asset management companies (AMCs)
  71  were established by the Ministry of Finance 
to transfer the toxic assets in the state banks. That is to say, the mission of these four 
AMCs was to maximise the value of toxic assets in the ―Big Four‖. To achieve this goal, 
these  asset  management  companies  were  authorised  to  use  a  variety  of  measures, 
including  foreclosure,  restructurings,  debt-equity  swaps,  and  outright  sales  through 
auctions and other means (Herd 2010). From 1999 to 2005, the four asset management 
companies  transferred  at  least  RMB  2.18  trillion  in  non-performing  loans  from  the 
balance  sheets  of  the  large  state  banks.  Meanwhile,  the  state  policy  banks  had 
increasingly built up their capacities to take over policy-lending functions from the ―Big 
Four‖ in late 1990s
72. 
The establishment of th e Central Huijin Investment Corporation (Hui jin) is another 
concrete measure  that enhanced state bank reform. A t the end of 2003,  the central 
government injected USD 45 billion of foreign reserves into the BOC and CCB through 
Huijin. The ICBC also took in USD 15 billion during the first half of 2005. Since then, 
Huijin, being a state-owned investment company, became the  central shareholder of 
state banks on behalf of the central government
73. In this way, the governance structure 
of state banks conformed more to international practice.   
In addition, to increase the  accountability  of state banks  through  foreign  entry, the 
Chinese authorities  adopted a minority stake  approach through joint -stock reform, 
which was at odds with privatisation strategy and control participation of foreign banks 
pursued in Latin America and Eastern Europe throughout the 1990s. As early as 1996, 
several pilot reforms were carried out by small banks including  the Bank of Shanghai, 
                                                 
71  The four asset management companies are Cinda Asset Management Company, Orient Asset 
Management Company, Huarong Asset Management Company and Great Wall Asset Management 
Company.   
72  In 1994, the central government established three policy banks: Agricultural Development Bank 
of China, China Development Bank, and Import and Export Bank of China. 
73  Nowadays Huijin holds stakes in various state-owned financial institutions, including commercial 
banks, securities house, financial conglomerates, re-insurance companies etc.  
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which sold seven percent of its share to the International Financial Corporation. The 
Chinese authorities applied the same approach to reform the ―Big Four‖ at the turn of 
21
st century. For example, Bank of America invested USD 2.5 billion in  the China 
Construction  Bank  (CCB)  in  2005,  representing  9.1  percent  of  its  total  ownership. 
Temasek Holdings, a Singapore state-owned investment company, also held 5.1 percent 
of ownership through the investment of USD 1.47 billion (Table 7.1). By the end of 
2012, there are over 35 banks in mainland China with stakes from foreign strategic 
investors (KPMG 2012).   
Table 8.1: Foreign investment in major mainland Chinese banks (1996-2008) 





Bank of Shanghai  1996 
2001 
2001 
International Finance Corporation   
HSBC 







China Everbright Bank  1996 
2005 
Asian Development Bank 







2002  Citibank  67  4.62% 
Fujian Industrial Bank 
Co. Ltd 
2003  Hang Seng Bank  208  16% 
Jinan City Commercial 
Bank 
2004  Commonwealth Bank of Australia  17  11% 





New Bridge Capital LLC 













Bank of Beijing  2005 
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Commercial Bank of 
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2005 
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China  2005  American Express    200  0.45% 





















Xi’an Commercial Bank  2005  Bank of Nova Scotia  20  12.5% 
Hangzhou City 
Commercial Bank 
2005  Commonwealth Bank of Australia  77  29.9% 
Bohai Bank  2005  Standard Chartered    123  19.9% 
Ningbo Commercial 
Bank 
2006  OCBC  70  12.2% 
Tianjin City 
Commercial Bank 
2006  Australia  and  New  Zealand  Banking 
Group 
112  19.9% 
Shanghai Rural 
Commercial Bank 
2006  Australia  and  New  Zealand  Banking 
Group 
252  19.9% 





















Source: Wang (2008, p.50), Adapted from Garcia-Horrero and Stantabarbara (2008) 
What  are  the  impacts  of  these  reforms?  Firstly,  introducing  foreign  strategic  player 
helps to bring forward a more effective corporate governance mechanism. Berger et al. 
(2010) found that China‘s state banks with minority foreign ownership were associated 
with better performance in terms of ROA as foreign ownership played an important 
mitigating role: they tend to have lowered costs/assets when they diversify in their loans, 
deposits, assets, or geographic portfolios. As foreign investors took seats on corporate 
boards  and  became  actively  involved  with  bank  management,  a  new  monitoring 
discipline  emerged  (Berger  et  al.  2009).  The  reforms  have  to  some  extent  lessened 
degree to which loans are given to different levels of government because non-state 
stakeholders  might  object.  Garcia-Herrero  and  Santabarbara  (2008)  also  argue  that 
Chinese banks appear to be more profitable and increasingly efficient when foreign 
banks act as strategic investors.    
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The second point to consider is that introducing foreign strategic players also helps to 
build up confidence for investors in later IPOs. In February 2002, at the conference of 
the National Financial Work Committee, the Chinese government decided to take the 
joint-stock reforms of state banks and to list them on the stock market. As pre-eminent 
global banks were shareholders, their stocks were more appealing to investors. Three 
years later, the ―Big Four‖ launched on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and Shanghai 
Stock Exchange (Table 8.2). By 2010, they had completed their public listings, thereby 
completing their transformation from state-owned to publicly-listed banks with a more 
diversified shareholding structure. Furthermore, they now follow international reporting 
standards and have large institutional investors monitoring their activities. In this way, 
these four largest state banks were converted into ―freestanding business corporations, 
accountable  to  their  shareholders  and  listed  on  the  international  stock  exchanges‖ 
(Pistor 2009). As of 2013, the total number of listed banks in mainland China increased 
to 16. 
Table 8.2: The public listings of the ―Big Four‖ in SSE and HKSE 












































Source: Author, available public information   
Thirdly,  introducing  foreign  strategic  partners  promotes  inter-organisational  learning 
(Pistor 2009) .Garcia-Herrero and Stantabarbara (2008) conducted an empirical analysis 
and showed that foreign investors could benefit Chinese state banks in terms of transfer 
of technology, skills etc and corporate governance improvements. Pistor (2009) suggests 
that institutional learning took place through the creation of equity ties between large 
state banks and two or more foreign strategic investors, which enabled cooperation and 
inter-organisational learning. She argues this approach reshaped institutional reform in  
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the financial sector, increased payoffs and to some extent, provided an alternative model 
that was superior to privatisation strategies. Those Chinese banks that partnered with 
more than one foreign investor benefited from the inputs from different players in the 
global financial marketplace and from the range of technical and governance expertise 
offered.   
Through  wide-ranging  reforms,  China  successfully  coped  with  extensive 
non-performing  loans  in  the  state  banks.  Between  2001  and  2006,  the  rate  of 
non-performing  loans  in  the  ―Big  Four‖  decreased  dramatically.  The  share  of 
non-performing loans as a proportion of total loans in state banks declined from 16.9 
percent in 2003 to 2.8 percent in 2008. As of 2011, the rate of non-performing loans 
across  China‘s  banking  sector  fell  further  to  one  percent.  With  the  drop  in 
non-performing  loans,  the  capital  adequacy  ratio  went  up.  At  the  end  of  2003,  the 
overall  weighted  average  capital  adequacy  ratio  of  China‘s  commercial  banks  was 
negative (-2.98 percent). The ratio turned positive in 2004, rose to 4.91 percent in 2005, 
and further jumped to 12.2 percent at the end of 2010 (CBRC 2010, p. 29). In 2003, 
there were only eight commercial banks whose capital adequacy ratio exceeded eight 
percent; in 2010 that number surged to 281
74. The weighted average capital adequacy 
ratio has already met the upper end set out in the Basel Accord. This suggests the assets‘ 
quality  of  Chinese  banking  sector  was  significantly  ahead  of  the  rest  of  the  global 
banking industry at the end of 2010. Anderson (2007) acknowledged the ―bad old days‖ 
of massive resource misallocation in the China‘s banking sector were truly over. 
Through joint stock reform, China has established a more responsible banking sector, 
combining state-ownership with market mechanisms. The market plays a major role in 
resources‘  allocation  and  the  government  is  not  allowed  to  interfere  with  the  daily 
operations of the state banks. This means the most common agency problems associated 
with state ownership (e.g. lack of commercial orientation, the absence of high-powered 
incentives and the influence of politics in the management of corporations) have been 
tamed.  Soft  budget  control  has  been  partially  addressed  by  improving  corporate 
                                                 
74  The information derives from China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) website.    
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governance structures. The state still retains ownership in commercial banks and other 
financial firms but the daily management of these banks has largely been delegated to 
professionals.Through minority ownership states keep cash-flow rights in key industries 
without  necessarily  having  to  worry  about  running  companies  themselves  (The 
Economist 2012). 
More importantly, following public listings state-owned shares became tradable on the 
stock  exchange.  The  state  could  then  buy  or  sell  shares,  which  gave  them  indirect 
influence  on  these  entities.  Interview  with  some  government  officials  and  senior 
managers in the state-owned banks also showed that joint stock reform had made the 
state banks more independent, market-based players and put them in a better position to 
pursue the commercial goal of profit maximisation. One interviewee from the SDRC 
commented: 
After  reform,  state  banks  have  more  incentives  to  make  lending  decisions  based  upon 
purely commercial goals. Actually, state banks have competed well with one other in the 
market and their performance is contingent more on their own branding and reputation 
(interview 6). 
After the joint-stock reforms of state banks, we observed the rapid growth of profits for 
these banks. Bank performance has improved significantly. In 2008-2009, China‘s state 
banks became the most profitable in the world. The ―Big Four‖ were among the top ten 
most profitable banks in the world at the end of 2010, measured by pre-tax profits (see 
Table8.3). Financial statism also produced champions on a par with global players in 
terms of size and profitability. In 2011, China‘s ―Big Four‖ were positioned 1st, 2nd, 4th 
and 6th respectively among global banks in terms of capitalisation. 
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Table 8.3: Global top 10 banks by pre-tax profits, 2007-2010 
2007  Bank  Country  USD 
million 
2008  Bank  Country  USD 
Million 
1  Bank of 
America 
USA  31,973  1  ICBC  China  21,260 
2  Citigroup  USA  29,638  2  CCB  China  17,520 
3  HSBC  UK  22,086  3  Banco Santander  Spain  15,825 
4  JP Morgan 
Chase 
USA  19,886  4  BOC  China  12,620 
5  RBS  UK  18,033  5  BBVA  Spain  9,640 
6  Credit Agricole  France  14,060  6  HSBC  UK  9,307 
7  Barclays  UK  14,009  7  Barclays    UK  8,859 
8  BNP Paribas  France  13,921  8  ABC  China  7,659 
9  Mitsubishi UFJ  Japan  12,824  9  UniCredit  Italy  6,952 
10  Wells Fargo  USA  12,745  10  Royal Bank of 
Canada 
Canada  6,077 
               
2009  Bank  Country  USD 
million 
2010  Bank  Country  USD 
Million 
1  ICBC  China  24,494  1  ICBC  China  32,528 
2  CCB  China  20,316  2  CCB  China  26,448 
3  Goldman Sachs  USA  19,826  3  JP Morgan 
Chase 
USA  24,859 
4  Barclays  UK  18,869  4  BOC  China  21,463 
5  Wells Fargo  USA  17,606  5  HSBC  UK  19,037 
6  Banco 
Santander 
Spain  16,951  6  Wells Fargo  USA  18,700 
7  BOC  China  16,319  7  ABC  China  18,230 
8  JP Morgan 
Chase 
USA  16,143  8  BNP Paribas  France  17,406 
9  BNP Paribas  France  12,222  9  Banco Santander  Spain  16,079 
10  Itau Unibanco  Brazil  11,521  10  Goldman Sachs  USA  12,892 
Source: The Bankers, 2011; Subacchi and Huang 2012, p.32 
8.1.2 Liberalisation of Interest Rates   
The Chinese state has been relaxing controls over interest rates gradually in recent years. 
Interest rates fall into three categories: (i) Liberalised, e.g. the inter-bank lending rate, 
the refinancing rate (discount rate) and the yield rate of treasury notes and repos (ii) 
Being liberalised, e.g. retail rates, the rate on the issuance of corporate bonds (iii) Not 
liberalised - set by the central bank - such as the deposit reserve rate, which is generally 
reckoned  as  an  important  monetary  instrument  to  manage  the  money  supply  at  the  
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macro-level. 
The earliest market-based interest rate was witnessed in the wholesale money market. In 
1996,  along  with  the  creation  of  the  inter-banking  lending  market,  the  inter-bank 
lending rate and issuance yield of Treasury bonds were liberalised. In 1998, foreign 
banks were permitted to participate in the inter-bank lending market (PBoC 2008). The 
central bank‘s refinancing rate was also liberalised in September 1998, as the central 
bank often provided short-term financing to commercial banks through open market 
operations (PBoC 2008). In January 2007, SHIBOR (the Shanghai Interbank Offered 
Rate) was launched, using pricing mechanisms that reflected international practice. The 
SHIBOR group consists of 16 commercial banks, which are the premium dealers of 
open  market  operations  or  market  makers  in  the  money  market.  The  launching  of 
SHIBOR  marked  the  formation  of  the  Renminbi  benchmark  rate  in  money  market, 
although it will still take some time to become the worldwide accepted benchmark rate, 
e.g.  LIBOR  in  London, EURIBOR  in  Frankfurt,  HIBOR  in  Hong Kong, SIBOR  in 
Singapore, and TIBOR in Tokyo.   
The liberalisation of retail rates is progressing much slowly as the central bank is more 
cautious about their possible adverse impact. The central bank‘s strategy has been to 
liberalise foreign currency interest rates prior to following suit for the Renminbi. In 
2000,  the  PBoC  started  to  liberalise  the  foreign  currency  lending  rate.  Commercial 
banks were thus allowed to decide their lending rates in accordance with international 
markets. Meanwhile, the rate on deposits over USD 3 million  could  be determined 
through  negotiations  between  banks  and  clients  and  deposit  rate  for  small 
denominations of foreign currency were no longer monitored by the PBoC. In 2003, the 
PBoC further lifted restrictions of deposit rates on British Pounds, Swiss Francs and 
Canadian Dollars. In the same year, the central bank removed its lower limit for other 
small-amount foreign currency deposit, such as the US dollar, the Euro and Japanese 
Yen. In 2004, the PBoC eased restrictions on the deposit rate for small-amount foreign 
currencies with maturities over one year (Guo 2013).   
In terms of Renminbi deposits and lending rates, modest progress has been made in 
recent  years.  In November 2004, restrictions on the upper limit of lending rate and 
lower limit of deposit rate for the Renminbi were lifted. The commercial banks were  
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allowed to decide their own rates within a band, i.e. the rate of deposit benchmark as the 
upper limit and 90 percent of the rate of the lending benchmark as the lower limit. In 
2012, the PBoC further widened the floating range of deposit and lending rates. The 
commercial  banks  were  allowed  to  lend  using  70  percent  of  the  rate  of  lending 
benchmark as the lower limit and 110 percent of the rate of deposit benchmark as the 
upper limit. So, compared with the deposit and lending rates in the early 1990s, they 
were much more variable and market-based.   
The central bank‘s cautious moves towards full liberalisation of retail rates are threefold. 
Firstly, the PBoC was concerned that commercial banks would be tempted to raise their 
deposit rates to attract more business while they were simultaneously trying to hold 
down lending rates to expand their loans business. These banks would then run the risk 
of lapsing into a vicious circle with a consequent deterioration in their balance sheets. 
This would also give rise to the possibility of a widespread banking crisis, particularly 
as  the  deposit  insurance  system  had  yet  to  be  established.  Further,  retail  depositors 
would be confronted with the massive risk of losing their entire savings if these banks 
went bankrupt (Xie 2001).   
Secondly, a specified interest margin created rents to state banks, which enabled them to 
continuously support the real economy with low-cost loans while securing their profits 
(Song 2005). As stated in section 6.2.1, the state banks were the source of massive 
infrastructure project investments in China when private banks were reluctant to fund 
them because of their huge costs and delayed returns on investment.   
Thirdly,  although  interest  rate  controls  have  led  to  lack  of  efficiency  in  resource 
allocation, the regime is consistent with its objective of maximising the societal welfare. 
It  is  noteworthy  that  economic  efficiency  is  not  the  sole  criterion  for  evaluating 
financial  statism  in  IFC  development.  For  an  economy  under  transition,  China‘s 
experience shows that maintaining macroeconomic and social stability is perhaps more 
important than improving economic efficiency.   
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Table 8.4 The interest rate liberalisation process 
1.  Liberalisation of inter-bank lending rate 
1990  Pilot liberalisation of inter-bank lending market and rates 
1996 
1996 
Creation of unified inter-bank market 
Abolish the upper limit of inter-bank lending rate 








Market-based issuance of government bonds on pilot markets (stock 
markets) 
Utilisation of the inter-bank market to deal in inter-bank bond repo 
transaction 
Liberalisation of the bond repo interest rate 
Market-based issuance of financial bonds by policy banks 
Market-based issuance of government bonds 
3.  Market-based reform of lending and deposit rates 




Introduction of foreign currency business in the commercial banks 









Liberalisation of over USD 3 million deposit rates 
Liberalisation of small deposit rates of residents in foreign financial 
institutions 
Liberalisation  of  deposit  rate  in  British  pounds,  Swiss  Franc  and 
Canadian dollar 
Lower limit of deposit rates removed 












Surcharge until 20% on reference rates on loans (working capital) 
The band changes to ± 10% around reference rates 
Increase of upper limit to 20% (RCCs 50%) 
Increase of upper limit to 30% (RCCs and large enterprises 10%) 
Increase of upper limit to pilot RCCs to 100% 
Increase of upper limit to 70% and RCCs to 100%. Lower limit remain 
at 90% 
Liberalisation of upper limit of RMB lending rate (excluding UCCs 
and RCCs, that increase until 130% above reference rate) 
Decrease of lower limit to 70% 
3.2.2Deposits  







Negotiation on rates on over RMB 30 million deposit with maturity 
above 5 years for insurance companies 
Same scheme for Social Security Fund 
Same scheme for China Postal Saving and Remittance Bureau 
All kinds of deposit rates can adjust downward 
Increase of upper limit to 110% 
Source: PBoC (2005), Garcia-Herrero et al 2006, Guo (2013) 
In sum, a full liberalisation of interest rates is contingent on a robust and deep financial 
market. The joint-stock reform of China‘s state banks has to a larger extent cleared the 
way for this to happen. The liberalisation of interest rate would encourage the banking 
sector  to  increase  its  focus  on  the  innovation  of  products  and  services,  rather  than 
creating policy-led interest margins. 
8.1.3 The internationalisation of the Renminbi     
Although  the  Renminbi  is  still  inconvertible  in  the  capital  account,  the  Chinese 
government has initiated a series of policies to encourage the internationalisation of the 
Renminbi in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008. Although China‘s massive 
foreign  reserves  are  beneficial  for  macro-economic  stability,  they  create  high-risk 
exposure at the meta-level. The United States‘ quantitative easing policy (QE) has led to 
the depreciation of its currency. As a result, the PBoC is buying depreciating US dollars 
with appreciating Renminbis. Furthermore, the PBoC has been forced to raise interest 
rates in the face of mounting inflation. This suggests China is engulfed in a vicious 
circle. To make matters worse, China‘s tremendous foreign reserves are heavily exposed. 
The depreciated US dollar has caused a massive value loss for China‘s reserves, which 
Krugman (2009) terms the ―dollar trap‖. Moreover, following the global financial crisis 
in 2008, there is a potential loss of confidence in the US Dollar as a reserve currency. 
Continuing  large  payment  deficits,  the  lack  of  a  credible  fiscal  plan  and  the  recent 
downgrade of the US credit outlook by S&P have damped investors‘ confidence in the US 
Dollar (The Times, 2011). 
Given that the current international monetary system is still dominated by the US dollar, 
it is very difficult for China to reform the international financial infrastructure by itself. 
Against this background, China has sought to turn the Renminbi into an international  
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currency on a step-by-step basis through a series of pilot schemes. 
Table 8.5：Bilateral currency swap agreements with the PBoC 
Counterparty    Date of Agreement  Size of Swap 
RMB billion 
Bank of Korea      12 December, 2008  180   
Hong Kong Monetary Authority    20 January, 2009  200   
Bank Negara Malaysia      8 February, 2009  80   
National Bank of the Republic of Belarus      11 March, 2009  20   
Bank Indonesia    23 March, 2009  100 
Central bank of Argentina    2 April, 2009  70 
The Central Bank of Iceland    9 June, 2010  3.5   
Monetary Authority of Singapore    23 July, 2010  150   
Reserve Bank of New Zealand    18 April, 2011  25   
Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan      19 April, 2011  0.7 
Central Bank of Mongolia    6 May, 2011  5   
National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan      13 June, 2011  7   
Bank of Korea    26 October, 2011  360 * 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority    22 November, 2011  400*   
Bank of Thailand    22 December, 2011  70   
National Bank of Pakistan    23 December, 2011  10   
Note: all agreements have a maturity of three years and are renewable.   
* The agreement was renewed after maturity and the size of swap doubled 
Source: PBoC website, www.pbc.gov.cn;   
Since December 2008， the PBoC has embarked on a series of swap currency agreements 
with its trading partners and has been experimenting with the idea of conducting trade 
and investment activities using the Renminbi and the respective partners‘ currencies. As 
of the end of 2011, China had conducted 14 bilateral currency swaps (Table 8.5 ) with 
countries including South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Brazil and 
Argentina, totalling more than RMB 1,300 billion (USD 190 billion). These currency 
swaps allow China to receive Renminbi instead of US dollars for its exports to those 
countries. It is noteworthy that the Renminbi‘s cross-border settlement is irrelevant to 
sensitive issues such as capital account convertibility (He and McCauley 2010). The 
currency swap agreement only allows foreign importers to obtain Renminbi from their 
own  commercial  banks.  In  the  meantime,  Chinese  exporters  are  entitled  to  use 
Renminbi as their settlement currency, instead of US Dollars, Euros or other currencies. 
Denominating transactions in Renminbi significantly reduces the exchange risks faced  
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by  Chinese  exporters  and  importers.  Bilateral  currency  swap  agreements  are  an 
important step in increasing the Renminbi‘s share of international trade.   
Overall, the SIFC‘s development and the internationalisation of the Renminbi have a 
symbiotic relationship.  It  is  evident that the SIFC‘s development  is  set  to  drive the 
international use of Renminbi (also see Subacchi and Huang 2012b). In April 2009, 
Shanghai and four other Chinese cities in Guangdong Province were initially selected 
for a pilot city project to conduct Renminbi cross-border settlements. The scheme was 
then  extended  to  the  entire  country  in  October  2010.  In  2011,  China‘s 
Renminbi-denominated trade settlement comprises 9 percent (RMB 2.08 trillion) of the 
total value of commodity import and exports (USD 3.6 trillion).   
Conversely, the Chinese government‘s efforts to use Renminbi as a settlement currency 
across borders will be  a strong incentive to  promote Shanghai  into an international 
financial  centre.  For  a  start,  Renminbi  cross-border  settlement  facilitates  companies 
trading abroad as it helps to prevent foreign exchange risks. As the Renminbi becomes 
accepted by more countries around the world, traders will want to use it to settle their 
transactions and investors will be willing to hold more of the currency as a store of 
value. An increase in Renminbi settlements means offshore Renminbi would require 
conduits for investment. This will force the government to further open up the financial 
system. In effect, the global currency status of the US dollar, UK Sterling and Japanese 
Yen are highly dependent on established financial markets in New York, London and 
Tokyo. Therefore, a deep, liquid and well-established onshore market is crucial for the 
internationalisation of the Renminbi. Shanghai thus needs to speed up infrastructure 
construction to build a cross-border clearing house for the Renminbi geared toward 
global demand (Xinhua 2012).
 Fang Xinghai, then Director General of the Shanghai 
Financial Services Office (SFSO), stated:   
The currency will go global and foreigners will hold Renminbi assets. But where will these 
assets be created? They will be created in this onshore financial centre. So, first of all,  
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Shanghai has to be open to let the assets go out and outside investment to come in. For that 
to happen, the capability of creating these assets has to be greatly expanded.
  75 
Although  the  move  to  Renminbi  internationalisation  is  a  gradual  process,  it  may 
proceed more quickly than expected. China‘s central bank has scheduled a move in the 
direction of a more flexible exchange rate regime and a fully convertible currency. In a 
recent report, PBoC (2012) laid out a roadmap to ease capital account restrictions with a 
ten-year  timeframe.  The  first  phase  occurs  from  2013-2015  to  encourage  China‘s 
outward direct investment. The second phase, in between three and five years, would 
accelerate greater cross-border commercial lending, including loans in Renminbi. In the 
longer term over five to ten years, foreigners would be allowed to invest more freely in 
Chinese stocks, bonds and property. Full convertibility of the Renminbi would be the 
―last step‖ and would be taken at an unspecified time. It would also be combined with 
restrictions on ―speculative‖ capital flows and short-term foreign borrowing. The PBoC 
also states that it would take other steps to further liberalise the financial industry. This 
will  entail  further  attempts  to  strengthen  the  competitiveness  of  China‘s  financial 
markets and to raise their attractiveness so that they can fulfil their role in meeting the 
demands  of  domestic  and  foreign  users.  This  report  suggests  that  with  the 
internationalisation of the Renminbi, China‘s financial sector will be more ―opening-up 
and  going-global‖.  Subramanian  (2012)  describes  this  aspect  of  currency 
internationalisation as an interventionist opening. 
In parallel with China‘s WTO accession, which helped the country integrate into the 
global trading system, the further internationalisation of the Renminbi would help it 
integrate into the global financial markets. With the increase of its economic weight, 
China badly needs an international financial centre as a platform to allocate resources 
across  borders  to  increase  capital  efficiency  and  reduce  transaction  costs  (also  see 
section 8.2).  By having greater recognition  of  the Renminbi  globally,  it would also 
enhance the competitiveness of China‘s financial institutions (Eoyang et al., 2010, p.27). 
                                                 
75  See Turning Shanghai into a Global Financial Hub: So Much to Do, So Little Time, available at: 
http://www.knowledgeatwharton.com.cn/index.cfm?fa=viewfeature&languageid=1&articleid=2257, 
accessed on 10 December 2013.  
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Zhou Xiaochuan, the Governor of PBoC, contended at the Lujiazui Forum in 2008: 
Albeit China is a large economic entity, it is imperative for China to integrate into the 
international community rather than to be a standalone player. Only by going global, can 
the  international  financial  centre  gain  competitiveness  and  be  successful.  Only  in  the 
course of integration can Chinese banks and financial firms learn from their counterparts 
and sharpen up their positions (original version in Chinese, translated by author). 
In  summary,  the  internationalisation  of  the  Renminbi  is  a  golden  opportunity  for 
Shanghai to build a real IFC. In a sense, it is only when Shanghai eventually builds up 
its global position in the Renminbi business that the city will become a genuine IFC on 
a par with New York and London. 
8.2  Catalysts for the Withdrawal of Financial Statism   
First  of  all,  China  is  transforming  its  developmental  model  from  an 
investment-incentive to a domestic-demand oriented one. The past 20 years have seen 
China  gain  comparative  advantage,  mainly  in  labour-intensive  commodities.  It  is 
becoming clear that industrial policies that relied on directed credit, subsidies, trade 
barriers and government purchases of products to induce the development of targeted 
industries, are increasing costly and inefficient. Moreover, many of the instruments used 
in support of such policies are banned by the WTO (Yusuf and Nabeshima, quoted in 
Logan 2008 p.41). To sustain its growth, the Chinese central government has decided to 
shift its comparative advantage towards knowledge-intensive sectors, i.e. to spur growth 
through  innovation,  rather  than  high-pollution-led,  low-value-added  commodities
76. 
Policy-makers  realise  the  structural  transformation  of  the  economy  –  to  rein  in 
investment and expand domestic consumption in particular - will require a termination 
of the cheap credit policy. 
Indeed,  one  of  the  sources  of  cheap  credit  is  the  specified  interest  margin  for 
                                                 
76   Please  see  the  the  communique  of  the  18
th  CCP  Congress  for  details.  Available  at: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/18cpcnc/2012-11/17/c_113711665.htm    
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commercial  banks.  This  has  created  new  soft-budget  restraints  for  state  banks  after 
joint-stock  reforms.  To  counter  the  impact  of  the  2008  global  financial  crisis  the 
Chinese authorities splurged a RMB 4 trillion stimulus package implemented through 
bank credit expansion (IMF 2011a, p. 19). The bulk of investment was largely derived 
from state commercial banks loans. It is notable that during that period, the state banks 
had already completed joint-stock reforms and had become more commercialised. Why 
then did they follow the scheme of stimulus package initiated by the government? One 
answer is that the specified interest margin set by the state would bring them large 
amount of profits if they expanded their credit loans, which rendered them ignorant of 
the potential high risks. In 2011, the IMF‘s report on China‘s Financial System Stability 
Assessment pointed out that ―China confronts a steady building up of financial sector 
vulnerabilities‖ (IMF 2011, p.7). In 2012, a report published by the World Bank also 
wrote:   
The conflicting roles of government in ownership and regulatory functions have made it 
impossible  for  regulation  and  supervision  to  be  truly  effective;  continued  patronage  of 
financial institutions, including through appointment of senior executives has prolonged the 
bureaucratic  culture  among  banks;  and  the  perception  of  implicit  guarantor  of  failed 
financial institutions has exacerbated moral hazard (World Bank 2012, p.132). 
The Chinese leaders were thus alerted to the high risks accumulated in the state-owned 
financial sector under financial statism.   
Table 8.6: The share of industrial output by ownership (1978-2010) 




Foreign, private, others 
(%) 
1978  77.6  22.4  0.0 
1980  76.0  23.5  0.5 
1985  64.9  32.1  3.0 
1990  54.6  35.6  9.8 
1995  32.6  35.5  46.2 
2000  23.5  13.9  62.6 
2005  10.6  4.4  85.0 
2010  8.2  1.5  90.4 
Source：China Statistical Yearbook, various years, Wu (2008, p.18) 
The second point to consider is that market reform has significantly reduced the share of 
state-owned  sector  in  manufacturing  industry.  China‘s  economy  has  hitherto  been  
- 203 - 
dominated by non-state enterprises in many categories, such as private, foreign-invested 
enterprises,  township  and  village  enterprises,  stockholding  enterprises  etc.  In  the 
mid-1990s, the Chinese government undertook the historically unprecedented task of 
downsizing state-owned enterprises by closing down, suspending operations, merging 
and shifting (in Chinese ―Guan Ting Bing Zhuan‖). The number of industrial SOEs has 
significantly decreased, particularly in the second half of the 1990s. As seen in Table 8.6, 
the share of SOEs has declined from 77.6 percent in 1978 to 8.2 percent in 2010 in 
respect to industrial output. In contrast to SOEs, the non-state sector is least dependent 
on financial support and state control. Furthermore, social welfare reforms have also 
made progress
77. When the share of state sector in the industrial sector fell to a certain 
level, state banks should have been able to come more commercially oriented and their 
reform should have shown more progress.    
For another, fiscal reform has made the revenue of central government increased sharply. 
In 2010, the budget revenue of government reached RMB 8,310 billion - more than 12 
times above its 1995 total (see Table A1 in Appendix 2). Between 1995 and 2010, the 
ratio of budgeted revenue to GDP also gr ew from 10 percent to 21 percent.  With the 
inclusion of additional budgeted revenue, the ratio stood at 22.2 percent in 2010. The 
increase in fiscal revenue strengthened the capacity of the state in promoting market 
reform of the banking sector.   
The third point is that the recent withdrawal of  financial statism is also influenced by 
exogenous forces, particularly after China ‘s  accession  to  the  WTO.  In  2001,  China 
eventually became a member of the WTO after 15 years of negotiations, during which it 
faced  enormous  pressures  from  advanced  economies  such  as  the  United  States  and 
European Union to open up its markets (Long 2007). To acquire the right to WTO 
membership, China committed to open up its service markets and in particular to afford 
market openness in banking, insurance, securities business etc. Table 8.7 depicts the 
                                                 
77  In the 1990s, a payroll-tax-based and contributory social insurance system was established, which 
included  community-based  pension  system,  health  insurance,  public  housing  fund  and 
unemployment insurance.    
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specific  commitments  made  by  the  Chinese  government  on  financial  services  after 
WTO. Foreign banks were permitted to provide Renminbi and foreign currency services 
without geographic and client limitation by the end of 2006.   
Table 8.7: Schedule of specific commitments on financial services after WTO accession 
Financial 
Sector 
Description of Commitment  Time Frame 
Banking 
Services 
  Foreign providers of foreign currency services 
permitted without geographic and client 
limitation 
Upon accession 
    Foreign providers of Renminbi services 
permitted without geographic and client 
limitations 
  Foreign providers of banking services subject 
to licensing and qualification requirements 




Securities    Foreign providers may establish fund 
management joint ventures with no more than 
49 percent equity   




  Foreign life insurers permitted to establish 
joint ventures with 50 percent equity, with no 
geographic limitations; subject to licensing 
requirements 





  Foreign nonlife insurers permitted to establish 
wholly owned subsidiaries, with no 
geographic limitations; subject to licensing 
requirements 
Within 3 years 
of accession 
Source: MOFTEC (2001)   
These audacious commitments imposed enormous challenges on China‘s state banks, 
although Long Yongtu, the Chief negotiator of China‘s WTO accession, contends that 
more openness might have been arranged if it hadn‘t been for the Asian financial crisis 
(Long 2007). Given that foreign banks held greater competitiveness in management, 
innovation and financial services, the only way domestic banks could survive was to 
accelerate reform. Otherwise, these crippled entities would surely have been taken over 
by foreign counterparts. The pressures from opening the door wider to foreign investors 
encouraged China‘s banks to operate as genuine commercial banks and become fully 
accountable for the profits they generated - and the losses they incurred. Had state banks 
treated themselves as ―resource allocators rather than financial intermediaries‖ (Pistor  
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2009) and considered their daily operations to be based on maximising societal welfare 
rather than profits, they would lose their competitiveness to their foreign counterparts 
from the onset. Jao (2003, p.41) cautioned that the Chinese government should tackle 
non-performing  loans  as  a  priority  before  fulfilling  other  essential  conditions  of 
developing an IFC in Shanghai. 
China‘s  WTO  commitment  has  also  had  direct  repercussions  on  the  selective 
intervention  policies  in  Shanghai.  As  stated  in  the  Chapter  6,  financial  statism 
functioned  well  in  terms  of  creating  financial  markets  and  promoting  infrastructure 
investment in Shanghai. Shanghai possessed various favourable policies (particularly in 
the Pudong New Area) which were not extended to other cities in the 1990s. However, 
most of these policies expired in 2002, particularly after China‘s entry into the WTO, 
after  which  the  Chinese  government  committed  to  opening  up  financial  services  to 
foreign  providers  without  geographic  and  client  limitation.  This  has  caused  two 
outcomes: firstly, the rents generated from restricting competition policies have been 
reduced  to  normal  levels  because  market  opening  without  geographic  limitations 
implies  that  no  extra  rents  are  obtainable  if  organisations  choose  Shanghai  as  their 
regional headquarters. Secondly, this has also led to a new phenomenon whereby nearly 
30 cities in China have planned the creation of a financial centre among their future 
development goals (CDI 2013). Although only five of these cities have claimed to have 
built an international financial centre (i.e. Shanghai, Beijing, Shenzhen, Guangzhou and 
Dalian), the inter-city competition has, to certain extent, undermined the effectiveness 
of financial statism in the SIFC development.   
In the new context, Shanghai‘s municipal government realised that to compete with peer 
cities within the country, Shanghai‘s strengths lie in its increasingly established financial 
markets rather than previous interventionist policies. Tu Guangshao, Deputy Mayor of 
Shanghai, expressed his preference for a more market-oriented approach for the SIFC 
development, when he made a speech at Caixin Annual Conference in 2010:   
Firstly,  we  should  endorse  the  rule  of  law  rather  than  preferential  policies  in  SIFC 
development. The latter is temporary while the former is more enduring and effective. 
Secondly, we should pay more attention to human resources rather than physical facilities. 
Human capital is utterly more important in future SIFC development. Thirdly, the role of  
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government should be changed and should give way to a more open and market-oriented 
system (Tu 2010, translated by Author). 
Yu Zhengsheng, the then Party Secretary of Shanghai, was more straightforward when 
he responded in an interview in March 2012 that ―without the full convertibility of the 
Renminbi, it is impossible to develop Shanghai into a successful international financial 
centre‖
78. His words imply that transforming Shanghai from a domestic financial centre 
to an international financial centre is largely dependent on the central government lifting 
capital controls in the medium term.   
Last  but  not  least,  after  30  years  of  rapid  development,  China‘s  macro-economic 
environment has significantly improved. China is currently ―the workshop of the world‖ 
and the world‘s second-largest economy. The export-push strategy has led China to be 
the largest trading nation in the world
79. Meanwhile, external debt is moderate and the 
exceptionally large foreign exchange reserves provide a considerable cushion against 
even large sudden capital outflows (Herd 2010, p.35).   
At meta-level, the most direct result of capital controls has been the segregation of 
domestic and international markets. The PBoC announced that at the end of March 2011, 
it  held  USD  3.04  trillion  in  foreign  currency  reserves.  However,  China‘s  massive 
foreign reserves have been invested in low-return US Treasury bonds. This phenomenon, 
often  labelled  as  ―capital  doubtful  recycling‖  (Pan  2009,  p.54),  has  had  a  negative 
impact  on  the  sustainability  of  China‘s  economic  growth.  While  China  has  been 
adopting  various  favourable  policies  to  attract  foreign  capital  and  investment  from 
developed  countries  at  high  rates,  it  has  been  unable  to  use  this  surplus  capital  to 
effectively support its own real economy, instead preferring to invest it in the form of 
treasury bills and other low-rate-of-return instruments (Stiglitz 1998).   
                                                 
78  See http://nf.nfdaily.cn/nfdsb/content/2012-03/11/content_40152960.htm, Accessed on 12 March, 
2012. 
79  In 2013, China‘s total volumes of imports and exports reached USD 4.16 trillion (surpassing 
United States with USD 3.91 trillion), becoming the largest trading country in the world.  
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Why did China have to rely on foreign direct investment while maintaining such a high 
volume of foreign reserves? This is, to a large extent, due to the under-development of 
financial markets and stringent capital controls. In a liberal financial market, countries 
are not only able to absorb foreign investment from around the world, they can also 
invest  surplus  capital  globally  to  reduce  risks  and  increase  returns.  The  Chinese 
financial system and market development is lagging behind its economic development. 
China confronts huge risks when it comes to foreign currency exchange but its capital 
controls mean it cannot take full advantage of its domestic capital and so is forced to 
borrow abroad to fund high-return industries. China‘s strong economic growth has also 
allowed overseas investors to reap huge profits.   
Furthermore, enforcement of capital controls is likely to become progressively more 
difficult after China‘s financial system becomes more sophisticated and the involvement 
of Chinese businesses in international markets increases. The most important constraints 
on the pace of China‘s capital account liberalisation are the incentive and capabilities of 
domestic financial institutions and non-financial businesses to prudently manage the 
risks of cross-border transactions and the ability of supervisory authorities to monitor 
external exposures sufficiently to contain systemic risk (Herd 2010, p.35). 
To summarise, the changing contexts have weakened the foundation of financial statism, 
which explains its recent withdrawal by the central government. It also demonstrates 
that financial statism is a development strategy that the state devised to maximise rents 
at  macro,  meso  and  meta  levels,  which  have  had  a  profound  impact  on  the  SIFC 
development. 
8.3 Withdrawal without Dismantling 
Although the central government has gradually relaxed its controls over the financial 
sector in some respects, it might be too early to conclude that financial statism has been 
fully dismantled in China.   
First of all, although the ownership structure of large state banks has diversified through 
joint-stock reform, the Chinese state still maintains strong control over the large banks 
through share  ownership  and  they  remain the  mainstay of the banking  system  after  
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joint-stock reform. In 1990, large state banks comprised 96 percent of total assets in the 
banking sector (see Table A6 in Appendix 2). Between 2002 and 2011, the share of large 
state banks assets was on a downward trajectory, falling from 73.6 percent in 2002 to 
48.5 percent in 2011. Yet the total assets of large state banks have increased from RMB 
13.55 trillion to RMB 53.64 trillion. Moreover, the ownership structure of state banks 
has  become  more  diversified  after  joint-stock  reform.  In  1998,  the  total  capital  of 
commercial banks amounted to RMB 515 billion, of which the state‘s share stood at 
RMB 484 billion, representing 94 percent of the total capital (Huang 2012). By the end 
of 2010, the state‘s capital share still accounted for 60.7 percent (including state legal 
person share
80), although the joint-stock reforms have introduced a large number of  
non-state shareholders (Figure8.1).   
Figure 8.1: Capital share of state and non-state for China‘s commercial banks (1998 vs. 
2010) 
 
Source: Huang (2012) 
With respect to foreign investment in the banking sector, several features of the deals 
should  be  noted.  First  of  all,  foreign  investors  were  offered  minority  stakes,  which 
means the banking system would still controlled by the state. Under Chinese legislation, 
                                                 
80  The  state-owned  legal  person  shares  (Guo  you  Fa  Ren  Gu)  refer  to  shares  of  a  joint  stock 
company/bank owned by another State-owned company or institution with a legal person status.   
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a single foreign investor‘s stake is limited to 20 percent of a Chinese domestic bank; all 
foreign investors have a combined maximum limit of 25 percent (Nie 2007, p.4; Herd et 
al. 2010). Secondly, foreign investors are required to lock in their investments for a set 
period, typically three years. Thirdly, foreign banks can only increase their stake to a 
maximum  of  19.9  percent  after  this  lock-in  period  has  expired.  Finally,  investors 
holding  shares  above  what  is  considered  a  critical  threshold  (i.e.  2.5  percent)  can 
nominate directors to the board of the bank in which they have invested (Pistor 2009). 
Anderson (2007) holds that the introduction of foreign banks as strategic partners is 
somewhat of a ‖red herring‖, since China is one of the most overbanked economies in 
the world
81. 
Table 8.8: A comparison of China‘s capital controls with other countries in 2012 
  China  Russia  Brazil  India  USA  UK  Germany  Japan 
Controls on: 
Capital market securities  *  *  *  *  *    *  * 
Money market 
instruments 
*  *  *  *  *    *  * 
Collective investment 
securities 
*  *  *  *  *    *  * 
Derivative and other 
instruments  *    *  *  *    *  * 
Commercial credits  *      *         
Financial credits  *    *  *      *  * 
Guarantees, securities, 
and financial backup 
facilities 
*      *  *       
Direct investment  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * 
Liquidation of direct 
investment 
*      *         
Real estate transactions  *    *  *  *    *  * 
Personal capital 
transactions 
*      *         
Provisions specific to: 
Commercial banks and 
other credit institutions  *  *  *  *    *     
Institutional investors  *  N.A.  *  *  *  *  *  * 
Note: ―*‖ indicates that there exists specific restriction 
Source: IMF (2012), 
                                                 
81  As  of  January  2012,  China‘s  banking  sector  assets  amounted  to  RMB  111.62  trillion, 
representing 93.6 percent of the total financial assets in the country. In comparison, the assets of 
securities firms totaled RMB 1.57 trillion, making up only 1.3 percent (CF40 2012).  
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In the financial markets, despite continuing government efforts to liberalise interest and 
exchange rates, controls on deposit rates remain in place and the floating of exchange 
rate  is  rather  limited.  Similarly,  China‘s  capital  account  still  operated  under  strict 
controls compared with other countries in 2012. According to the IMF‘s 2012 Annual 
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER), China had 
the  strictest  capital  control  regime  (similar  to  India‘s)  when  compared  with  other 
developed and developing countries (Table 8.8). It is also worth noting that Renminbi 
internationalisation is not equivalent to full Renminbi convertibility and the free-flow of 
the Renminbi across borders. 
The  state  might  yet  be  reluctant  to  dismantle  financial  statism  even  after  market 
mechanisms have been put in place. There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, 
entrenched  interests  groups  are  unwilling  to  change  the  status  quo,  which  is  to  the 
impediment  of  financial  development.  The  management  of  state  banks  and  the 
beneficiaries of cheap credit (e.g. other state-owned enterprises) will resist any attempt 
in liberalise interest rates. Furthermore, the state is not willing to lift the control on 
interest rates as this would increase the cost of loans for state-owned enterprises, which 
would have a negative impact on their finances. If interest rates were liberalised too 
rapidly, a number of SOEs and even local governments would go bankrupt (see Song 
2005). Secondly, there is a symbiotic relationship between the interests of bureaucrats 
and the SFIs. To a large degree, state ownership of the financial sector is related to state 
capacity  and  its  effectiveness  in  socio-economic  intervention,  which  is  critical  to 
employment, investment  and  fiscal  revenues. The third reason is  due to  ideological 
considerations. Some socialists argue the state sector is one of the defining features of 
socialism.  State-ownership  is  considered the  cornerstone of China‘s socialist market 
economy.  According  to  Li  Rongrong,  the  Chairman  (2003-2010)  of  China‘s 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC): 
State ownership is the foundation of the socialist economic system. The state-owned sector, 
which takes a dominant place in the country‘s economic lifeline and key areas, is one of the 
key features that distinguish a socialist market economy from a capitalist market economy 
(Li 2004).   
I would argue that Chinese leaders still remain cautious when it comes to dismantling  
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financial statism. They are well aware China is still a developing country. Although the 
financial markets developed rapidly, they are still imperfect. As we discussed in chapter 
7, the financial system is still fragile; the financial markets are not functional; the skilled 
human resources are insufficient; and the regulatory environment is relatively weak. 
China has yet to establish a deposit insurance system to protect savers from a meltdown 
of the banking system. Hence, dismantling China‘s financial statism will certainly be an 
incremental  process  and  the  development  of  the  SIFC  will  also  take  some  time  to 
accomplish. Nevertheless, in the long run, a modern financial infrastructure and a more 
market-based  financial  system  will  help  China  to  integrate  into  the  global  financial 
system and eventually transform Shanghai into a pre-eminent global financial centre
82.   
8.4 Summary 
China‘s  financial statism  has  been rolled back  in  recent  years,  particularly after  the 
global financial crisis in 2008. Policy measures such as ownership diversification within 
the banking sector, the gradual liberalisation of interest rates and the internationalisation 
of  the  Renminbi  suggest  the  Chinese  financial  sector  is  leaning  towards  a  greater 
emphasis on market mechanisms and away from administrative rule. This movement 
has been created by demands that the domestic financial sector be more competitive in 
the  globalised  marketplace  and  better  skilled  at  handling  the  complexities  of  the 
international  monetary  system.  From  a  system  characterised  by  dominant 
state-ownership, financial restraint and stringent capital controls, a new one has been 
emerging in which the state still plays a major part in policy guidance and direction but 
emphasis is placed on its ability to enforce and steer. In a nutshell, financial statism 
might act as an alternative development strategy for developing countries where market 
mechanisms are weak and under-developed. 
                                                 
82  In November 2013, the resolution of the 3
rd Plenary of 18
th CCP Congress pledged a range of 
measures to deepen financial reform, including accelerating liberalisation of interest rates, giving 
permission for qualified private investors to set up small and medium-sized banks, and speeding up 
full  convertibility  of  the  Renminbi  in  the  capital  account.  This  resolution  appears  to  show  a 
willingness on the part of the Chinese leadership to further weaken the regime of financial statism.  
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The role of the state in  IFCs  development  appears  to  be a contentious topic  in  the 
academic and practical arena. In this chapter, we bring forward a scaffolding metaphor 
for understanding the changing role of the Chinese state at the different stages of SIFC 
development.  The  chapter  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  9.1  describes  what  the 
―scaffolding‖ metaphor is. Then we analyze the implication of the scaffolding metaphor. 
The final section addresses several possible misconceptions regarding financial statism 
approach for the IFCs development.   
9.1 Financial Statism as Invisible Scaffolding 
Interestingly,  the  World  Bank  (2012)  reveals  there  are  two  conflicting  views  with 
respect to the role of the state in finance.   
First, there are sound economic reasons for the state to play an active role in financial 
systems. Second, there are practical reasons to be wary of the state playing too active a role 
in financial systems (p.1).   
The conflicting views on the role of the state in finance are consistent with the dual 
nature of the state discussed preciously in section 4.1. In this thesis, I use the metaphor 
of scaffolding to describe the changing role of the state in the SIFC‘s development. Just 
as scaffolding is necessary to provide temporary assistance when erecting a building, 
financial statism is also a supportive aid in the shaping of international financial centres, 
particularly in a transitional country. Using the scaffolding metaphor, the role of the 
state in IFCs‘ development can be viewed as a function of financial development. Table 
9.1 lists the transformation of financial statism at different levels of IFCs‘ development. 
Generally  speaking,  emerging  economies  need  a  higher  degree  of  development 
intervention than advanced economies. The poorer and weaker the situation and the  
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financial market is, the deeper intervention in its economy will be required to create an 
internal environment adequate to the IFCs‘ development.   
Table  9.1:  The  transformation  of  financial  statism  at  different  levels  of  IFCs‘ 
development 
Levels  Description  Initial Stage  Matured Stage 
Micro 
Level 
The agglomeration of 
financial institutions, 
markets, services and 
professionals 
Control over 




to private capital 
Meso 
Level 
The endowed factors, 
such as tax regimes, 
financial regulations, 
urban infrastructures and 
amenities etc. that the 
host city could offer 





intervention reduced   
Macro 
Level 
The political, economic 
and societal environment 
of the country where the 









Connection of the 
financial centre to the 
outside world, such as 
access to the international 
markets, mobility of 
capital flows and 











The  next  important  question  is  whether  financial  statism  needs  to  be  withdrawn  or 
dismantled  after  late-developing  countries  have  established  well-functioning, 
competitive  market  institutions.  Financial  statism  is  a  composite  of  state-owned 
financial  institutions,  financial  restraint  policies  and  capital  controls;  therefore  we 
should discuss these components separately. 
When it comes to capital controls, Kose et al. (2009) identify five threshold conditions  
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for  financial  liberalisation:  financial  market  development;  institutional  quality; 
governance;  macro-economic  policies;  and  trade  integration.  They  argue  that  if  an 
economy  is  above  a  certain  threshold  regarding  these,  financial  liberalisation  will 
benefit total factor productivity and GDP while the risk of crises will diminish. If a 
country fails to meet these thresholds,  financial integration will increase the risk of 
crises. Furthermore, connectivity to the global network is crucial for an IFC. Without 
free flow of capital, the efficiency and competitiveness of an IFC will be seriously 
undermined. More importantly, all states are being affected by globalisation; no single 
state can truly be isolated from the global process. Therefore, this thesis maintains that a 
capital control regime needs to be dismantled after emerging economies catch up with 
existing industrial powers. 
Secondly,  financial  restraint  policies  in  certain  conditions  can  promote  financial 
deepening  through  producing  contingent  rents.  Yet,  the  optimal  level  of  financial 
restraints falls as the economy increases its level of financial depth (Hellmann et al. 
1998).  As  we have seen  in  the case of China, the specified margin  of interest  rate 
distorts the credit market, creating many redundant projects that are not sustainable. If 
financial markets are already functioning well, the state no longer needs to intervene 
through administrative tools. Financial restraint thus appears to be more effective during 
the  early  stages  of  modernisation  than  in  later  stages  when  the  economy  demands 
creativity rather than sheer scale. Therefore, it is desirable that financial restraint be 
phased out as the economy acquires financial depth.   
Finally, it is still an open question as to whether the state should withdraw its significant 
ownership in the financial system, even after a functional market has been established. 
As discussed throughout this study, state-owned financial institutions can help to create 
an enabling environment that allows market institutions to grow. In this context, once a 
functional and effective market has been attained, the role of SFIs can be diminished. 
However, it is not clear if there is still a need for dominant state-ownership in a financial 
system once an international financial centre has been built up. In the academic arena, 
there are a number of scholars who endorse state-owned financial institutions, without 
connecting their existence with the maturity of  a market system. Butzbach and von 
Mettenheim (2014), for instance, argue that public banks have competitive advantages 
over private banks with lower overall agency costs, greater stability and better societal  
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welfare. From a Marxist perspective, finance is not neutral or classless. Within capitalist 
society, financial capital has taken on an increasingly hegemonic position, often to the 
detriment of labour (Marois 2012). State banks are a viable option for financing public 
services not only for developing countries, but also for advanced economies (Marois 
2013).   
However, one could question to what extent state-owned banks in developing countries 
are eventually able to cope with the problems they face, such as soft-budget constraints, 
conflicts of interest and so on. Meanwhile, with the enhancing of institutional strength 
and  a  market  system,  microeconomic  information  becomes  increasingly  complex: 
market  opportunities  become  more  uncertain  and  complex  after  the  financial  sector 
develops to a more advanced stage. A bigger concern is whether state-owned financial 
institutions  are  able  to  outstrip  privately-owned  ones  in  terms  of  competitiveness, 
innovation and efficiency in a globalised world. Further research is needed to clarify 
this issue.   
Moreover, it is worth mentioning that withdrawal of state-ownership in the financial 
sector does not equate to full privatisation in the whole industry. For example, in China, 
the recent reform of state-owned commercial banks is introducing various investors to 
transform  them  into  joint-stock  banks  consisting  of  mixed  ownership;  including 
state-owned, collectively-owned, individual, private and foreign ownership. In effect, 
there are certain types of state-owned banks, e.g. development banks or policy banks, 
which have been an important instrument used by governments to promote economic 
development in practically all countries around the world, regardless of their stage of 
development(Luna-Martinez and Vicente 2012) . 
In a nutshell, financial statism is a developmental strategy deliberately designed by the 
state to catch up with developed countries during the process of IFCs‘ development. To 
some extent, financial statism creates the seeds of its own destruction. The set-up of 
scaffolding occurs at a time of IFCs‘ development when late-developing countries may 
not be able to deal with problems such as institutional failure, market dysfunction and 
unequal foreign competition. These supports are gradually removed after developing 
countries  have  established  the  necessary  institutions,  created  markets  and  enhanced 
competitiveness  in  the  global  market.  The  scaffolding  metaphor  illuminates  the  
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changing role of the state in IFCs‘ development.   
9.2 Implications of the Scaffolding Metaphor 
My  study  advocates  that  large  emerging  economies  might  use  financial  statism  as 
invisible scaffolding to catch-up to developed countries in the development of IFCs. A 
scaffold is a temporary framework for construction in progress. It is put up for support 
and taken away as needed when the structure is strong enough to stand on its own. 
Financial  statism  is  thus  an  expedient  measure  designated  to  facilitate  IFCs‘ 
development and as a long-term strategy to boost their competitive advantages in the 
global IFCs‘ network. Several significant implications of the scaffolding metaphor are 
highlighted as follows. 
Firstly, the scaffolding metaphor sheds some light on the relationship between the state 
and the markets in the development of international financial centres. The development 
of the SIFC is a crossover development project affecting both the market and the state. 
Both parties are complementary. At different stages of development, the state and the 
market can play different roles, which can be viewed as a dialectical relationship. In the 
financial sector, the state can also provide essential regulations without which markets 
cannot function. Underpinning all of this, state managers have a special responsibility to 
create the institutional infrastructure that markets require. In the scaffolding metaphor, 
we view the state as part of the market system, rather than as an exogenous player. This 
concurs  with  the  market-enhancing  view  (Aoki  et  al.  1998).  In  other  words,  if  the 
government is not an endogenous player, the market is not complete. In the case of 
Shanghai, financial statism is necessary and advantageous due to the fact that its market 
system is imperfect and dysfunctional.   
As it is part of the market system, the state is thus able to play an independent role as an 
owner, and therefore establishing a mutual relationship with private investors in this 
public-private  joint  venture.  Financial  statism  was  helpful  in  stabilising 
macro-economic conditions and promoting investment-incentive economy. At the initial 
stages of development, moderate government intervention was helpful in cultivating the 
market,  as  in  the  case  of  Shanghai.  Without  effective  guidance,  weak  financial 
institutions and a rudimentary financial system would only evolve as the result of a  
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long-term, gradual process. As Evans (1995, p.29) put it, an effective state was not 
simply an adjunct to the market; it was an essential prerequisite to the formation of 
market relations.   
Development  intervention,  in  one  sense,  is  made  up  of  targeted  efforts  to  improve 
certain conditions (Lund 2010). Wang (2000, p.15) argues that a country's comparative 
advantages  are  not always naturally  endowed.  Instead, they  are  created through  the 
adoption of deliberate state policies to enhance their competitiveness. Wang‘s argument 
is appropriate for LDCs in the shaping of international financial centres. Considering 
the strategic significance and the large gaps behind advanced economies, the financial 
sectors in developing countries should be given privileged access to public resources in 
order to gain comparative advantage. Wang (2000) also maintains that only a strong 
state that is relatively autonomous from the influences of domestic and foreign special 
interests can undertake such a task. Where public resources are limited - as is the norm 
in LDCs - it is crucial that the state can use these limited resources wisely.     
Here the transformative capability of the state is particularly important. Transformative 
capability refers to the governing capacity that the state can reconfigure or rescale its 
power or resources to and/or from other economic and social actors in accordance with 
its strategic objectives. In the course of IFC development, the transformative capability 
refers to the skilfulness of the state to rein in or unleash financial statism; including state 
ownership, control over financial instruments and the market, convertibility of currency 
etc, in accordance with the different stages of financial development and conditions in 
the external environment. The state should constantly re-examine the rationale for the 
regulations it has imposed. This means states need to be ―adaptive‖ and ―reflexive‖, 
allowing them to respond creatively to evolving their roles in the new context. This 
capability  is,  in  part,  based  on  continuous  learning  in  the  form  of  interaction, 
coordination and dialogue among different domestic and international players. 
Secondly, financial statism can be costly. The erection of scaffolding is also costly in 
terms  of material  and labour but  it is  necessary  for the building process.  Similarly, 
financial statism constitutes neither a free lunch, nor a one-size-fits-all approach. It can 
be expensive because it could cause inefficiencies, lack of competition and even some 
moral  hazard  issues  (e.g.  corruption,  embezzlement).  Nevertheless,  in  the  face  of  
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institutional failure and infrastructure weakness, financial statism, if well designed, can 
be a temporary interventionist approach in the building of international financial centres 
in late-developing countries.   
Thirdly, we maintain that financial statism is only an expedient measure and it is likely 
to  be  tempered  or  even  dismantled  when  the  market  system  becomes  matured  and 
functional. Scaffolding is a temporary framework that supports construction: when the 
task is completed it is disassembled because otherwise it would obstruct the function of 
the building. In the same vein, financial statism should become redundant when the 
market  becomes  mature.  In  practice,  the  vested  interest  groups  who  benefit  from 
financial statism will likely be unwilling to remove the scaffolding even if it has already 
become the hindrance to the system as a whole. Certainly, the withdrawal of financial 
statism will be an incremental process, which is largely contingent on the maturity of 
the  market  system  and  the  contextual  environment,  both  domestically  and 
internationally. In China, the withdrawal of financial statism is often pushed hard by top 
political leaders. For instance, at a press conference held in March 2013, Li, Keqiang, 
the Premier, compared reducing direct government intervention to ―cutting one‘s own 
wrist‖ to demonstrate his resolve to transform Chinese government into de facto limited 
government.     
The case study also shows that in the recent years, China‘s financial statism has been 
watered down somewhat for a number of internal and external reasons. It first occurred 
with China‘s entry to the WTO in 2001. Chinese political leaders believed the original 
development  model  could  not  sustain  optimal  growth  for  China  and  the  market 
economy had already been preliminary established. The conventional model of financial 
statism has become less significant, as economic policies and legislation have become 
more  transparent  and  effective.  This  in  turn  has  largely  released  the 
underhand-operation concerns of foreign investors when engaging in business in China. 
With  the  development  of  the  market,  the  Chinese  state  has  gradually  changed  its 
supervisory principles and adopted more market-oriented methods (Chen 2009, p.577). 
In  the  meantime,  the  Chinese  state  has  shifted  from  its  previous  role  as  full-time 
manager to that of a more market-oriented regulator. 
Finally, we argue that the sequencing, tempo and pacing of scaffolding remain central to  
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the successful shaping of an IFC in developing countries. It is interesting to note that the 
Chinese state responded differently to the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-8 and Global 
Financial Crisis of 2008. After the Asian financial crisis, the Chinese state became more 
cautious and slowed down market liberalisation. The central government strengthened 
financial statism, particularly in the control of capital flows across borders. In 2008, 
China had also become more proactive in building the SIFC. The state has expedited its 
developmental progress in this regard, including encouraging the internationalisation of 
Renminbi.  In  the  previous  section,  we  discussed  the  underlying  reasons  for  such  a 
response but now we must highlight the importance of proper timing in establishing or 
removing  the  scaffolding  in  the  development  process.  Two  key  propositions  of  the 
scaffolding metaphor are highlighted here.   
For one, the pace of financial liberalisation should neither hasty nor delayed. Excessive 
liberalisation  can  cause  capital  flight  or  an influx of huge speculative  funds, which 
would adversely affect a country‘s monetary independence and financial stability. This 
would also pose threats to a country‘s creditworthiness, drag down its sovereignty rating 
and eventually jeopardise the entire financial system. In this regard, China is correct to 
retain  controls  on  its  capital  account  until  a  robust,  healthy  and  resilient  domestic 
financial system is established. Nevertheless, it is also crucial to avoid the other extreme 
of  the  spectrum.  Japan  experienced  remarkable  economic  development  between  the 
1960s  and  1980s.  Nevertheless,  its  government  was  reluctant  to  open  the  country‘s 
financial markets, believing protectionism was beneficial to the national interest. As a 
result, the Japanese government‘s tight controls over its financial sector and its regime 
of high taxation have undermined Tokyo‘s ascendancy as a global financial centre on a 
par  with  London  and  New  York  (Shirai  2007).  Therefore,  the  tempo  of  financial 
liberalisation should be appropriate to the peculiar circumstances faced by a state.   
For another, the sequencing of liberalisation is important: a deep and liquid domestic 
market is vital for liberalisation. The Asian financial crisis stemmed primarily from the 
internal  deficiencies  of  its  economic  and  financial  system  (Young  et  al.  2009).  If 
financial  investment  is  largely  contingent  on  administrative  command  rather  than 
market signals, it will invariably lead to lower competitiveness. Herein I concur with 
McKinnon (1993) that there should be an orderly sequence of fiscal,  monetary  and 
foreign exchange policies in the course of capital liberalisation. McKinnon listed an  
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optimal order of economic liberalisation for the transition from a planned to a market 
economy. Currency convertibility in the capital account is the last stage of economic 
liberalisation. 
McKinnon（1993）states that transition to a market economy requires the following 
steps:   
  Before opening the international sector, the domestic capital market should be gradually 
liberalised and interest rates should be gradually shifted to a market-based rate 
  Liberalisation of the foreign exchange sector and the adoption of single exchange rate can 
be undertaken after the liberalisation of domestic finance and trade market 
  Stabilisation of domestic prices is necessary before allowing free international capital 
mobility 
  Free foreign exchange convertibility on the capital account is usually the last stage in the 
optimal order of economic liberalisation (p.10). 
Therefore, the degree of financial openness should reflect the maturity of the financial 
markets. There are a range of criteria for a matured financial market including sound 
macro-economic conditions with low inflation and a manageable government deficit, an 
efficient,  market-based  financial  market,  a  large  number  of  highly  competitive  and 
well-performing listed companies etc. Most importantly, interest rates should be fully 
liberalised - otherwise investments and financial allocations will be distorted.   
Therefore, in the development of SIFC, the state is responsible for the order, pace and 
tempo of the development. This is critical as IFCs‘ development is a dynamic process 
that involves various factors. What the state did is weigh the importance of different 
factors relevant to the multi-faceted model of IFCs‘ development and identify their key 
strategic objectives. Generally, this will involve the maximisation of national interests 
and societal welfare (i.e. maximise the rents, in the words of the neo-institutionalists), 
although the details can be different contingent on the state structure and social setting 
of a country. The state needs to strike a balance and arrive at a trade-off in determining 
the sequence and pace of transformation. This is because some policies might promote 
the IFCs‘ development in one respect, but could hinder it in another. If it does not occur 
in the right sequence and at the right pace, it would have disastrous consequences. For 
example,  Atkins  (2006)  states  that  if  financial  sectors  in  developing  countries  are  
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privatised and opened for foreign investors all at once, their domestic financial sectors 
would be controlled by foreigners overnight. Although this might be beneficial to IFCs‘ 
development at a micro-level, i.e. the agglomeration of foreign financial firms, this will 
have greatly undermined national territorial sovereignty at a macro-level. 
In sum, financial reforms and liberalisation are two sides of the same coin for IFCs‘ 
development. IFCs‘ development should be synchronised in line with substantial and 
well-designed  financial  sector  reform.  Sound  financial  reform  is  an  important 
component of an IFC‘s  development and its design is crucial: just as well-designed 
financial reforms can promote IFCs‘ development, poorly designed financial reforms 
can jeopardise their success. 
9.3 Misconceptions of Financial Statism   
In this section, I intend to clarify three possible misconceptions with regard to financial 
statism in China. First of all, it is noteworthy that financial statism is not equivalent to 
state  capitalism.  State  capitalism  has  various  meanings.  In  the  early  20
th  Century, 
Bukharin (1915, p.157) identified state capitalism as a new stage in the development of 
capitalism,  in  which  all  sectors  of  national  production  and  all  important  social 
institutions had been centralised by the state. Rothbard (1973) attaches state capitalism 
to Nazi economic management in Germany. In his book The End of the Free Market 
Bremmer (2010) labelled a broad set of countries as state capitalism countries, including 
Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Algeria, Ukraine, Russia, India, 
Mexico, Brazil, China, and many countries in Africa and South East Asia. According to 
him, these countries have one thing in common: authoritarian governments use various 
kinds of SOEs to manage the exploitation of resources. As Bremmer (2010) states: 
The ultimate motive is not economic (maximising growth) but political (maximising the 
state‘s power and the leadership‘s chance of survival). This is a form of capitalism but one 
in which the state acts as the dominant economic player and uses markets primarily for 
political gain. 
For  Bremmer,  there  are  two  distinguishing  features  between  state  and  free-market 
capitalism.    
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First, policy-makers don‘t embrace state capitalism as a temporary series of steps meant to 
rebuild a shattered economy or to jump-start an economy out of recession… Second, state 
capitalism sees markets primarily as a tool that serves national interests, or at least those of 
ruling elites, rather than as an engine of opportunities for the individual.   
I  disagree  with  his  categorisation  of  China.  First  of  all,  the  Chinese  government 
maintains that China is still a socialist state but a market economy is not the preserve of 
capitalist countries. Secondly, China is still governed by the Chinese Communist Party. 
In other words, the CCP is the only ruling party in China. I cannot imagine a capitalist 
country  being  ruled  by  a  Communist  Party  as  the  ideologies  and  beliefs  are 
diametrically opposed. However, I do not intend to delve into this subject more deeply 
as this is beyond the scope of the thesis.   
Moreover, it is arguable there are two fundamental differences between financial statism 
and state capitalism as defined by Bremmer. Firstly, financial statism refers to state 
control over the financial sector; such as ownership, interest rates, capital flows etc. 
which is much narrower than the scope defined under state capitalism. In other words, 
for  other  sectors,  such  as  manufacturing  industries,  the  state  is  much  less  likely  to 
intervene and these are primarily contingent on the market system. Secondly, in this 
thesis,  financial  statism  is  considered  as  a  set  of  development  policies  used  by 
developing countries to maximise social welfare and to modernise the financial sector. 
Specifically,  financial  statism  is  utilized  by  late-developing  countries  to  mend 
institutional loophole, preclude financial shock and maintain macroeconomic stability. 
Financial statism would never pose a threat to democracy in developing countries as 
Bremmer postulates it would for state capitalism. On the contrary, financial statism is an 
alternative interventionist approach that allows developing countries to modernise their 
financial sectors and even to shape an international financial centre.   
The second biased view is that financial statism inevitably leads to prevalent corruption 
and rent-seeking behaviour. In this case, the inability of political systems could reduce 
social welfare rather than address problems arising from information and transaction 
costs  (see  Barth  et  al  2008).  In  a  broad  sense,  this  issue  might  be  pertinent  to 
philosophical  beliefs  about  human  nature:  is  bureaucracy  composed  of  ―economic 
humans‖  or  ―reciprocal  humans‖?  The  former  believes  humans  are  narrowly  
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self-interested,  whereas  the  latter  maintains  that  human  beings  are  co-operative  and 
motivated to improve their environment and that of their fellow human beings. To the 
best  of  my  knowledge,  it  is  still  an  open  question.  Evans  (1995)‘s  discourse  on 
―embedded autonomy‖ counters public choice theory (Buchanan et al. 1980; Self 1993). 
In a narrow sense, it is generally more concerned with good governance structures. Here 
we need to separate the legitimate role of the state from white-collar criminality in 
particular, such as embezzlement and corruption. Whether in laissez-faire or dirigisme 
states,  there  will  always  be  corruption.  To  minimise  corruption  and  rent-seeking 
behaviour,  the  most  important  measures  are  enhancements  to  the  rule  of  law  and 
enforcement. Singapore is a typical example of a country with a high proportion of 
public sector employment yet it is considered among the least-corrupt societies in the 
world.     
When  talking  about  the  relationship  between  the  state  and  the  market  in  economic 
development,  some  commentators  often  impugn  government  bureaucracy  as  an 
untrustworthy interest group that seeks for self-interests. However, it is not always the 
case that the private sector is more productive than the state sector. In the real world, 
public policies are often manipulated by private sector interests who lobby governments 
to make policies that benefit them. The sub-prime fiasco taking place in the United 
States suggests it is not always the case that nobody is able to foresee a crisis but in this 
instance  the  commercial  interests  of  Wall  Street  financiers  deterred  the  Federal 
government from taking effective measures to prevent it (Fang 2013).   
In  addition,  a  wide  range  of  market  failures  exist  in  the  financial  sector,  including 
improper  payments  and  bonuses  for  bankers.  Table  9.2  presents  a  comparison  of 
executive  pay  in  the  top  banks  in  China  and  the  United  Kingdom.  In  the  United 
Kingdom, although the banks have encountered huge losses and received billions in 
taxpayer bailout funds, their top executive still received millions of pounds in salary and 
bonus payments. The Royal Bank of Scotland, for example, received up to GBP 20 
billion in a government bailout in 2008, while its chief executives received GBP 4.2 
million in total. In contrast, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the largest 
bank in China, earned GBP 27 billion (profit before tax) in 2011. Yet its Chairman and 
Chief Executive only received RMB 1.64 million (GBP 164,000) and RMB 1.44 million 
(GBP 144,000) respectively. These results might be an extreme example but they imply  
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that when it comes to the financial industry even developed countries still cannot cope 
with the issue of ―too big to fail‖. This also shows the ownership of the banking sector 
has  no  direct  bearing  on  its  performance  and  that  state  banks  are  not  always  less 
profitable  than  private  ones.  Even  developed  countries  still  require  more  regulation 
when it comes to such matters as executive pay and bonuses.   
Table 9.2: Executive pay of major banks: China versus United Kingdom 
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Note: The data for Chinese banks has been transferred to British pounds with the exchange rate GBP 
1.00 = RMB 10.00 
Source: KPMG (2012), Hannam (2009), 2011 annual report of all listed banks, compiled by author 
The  third  misconception  is  that  financial  statism  is  synonymous  with  financial 
repression, which is incompatible with IFCs‘ development. In effect, as we mentioned 
earlier,  financial  statism  embodies  financial  restraint  policies,  the  preconditions  for 
which are positive real interest rates and low inflation rates (Hellmann et al. 1998). The 
controlled interest rate might be lower than the Walrasian interest rate (i.e. the market 
equilibrium rate) but financial repression refers to a set of government policies that  
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create low or negative real interest return on deposits (Lardy 2008). Under financial 
repression, the real interest rate is often negative. As seen from the earlier case study on 
China, although interest rates have been controlled by the state, real interest rates have 
been positive most of the time. On the contrary, the Federal Reserve, European Central 
Bank, Bank of Japan, and Bank of England all set their short-term policy rates to near 
zero after the global financial crisis in 2008. In addition, quantitative easing has been 
adopted by developed countries to counter the overhang of government debts. As a 
matter of fact, we have witnessed prevailing financial repression in developed markets 
where interest rates were liberalised (Shepherd 2013).   
Financial statism is more applicable to developing and transitional economies, in that 
they  are  often  associated  with  market  incompleteness  and  institutional  deficiencies. 
Financial restraint policies are effective in creating ―contingent rents‖ for both the state 
and non-state financial sectors to develop strong financial institutions and markets. We 
have witnessed abundant evidence of this in the case of Shanghai‘s development of an 
international  financial  centre.  Under  financial  statism,  China  experienced  financial 
deepening  rather  than  financial  repression.  If  we  look  at  the  M2/GDP,  the  rate  has 
grown  radically  from  32  percent  in  1978  to  181  percent  in  2010  (see  Table  A7  in 
Appendix  2).  In  terms  of  financial  markets‘  development,  we  can  see  that  under 
financial statism, the state has played a major part in fostering the market in Shanghai.   
Therefore,  financial  statism  cannot  be  summarily  dismissed  as  a  hindrance  for  the 
development  of  IFCs,  although  it  is  in  conflict  with  some  key  building  blocks  of 
international  financial  centres,  such  as  the  open  market,  free  capital  flows  etc  (see 
chapter 3). The case study demonstrates that IFCs‘ development should be aligned with 
the different stages of a country‘s development. Moreover, for late-developing-countries, 
IFC  development  should  be  viewed  a  means  to  attaining  social  and  economic 
development, rather than an ultimate end in itself. Under certain conditions, developing 
a  competitive  international  financial  centre,  as  opposed  to  an  effective  domestic 
financial centre,  may  conflict with  other  social  and economic  objectives  of a  given 
country (see Arner 2009). For instance, in the case of Shanghai, the central government 
restricted  free  capital  liberalisation  requisite  for  a  successful  international  financial 
centre for the benefits of entire nation. As Wu Xiaoling, the then deputy governor of the 
PBoC, stated in a high-level Symposium in Shanghai in 2002:    
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The SIFC should aim to service the real economy [of the country], rather than money 
brokers and capitalists; Shanghai should not become an enclave of the Chinese economy 
but a hub of global and domestic financial resources.
  83 
In  view  of  this,  financial  statism  is  better  regarded  as  a  strategic  policy  set  by  the 
government  to  support  domestic  economic  development.  With  the  establishment  of 
effective market institutions, financial statism is gradually withdrawn, paving the way 
for  a  more  liberal  and  open  economic  system.  Chinese  authorities  have  already 
announced the introduction of more diversity in financial services, derivative products 
and  futures  transaction  for  Shanghai  in  the  years  ahead.  International  development 
organisations have been encouraged to issue more Renminbi-denominated bonds. Over 
time, other foreign companies will be permitted to do the same and they will also be 
allowed to list shares on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. It is intended that Shanghai will 
develop a reinsurance market by encouraging international reinsurance companies to 
open  business  in  the  city,  and  setting  up  domestic  and  joint  venture  reinsurance 
companies.  One  more  recent  effort  from  central  government  to  promote  the  SIFC 
development was its launch of the Shanghai Free Trade Zone (FTZ) in 2013. The idea is 
to allow onshore financial institutions to directly offer international financial services to 
domestic and international counterparts with fewer restrictions than those imposed on 
their  onshore  business.  With  the  expansion  of  investment  channels  for  offshore 
Renminbi, Shanghai is moving towards a hub of international Renminbi settlement. 
   
                                                 
83  Key  points  of  promoting  Shanghai  into  an  international  financial  centre,  February,  2010, 
Shanghai city development, Chinese version  
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10. Concluding Remarks   
 
Only the one wearing the shoes knows how they fit.   
--Xi Jinping   
Chinese President 
 
In  the  contemporary  world,  international  financial  centres  have  gone  beyond  a 
geographic concept and become unique economic complexes with peculiar functions, 
including fund raising, settlement clearance, price discovery, risk diversification etc. 
Given  the  rapid  pace  of  economic  globalisation  and  the  enormous  advances  in 
information technology, the development of IFCs is one of the defining agendas for all 
economies – both developed and fast-growing emerging ones. This chapter provides 
concluding  remarks  on  the  research  findings,  the  limitation  of  the  study  and  future 
research areas. 
10.1 Research Findings 
During this doctoral study, I have focused attention on the relationship between state 
intervention and a broad set of contributory factors on IFCs‘ development. The research 
findings shed some light on how large, fast-growing developing countries may, or may 
not,  promote  IFCs‘  development  through  deliberate  institutional  design  and  policy 
transformation. 
The Multi-scalar Dimension of IFCs Development and the Role of the State 
IFCs‘ development is multi-faceted and is associated with a wide range of contributory 
factors. The neo-classical economists attribute the formation of IFCs to the comparative  
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advantages, economies of scale and agglomeration of economies (Kindleberger 1974; 
Davis  1990).  This  helps  to  explain  why  financial  markets  and  institutions  tend  to 
concentrate on a particular place and to shape a financial centre. The socio-geographers 
highlight  the  interaction  of  information,  globalisation  and  IFCs‘  development.  The 
information hinterland theory explains why financial activities tend to concentrate on 
one particular location rather than another. They argue that financial centres usually 
locate in places with the best access to valuable information flows (Porteous 1995; Zhao 
et al. 2004, 2005).The world city thesis posits that each city, regardless of whether it is 
in a developed or developing country, has become a node in a hierarchical ―world city 
network‖.  The  cities  that  contain  advanced  producer  services  are  positioned  in  the 
higher tier of the network and play a role as ―command and control centres‖ (Sassen 
1991, 2001; Friedmann 1986; Taylor 2005). The theorists on the nexus of financial and 
growth focus on the significance and implication of IFCs‘ development for developing 
countries and two main contradictory discourses have been presented. One believes the 
IFCs‘ development in developing countries is an important development strategy for 
economic growth and a way of shaping a new international monetary infrastructure 
(Goldsmith  1969;  Obstfeld  2007;  Castells  2000a).  The  other  argues  that  IFCs‘ 
development in developing countries is a new instrument of imperialist control imposed 
by Western developed countries (e.g. Gorostiaga, 1984). In this view, the worldwide 
financial  network  has  been  used  to  feed  capitalism  in  developed  countries,  thereby 
redistributing wealth upwards and risks downwards, with the poorer countries suffering 
most (Shaxon 2011).   
The literature review of different perspectives of IFCs‘ development shows there are at 
least two major weaknesses in previous studies on IFCs‘ development: firstly, they were 
primarily segregated and isolated within particular subjects or disciplines; and secondly, 
the role of the state was understated. To fill these gaps, to some extent I have attempted 
to cross the boundaries of different disciplines in the investigation of this subject, i.e. I 
integrated various contributory factors into a multi-scalar approach in the exploration of 
the  state  in  the  development  of  IFCs.  In  this  thesis  I  have  categorised  various 
contributory factors in an IFC‘s development into four levels: macro, meso, micro and 
meta.  The  macro-level  is  related  to  the  macro-economic,  political  and  legislative 
environment  from  the  entire  hinterland.  The  meso-level  considers  the  urban  and  
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business environment in the host city. The meta-level is defined as connectivity to the 
global financial network and interaction with other IFCs. The micro-level refers to the 
agglomeration of financial markets, institutions and human capital, all of which have a 
direct bearing on the breadth, depth and competitiveness of a financial centre.   
In chapter 4, we reviewed the role of the state in different strands of development theory, 
which are often considered incompatible or contradictory with each other but they give 
several insights  to  the  IFCs‘ development  for  emerging  economies.  Firstly,  from  an 
historical perspective, every rising power has relied on the state to kick-start growth or 
to protect fledgling industries. Developed countries are now attempting to ―kick away 
the ladder‖ (Chang 2002) after they have attained the position as leading players. In this 
respect,  we  need  to  re-erect  the  ladder  to  allow  late-developing-countries  seek  to 
develop their IFCs. Secondly, the state plays a major role in determining ownership 
structures and thereby maximising the rents for ruling elites. According to NIE, the state 
has two paradoxical roles most of the time: it can be a ―grabbing hand‖ as well as a 
―helping hand‖. In particular, a rational state tends to maximise its rents during the 
process of institutional change. In the process of IFCs‘ development, the state is likely 
to opt for an ownership structure that produces maximum rents even if this is inefficient. 
Thirdly, the role of the state in economic development is not rigid; it oscillates between 
laissez-faire policies at one end of the spectrum and intense state intervention at the 
other (Brett 2009; Aoki et al. 1998). The extent of state intervention varies from country 
to country and is contingent on institutional, structural and ideological conditions.   
Financial Statism as Alternative Interventionist Approach 
Neo-liberals  claim  IFCs‘  development  is  a  time-consuming,  spontaneous  and 
self-sustaining  process.  Financial  statism  provides  an  alternative  approach  for  IFCs 
development  in  LDCs.  In  the  case  of  Shanghai,  we  have  witnessed  that  as  an 
endogenous actor the Chinese state played a pivotal role at different stages of the SIFC‘s 
development. The case study shows China‘s financial statism is not an obstacle, rather it 
serves as ―invisible scaffolding‖ in its development. Just like scaffolding is necessary to 
provide crucial temporary assistance to construction workers when erecting a building, 
financial statism is also a supportive device that has helped shape a financial centre in 
Shanghai.  Financial  statism  connotes  a  custom-made  support  for  the  SIFC‘s  
- 230 - 
development,  a  support  that  can  eventually  be  disassembled  when  it  is  no  longer 
needed.   
The case of Shanghai shows that financial statism has made China‘s economic transition 
a source of growth at macro-level. Financial statism has been extraordinary successful 
in  mobilising  deposits  and  channelling  capital  to  strategic  sectors  during  China‘s 
economic  take-off  in  the  1990s  when  the  state  was  confronted  with  massive  fiscal 
deficits and institutional weaknesses. Financial statism has not only provided substantial 
investment in the process of industrialisation, but also shouldered much of the reform 
costs since the beginning of the reform era. It has served as an important stabilising 
force  in  safeguarding  economic  transition  and  it  has  successfully  underpinned  the 
SIFC‘s development at macro-level.   
At  meso-level,  financial  statism  has  also  played  an  active  role  in  infrastructural 
upgrades and institutional building over recent decades. Under financial statism, the 
Shanghai municipal government has developed a large number of infrastructure projects 
through lump-sum investments from state banks and capital markets, which has helped 
to  overcome  the  threshold  effect  often  confronted  by  developing  countries.  Market 
restriction  policies  also  created  rents  to  encourage  international  banks  and  financial 
institutions  into  the  Lujiazui  Financial  City,  the  new  CBD  of  Shanghai.  Shanghai‘s 
financial  markets  have  been  thriving  from  the  ground  up  in  the  past  decades  (see 
Chapter  7).  The  trajectory  of  SIFC  development  reveals  that  the  booming  financial 
markets and institutions in Shanghai did not evolve as a consequence of its historical 
and geographical legacy or the natural evolution of its market economy but occurred as 
a result of a powerful push by its government. It also showed that central government 
played  a  major  part  in  formulating  the  developmental  strategy  and  mediating  the 
conflicts of these policies at different stages of development.   
However, at meta-level, the case study reveals that financial statism has been a mixed 
blessing. On the one hand, it is widely recognised that stringent capital controls have 
prevented China from financial carnage amid two widespread economic crises: the Asia 
financial crisis of 1997-8 and the global financial crisis of 2008. On the other hand, the 
capital control regime under financial statism contradicts key elements of an IFC - most 
notably the free capital flows across borders and full currency convertibility. In China,  
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the stringent control of capital and other red tape have segregated the city from the rest 
of the world and hampered its further connection to the globalised economy. In this 
sense, it has impeded Shanghai‘s transformation from a domestic financial centre to an 
international one.   
The micro-level assessment of the SIFC‘s development is consistent with the meta-level 
analysis. The study demonstrates that Shanghai has experienced remarkable growth in 
terms of agglomeration of financial markets, institutions and human capital. However, 
the  SIFC‘s  development  has  also  been  confronted  by  challenges;  such  as  the 
semi-closed  financial  markets,  a  shortfall  of  international  players,  incompetency  of 
financial innovation  etc. There is  also  compelling  evidence that the progress  of  the 
SIFC‘s development at micro-level has been closely related to various conditions at 
macro, meso and meta levels, on which China‘s financial statism has a direct impact. 
The study thus posits that the mechanisms for shaping a domestic financial centre are 
different from those employed to develop an international one. The former favours more 
state intervention whilst the latter favours a more open and liberalised market system, 
particularly at the meta-level.   
The case study of Shanghai also shows that China‘s financial statism was not constant 
throughout  the  SIFC‘s  development.  Chapter  8  explores  the  recent  evolutions  of 
financial statism after China‘s accession to the WTO in 2001. The study references the 
new round of financial reforms carried out by the state in the aftermath of WTO entry, 
including the diversification of ownership in state banks, the gradual liberalisation of 
interest rates and the internationalisation of the Renminbi. These reforms indicate that 
the Chinese state has taken steps to withdraw financial statism amid changes to the 
contextual setting in recent years (see Section 8.2). In this respect, the Chinese state is 
well underway towards transforming Shanghai into an international financial centre. 
Figure 10.1 depicts how financial statism serves as the scaffolding in transforming a 
domestic financial centre into an international financial centre in Shanghai. 
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Figure 10.1: Financial statism as the scaffolding for SIFC development in China   
 
Source: Author 
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Overall, the case of Shanghai provides an example of how financial statism might be 
used as  an alternative interventionist approach  to  IFCs‘ development. Over the past 
couple  of  decades,  financial  statism  has  successfully  transformed  Shanghai  into  a 
domestic financial centre during the nascent stages of China‘s financial development. 
The scaffolding metaphor shows what is implicit, but not explicitly articulated, in the 
SIFC‘s development. 
The strengths and Limitations of the Scaffolding Metaphor   
The scaffolding metaphor is useful for enriching our understanding of the appropriate 
role of the state in IFCs‘ development.   
The first strength of the metaphor is that it is different from the gradualist approach 
favoured by a large number of scholars and commentators in development studies. The 
gradualist  approach  highlights  the  pace  of  the  liberalisation  while  the  scaffolding 
metaphor of financial statism emphasises the role of the state in development. In vying 
for IFC status, developing countries are not only confronted with internal problems such 
as institutional weaknesses, market deficiencies, governance failures and brain drain, 
they also face intense competition from foreign counterparts (see Chapter  4). These 
idiosyncrasies act as pre-existing, structural conditions for IFCs‘ development, which 
exert strong influences on the role of the state in the course of such development. The 
scaffolding metaphor suggests that when advanced market institutions are not in place 
and effective market mechanisms have yet to be established, the state must step in if it is 
in a position to do so. More importantly, the state acts deliberately to alter rather than 
simply react to pre-existing structural conditions.   
The second point to consider is IFCs‘ development in developing countries should not 
be seen as an end in itself, but rather an instrument to enhance the entire economy. 
Ostensibly,  such  financial  statist  policies  contradict  the  key  ingredients  of  IFCs‘ 
development but there are plenty of reasons why developing countries should follow 
this  path.  In  the  case  of  Shanghai,  the  central  government  applied  dominant  state 
ownership  and  restricted  market  entry  to  the  financial  markets  to  channel  financial 
resources to strategic sectors. At meso-level, the state played a key role in determining 
the timing, pace and sequencing of market reform and liberalisation in order to mediate  
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the global-local nexus. At the meta-level, the state managed to impose control on capital 
flows  and  currency  convertibility  to  reflect  the  chasm  in  institutional  and  market 
efficiencies between advanced economies and the developing world. All of these efforts 
were for the ultimate purpose of sustaining political stability and creating economic 
growth. As far as the Chinese state is concerned the SIFC‘s development must serve the 
needs of the real economy, i.e. industry and commerce. In this respect, China‘s bid for 
an  IFC  is  part  of  its  development  strategy  that  plays  an  integral  role  for  national 
interests and economic growth. In other words, financial statism has had very clear 
goals  that  make  national  economic  growth  and  social  stability  a  priority.  This  was 
essential to ensure that IFCs‘ development was a developmental strategy for developing 
countries,  rather  than  an  instrument  of  imperialist  control  by  the  developed  world. 
During  this  process,  the  state  acted  as  a  strategic  planner  and  policy  coordinator, 
deciding  the  tempo  and  space  of  the  development  process  based  on  domestic  and 
international conditions. Only in this way, can IFCs‘ development be viewed as a means 
to attain financial and economic development for developing countries. 
Thirdly, the scaffolding metaphor also suggests state intervention in IFCs‘ development 
is bi-directional rather than uni-directional. At the nascent stage, state intervention can 
be exerted via stringent controls on ownership, interest rates, capital mobility etc. When 
the external conditions have changed and market mechanism and institutions have been 
established, the state should be alert to deregulate and liberalise financial markets and 
the system under which they operate. If market mechanisms have been able to take hold, 
then the process of IFCs‘ development will be more self-reinforcing and self-sustaining. 
In other words, central government should be responsible for establishing and removing 
the  scaffolding  according  to  internal  and  external  conditions.  Certainly,  progress  is 
rarely linear or continuous. It is also worth noting that establishing scaffolding can be 
recursive, especially when the building becomes damaged and needs to be overhauled. 
That is to say, when a financial crisis occurs or the economy is paralysed, the state 
should step back in and reconfigure the financial system. 
Finally, the scaffolding metaphor gives some hints for dealing with the dual nature of 
the state. The state often confronts a series of dilemmas. On the one hand, it requires 
centralised policy coordination to maintain social stability; on the other hand, it needs 
decentralised capacities for gathering information and fulfilling policy goals in various  
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social  settings.  It  requires  financial  ownership  to  enhance  capital  accumulation  and 
foster national champions so as to strengthen state capacity but it also needs to promote 
the participation of the private sector and to boost economic efficiencies. It requires 
direct control measures to maintain economic sovereignty but it also needs to ensure 
capital  mobility  and  liquidity  to  connect  with  the  international  community  in  the 
globalised world. The scaffolding metaphor provides a vivid description for the role of 
the state in IFCs‘ development, particularly for large, fast-growing economies.   
The  scaffolding  metaphor  also  has  its  limitations.  Firstly,  it  does  not  address  the 
question of what kind of role the state should take to develop an IFC in developing 
countries. The role of the state can be as an active planner, implementer, as well as 
facilitator,  regulator  and  coordinator;  it  all  depends.  We  should  adopt  appropriate 
policies subject to the context of different countries and their developmental stages. 
States are not generic and state intervention can only be determined in the concrete 
historical, institutional and geographical context (Chang, 2003). The financial statism 
approach in this thesis might provide a recipe of interventionist policies that LDCs can 
pick up in accordance with their own needs. 
The metaphor also emphasises the pace, tempo and sequencing of IFCs‘ development 
but it is incapable of setting a unified development agenda. Institutional change has to 
be  implemented  at  a  measured  pace  set  by  the  state  to  ensure  fiscal,  financial  and 
resource  sustainability.  Dai  Xianglong,  the  ex-governor  of  PBoC,  said  in  World 
Economic Forum in 2012:   
The timetable of financial reforms cannot be pre-determined like a train schedule since 
they  would  be  frequently  influenced  by  various  economic  and  financial  settings,  both 
global and domestic. 
Moreover, financial statism might be suitable for certain developing countries but it is 
far from a universal model suitable for all developing countries. In this thesis, financial 
statism as scaffolding is embedded in China‘s unique political, economic and historical 
contextual setting. To what extent financial statism approach can be replicated in other 
large emerging economies remains an unsettled question. 
10.2 Policy Recommendations for Late-developing-countries  
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Given that the financial sector is a ―lubricant for the main engine of growth‖ (Stiglitz et 
al. 1993), it is well-accepted that developing countries should strive to modernise their 
financial services and build their own international financial centres. Compared with 
developed  countries,  emerging  economies  are  often  confronted  by  undeveloped 
financial  markets,  poor  regulation,  insufficient  financial  professionals  and  immature 
financial instruments. These are obvious obstacles for them to build their own financial 
centres.  However,  sophisticated  financial  institutions  and  markets  rarely  spring  up 
automatically.  Moreover,  given  the  nature  of  the  evolutionary  process,  there  is  no 
guarantee that a laissez-faire approach will in fact yield the best possible institutions 
(Chang 2002, p.70) .    Even though some of them might turn up spontaneously through 
institutional evolution, it is likely be too lengthy and costly for developing countries to 
obtain.   
While  China‘s  unique  contexts  are  not  entirely  duplicable,  some  aspects  might  be 
helpful to other emerging economies. 
First  of  all,  financial  statism  should  be  understood  as  state-led 
marketisation/modernisation  process  implemented  by  well-designed,  restricted  state 
intervention, which is totally at odds with the ―command and control‖ planned economy. 
As  seen  in  the  case  of  Shanghai,  financial  statism  was  used  to  strengthen  the 
competitiveness of the real economy in an increasingly globalised world. State banks 
provided policy loans to support SOEs in the course of economic transition. This helped 
China to carry forward further marketisation while maintaining relative social stability 
and  economic  growth.  Besides,  we  need  to  cast  aside  the  biased  views  that  state 
ownership  will  always  lead  to  low  efficiency.  Through  establishing  good  corporate 
governance and introducing competition, state banks and other SFIs can be compatible 
with a market system.   
Meanwhile,  working  out  a  systematic  and  practical  strategy  is  crucial  for 
late-developing-countries to catch up with developed countries in IFCs‘ development. 
Developing  the  international  financial  centre  is  a  multi-scalar  and  comprehensive 
project.    A  sound  strategy  is  beneficial  for  developing  countries  to  gain  the 
―advantages  of  backwardness‖  (Lin  2004).  When  drawing  up  a  strategic  plan, 
late-developing-countries are encouraged to learn from developed countries. However,  
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special attention should be drawn to policies and practices these countries adopted when 
they were in the course of development. Late-developing-countries should be alert to 
the  dual  nature  of  IFCs‘  development,  i.e.  a  developmental  strategy  for  emerging 
economies as well as an instrument of imperialist control by developed countries. In this 
manner, developing countries are able to choose an appropriate approach to maximise 
the benefits to their national interests.   
At  macro-level,  the  IFCs‘  development  should  first  serve  the  real  economy  and 
accommodate  economic  conditions  at  both  home  and  abroad.  During  the  IFCs‘ 
development,  it  is  crucial  to  balance  social  stability  and  economic  development.  In 
developing countries, there often have various social problems, such as urban poverty, 
unemployment,  deterioration  in  environmental  conditions  etc.  Sometimes  the 
maintenance of a stable macroeconomic and social environment is perhaps even more 
important  than  improving  efficiencies  in  an  individual  industrial  sector.  Without 
political and social stability it is unlikely economic growth can be attained, let alone the 
building  of  a  premier  international  financial  centre.  Therefore,  developing  countries 
should  not  only  formulate  economic  and  financial  policies  based  on  hitherto 
conventional theories and concepts. In certain circumstance, financial statism might be a 
viable option.   
In addition, an enticing urban and business environment is vital for hosting an IFC. At 
the nascent stage of an IFC‘s development, state-led investment is beneficial to upgrade 
urban infrastructure and the business environment through large-scale investment. A 
developing  country  in  transition,  where  market  mechanisms  are  not  yet  in  place, 
requires  selective  intervention  by  the  state  to  speed  up  institutional  and  physical 
infrastructure. With the support of various interventionist policies, developing countries 
could improve their market infrastructure in a more efficient and effective way by, for 
example, market entry restrictions, control of interest rates and even direct government 
subsidies.   
At  the  meta-level,  capital  controls  are  necessary  at  the  initial  stages  of  an  IFC‘s 
development.  For  late-developing  countries,  IFCs‘  development  is  a  process  of 
modernising  a  financial  sector  and  connecting  to  the  global  network.  Yet  financial 
deregulation  and  liberalisation  can  cause  overwhelming  risks,  especially  when  
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necessary institutions are not prepared and prudent regulation and supervision are not 
properly developed (Demirgü ç -Kunt and Detragiache 1999). For example, it is claimed 
South Korea suffered most in the Asian Crisis not because it deviated too much from the 
free  market  but  because  it  had  abandoned  too  much  of  its  developmental  capacity 
(Weiss 1999; Chang et al 1998).   
It is also important to bear in mind that financial statism needs to be withdrawn with the 
advancement of the market system. It is particularly important for the state to transform 
its role from setting up a market system to regulating and supervising it. If it is not 
transformed in a timely manner, it risks undermining its competitiveness. Meanwhile, 
the  state  needs  to  be  cautious  about  the  sequence,  tempo  and  pace  of  financial 
liberalisation.  Usually,  external  liberalisation  should  follow  internal  marketisation; 
current account liberalisation should precede capital account liberalisation. Developing 
countries  should  first  establish  a  solid  and  liquid  market  system  in  their  domestic 
financial markets, e.g. the liberalisation of interest rates and allowing private capital to 
access the financial industry before opening it up further to foreign investors. 
Can the state provide an adequate policy framework to fast-track an IFC development 
agenda?  This  is  far  from  a  simple  yes  or  no  answer.  It  is  reckless  to  analyse  the 
formation  of  IFCs  without  considering  their  special  individual  contextual settings.  I 
would argue that for LDCs the approach to developing financial markets depends on a 
country‘s  current  capacity  and  institutional  environments.  In  a  country  with 
well-established market institutions, it is viable to choose a market-oriented approach 
but in a country with high administrative capacity stock it may be more efficient to 
choose a state-led approach, especially at the early stages of development. 
Finally,  there  is  no  one-size-fits-all  model  to  prompt  IFCs‘  development  in  every 
country at every time. States differ in political, historical and cultural legacies and these 
differences shape their ability to operate both at home and within the world system. The 
same  government  action  may  succeed  in  facilitating  IFC  development  in  certain 
conditions but may fail under others. Different ideological approaches and state-market 
relationships  have  resulted  in  dissimilar  development  outcomes  among  nation  states 
because each one has its own national embeddedness (Evans 1995).The need to analyse 
states in relation to political and socio-economic contexts has been widely illustrated in  
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the present research on the evolution of IFCs. Therefore, we must be cautious to adopt a 
single model of development drawing from the experience of a few industrial countries. 
In the words of Fang Xinghai:   
When  we  evaluate  a  developmental  model,  it  is  senseless  to  assert  that  one  particular 
approach is perfect. Central to this subject is an assurance that the ruling party is able to let 
their people share the benefits of economic growth, while not merely empathising with the 
public（Fang 2013）. 
10.3 Future Research Areas 
There are still a number of issues I have not elaborated upon in this thesis due to the 
limited resources and time constraints.     
One of the under-examined issues concerns the legal system and legislation, which are 
also essential to the IFCs‘ development (Arner 2009). In developing countries such as 
China, not only markets and institutions tend to be underdeveloped, but also laws and 
regulations (Allen et al 2005; Zhao 2013). They are often not transparent and apt for the 
market economy. Different laws and regulatory systems also have different impacts on 
the IFCs‘ development, which needs further investigation in future studies. Meanwhile, 
since the development of Shanghai as an international financial centre is still underway, 
the  conclusions  drawn  from  the  case  study  are  generally  provisional.  Further 
investigation and surveys are needed to give an overall picture of its development. 
It would also be meaningful to conduct a comparative study among different emerging 
economies (e.g. BRICs) to explore the roles of the state in developing their international 
financial  centres.  It  would  be  also  interesting  to  explore  whether  other  developing 
countries  have  also  imposed  similar  controls  over  their  financial  sectors  during  the 
development process in a similar vein to financial statism in China. 
Aside from IFCs‘ development, financial statism might also be applied as an alternative 
interventionist approach in dealing with other development issues. For example, in the 
recent debt crisis in the European Union, the Greek government was in heavy debt and 
confronted  serious  challenges  in  political  and  social  stability  as  well  as  economic 
growth. Extrapolating from the Chinese experience, selective state intervention such as  
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nationalising commercial banks, capital control regimes and financial restraint policies 
could have been considered as scaffolding to overhaul that country‘s financial system 
and to help other, similarly highly-indebted countries to get through the crisis.   
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Appendix 1 Chronology of SIFC Development (1990-2012) 
Year  Contents 
1990 
(December)   
Shanghai Stock Exchange incorporated 
1992  The first B share – ZhenKong Dianzi – was listed on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange 
1992  Four foreign insurance companies including AIG, started to set up 
branches in Shanghai   
1992 (October)  The 14
th CCP Party Congress announced ―the building of Shanghai 
into an international economic, financial and trading centre‖. 
1992 (October)  Shanghai Pudong Development Bank established 
1992 
(December) 
T-bond futures transactions launched 
1994 (April)  China Foreign Exchange Trading Centre Launched in Shanghai 
1994  Unification of exchange rate 
1996  Law of Negotiable Instruments Enacted 
1996  Restriction of interbank lending rate relaxed 
1996 (January)  National Interbank Market launched in Shanghai 
1996 
(December) 
Qualified foreign institutions were allowed to conduct Renminbi 
business in Pudong   
1997  National Interbank Bond Market established in Shanghai 
1997  Renminbi exchange rate pegged to US dollar 
1998 
(December) 
The Securities Law promulgated 
1999 
(December) 
Shanghai Metal Exchange, Shanghai Commodity Exchange and 
Shanghai Cereal and Oil Exchange merged into Shanghai Futures 
Exchange 
2000 (October)  Shanghai Diamond Exchange launched 
2001 (February)  Domestic residents permitted to trade B shares 
2001 (March)  China Security Registration and Clearing Company launched in 
Beijing, establishing two branches in Shanghai and Shenzhen 
2001  China joins World Trade Organization 
2002 (October)  Shanghai Gold Exchange launched 
2002  Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) scheme launched 
2003  CBRC branches off from PBoC 
2004 (June)  Law of Securities Investment Fund enacted 
2005 (April)  CSRC initiated reform of non-tradable shares 
2005 (July)  Renminbi abandoned the peg to US dollar and was transformed to a 
managed-floating regime based on a basket of currencies 
2005 (August)  PBoC, Shanghai headquarters established 
2006  Wholly foreign-owned insurance brokerage companies allowed 
2006 (February)  Interest Swaps launched  
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2006 (June)  Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors (QDII) scheme launched 
2006 
(September) 
China Financial Futures Exchange launched in Shanghai 
2007 (January)  Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate (SHIBOR) established 
2009 (April)  State Council released Double-Centre plan 
2009 (July)  Pilot scheme for Renminbi cross-border settlement announced 
2009 
(September) 




Shanghai Clearing House launched 
2010 (April)  Stock Index Futures launched in CFFE 
2010 (from May 
to October) 
Shanghai hosts World Exposition 
2010 (August)  Foreign financial institutions permitted to invest in Interbank 
Renminbi market 
2010(September)  Offshore institutions permitted to open RMB settlement accounts 
2010 (October)  Renminbi cross-border settlement scheme extended to the whole 
country 




National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) releases 
the 12
th five-year (2011-2015) plan for Shanghai‘s IFC development 
2012 (March)  Bank of China relocates its Renminbi business headquarters to 
Shanghai 
2012 (April)  World Bank permitted to participate in China‘s inter-bank bond 
market 
Source: complied by the author 
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Appendix 2 Tables and Figures 
Table A1: China‘s fiscal revenue and household deposits (1978-2010) 















1978  113    35    31    40.6    21    6   
1980  116    56    26    37.8    40    9   
1985  200    153    22    39.2    162    18   
1990  294    271    16    30.2    712    38   
1991  315    324    14    29.3    924    42   
1992  348    386    13    27.3    1,176    44   
1993  435    143    12    16.4    1,520    43   
1994  522    186    11    14.7    2,152    45   
1995  624    241    10    14.2    2,966    50   
1996  741    389    10    15.9    3,852    55   
1997  865    283    11    14.5    4,628    59   
1998  988    308    12    15.4    5,341    64   
1999  1,144    339    13    16.5    5,962    67   
2000  1,340    383    14    17.4    6,433    66   
2001  1,639    430    15    18.9    7,376    68   
2002  1,890    448    16    19.4    8,691    73   
2003  2,172    457    16    19.3    10,362    77   
2004  2,640    470    17    19.4    11,956    75   
2005  3,165    554    17    20.1    14,105    77   
2006  3,876    641  18    20.9    16,159    75   
2007  5,132    682  19    21.9    17,253    65   
2008  6,133    662  20    21.6    21,789    69   
2009  6,852    641  20    22.0    26,077    76   
2010  8,310    579  21    22.2    30,330    75   
Note: BR: Budgeted Revenue 
EBR: Extra-budgetary Revenue   
BR/GDP: Budgeted-Revenue-to-GDP Ratio 
HD: Household Deposits 
HD/GDP: Household Deposits to GDP Ratio 
Source: China Financial Statistics Yearbook 2012, the Ministry of Finance website    
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Table A2: One-year deposit and lending rate set by the PBoC (1990-2010) 








1990  9.36  8.64  0.72 
1991  8.64  7.56  1.08 
1992  8.64  7.56  1.08 
1993  10.98  10.98  0.00 
1994  10.98  10.98  0.00 
1995  10.98  10.98  0.00 
1996  10.08  7.47  2.61 
1997  8.64  5.67  2.97 
1998  6.39  3.78  2.61 
1999  5.85  2.25  3.60 
2000  5.85  2.25  3.60 
2001  5.85  2.25  3.60 
2002  5.31  1.98  3.33 
2003  5.31  1.98  3.33 
2004  5.58  2.25  3.33 
2005    5.58    2.25    3.33   
2006    6.12    2.52  3.60   
2007    7.47    4.14    3.33   
2008    5.31    2.25    3.06   
2009    5.31    2.25    3.06   
2010    5.81    2.75    3.06   
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1996-2011   
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Table A3:    Shanghai‘s GDP and financial services output 1990-2012 









Financial Output   
Share of GDP 
(% 
1990  78.2      3.5  7.1    9.1   
1991  89.4      7.1  8.3    9.3   
1992  111.4      14.8  9.9    8.9   
1993  151.9      15.1  14.1    9.2   
1994  199.1      14.5  21.5    10.8   
1995  249.9      14.3  24.5    9.8   
1996  295.8      13.1  34.8    11.8   
1997  343.9      12.8  46.0    13.4   
1998  380.1      10.3  51.2    13.5   
1999  418.9      10.4  57.8    13.8   
2000  477.1      11.0  60.3    12.6   
2001  521.0      10.5  62.0    11.9   
2002  574.1      11.3  58.5    10.2   
2003  669.4      12.3  62.5    9.3   
2004  807.3      14.2  74.2    9.2   
2005  924.8      11.4  67.5    7.3   
2006  1057.2      12.7  82.5    7.8   
2007  1249.4      15.2  120.9    9.7   
2008  1407.0      9.7  141.4    10.1   
2009  1504.6      8.2  180.4    12.0   
2010  1716.6      9.9  195.1    11.4   
2011  1919.6    8.2  227.7  11.9 
2012  2018.2  7.5  245.0  12.1 
Source: Shanghai Statistics Yearbook 2011 
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Table A4: China‘s position in merchandise import and export in 2010 
Merchandise export  Merchandise import 
  USD billion  Share, %    USD billion  Share, % 
China  1578  10.4  USA  1969  12.8 
USA  1278  8.4  China  1395  9.1 
Germany  1269  8.3  Germany  1067  6.9 
Japan  770  5.1  Japan  694  4.5 
Netherlands  573  3.8  France  606  3.9 
France  521  3.4  UK  560  3.6 
Korea  466  3.1  Netherland  517  3.4 
Italy  448  2.9  Italy  484  3.1 
Belgium  412  2.7  Hong Kong  442  2.9 
UK  406  2.7  Korea  425  2.8 
World total  15,237  100  World total  15,402  100 
Source: WTO (2011) 
Table A5: Mainland China‘s position in FDI inflows and outflows in 2009 









USA  130  11.7   USA  248  22.5   
China  95  8.5   France  147  13.4   
France  60  5.4   Japan  75  6.8   
Hong Kong  48  4.3   Germany  63  5.7   
UK  46  4.1   Hong Kong  52  4.7   
Russia  39  3.5   China  48  4.4   
Germany  36  3.2   Russia  46  4.2   
Saudi Arabia  36  3.2   Italy  44  4.0   
India  35  3.1   Canada  39  3.5   
Belgium  34  3.1   Norway  34  3.1   
World total  1,114  100  World total  1,101  100 
Source: UNCTAD (2010) 
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Table A6: Market share of state bank assets in total banking institutions (1983- 2011) 
Year  Total    Banking   
Assets 
RMB billion 
Large State Banks 
(LSB) 
RMB billion 
Share of LSB 
% 
1983  396  396  100 
1990  2,896  2,788  96.3 
1995  6,422  4,436  69.1 
1996  7,903  5,227  66.1 
1997  9,501  5,890  62.0 
1998  11,042  7,041  63.8 
1999  12,323  7,926  64.3 
2000  13,548  9,296  68.6 
2001  15,487  10,104  65.2 
2002  18,403  13,550  73.6 
2003  27,658  16,051  58.0   
2004  31,599  17,982  56.9   
2005  37,470  21,005  56.1   
2006  43,950  24,236  55.1   
2007  52,598  28,007  53.2   
2008  62,388  31,836  51.0   
2009  78,769  40,089  50.9   
2010  93,125  46,804  50.3   
2011  110,680  53,634  48.5   
Source: Wang (2008), CBRC Annual Report 2009-2011 
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Table A7: China‘s overall financial Development (1978-2010) 






1978  0.36    0.12    32   
1980  0.45    0.18    41   
1985  0.90    0.55    61   
1986  1.03    0.71    69   
1987  1.21    0.88    73   
1988  1.50    1.08    71   
1989  1.70    1.27    75   
1990  1.87    1.53    82   
1991  2.18    1.94    89   
1992  2.69    2.54    94   
1993  3.53    3.49    99   
1994  4.82    4.69    97   
1995  6.08    6.08    100   
1996  7.12    7.61    107   
1997  7.90    9.10    115   
1998  8.44    10.45    124   
1999  8.97    11.99    134   
2000  9.92    13.46    136   
2001  10.97    15.83    144   
2002  12.03    18.50    154   
2003  13.58    22.12    163   
2004  15.99    25.41    159   
2005  18.49    29.88    162   
2006  21.63    34.56    160   
2007  26.58    40.34    152   
2008  31.40    47.52    151   
2009  34.09    60.62    178   
2010  40.12    72.58    181   
Source: Chinese Statistic Yearbook 2011, Wang 2008 
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Table A8: The market capitalization and fund raising in SSE(1990-2011) 











1990  1    N.A.  1    N.A. 
1991  3    N.A.  0    N.A. 
1992  56    53  5    54 
1993  221    62  11    29 
1994  260    70  17    51 
1995  253    73  6    49 
1996  548    56  21    60 
1997  922    53  47    51 
1998  1,063    54  38    47 
1999  1,458    55  49    54 
2000  2,693    56  92    60 
2001  2,759    63  96    81 
2002  2,536    66  61    79 
2003  2,980    70  56    68 
2004  2,601    70  46    53 
2005  2,310    71  29    86 
2006  7,161    80  171    70 
2007  26,984    82  681    88 
2008  9,725    80  224    63 
2009  18,466    76  334    66 
2010  17,901    67  553    58 
2011  14,838  69  320  42 
*Note: H share is not included in the calculation 
Source: Yearbook of Shanghai 1996-1997, Yearbook of China‘s Securities and Futures Market 2011, 
Yearbook of Shanghai Stock Exchange 
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TableA9: Market share of bond market in SSE (1996-2011) 





















1996  24  43  56    1740    1804    96   
1997  22  42  52    1,540    1,648    93   
1998  20  39  51    2,127    2,166    98   
1999  23  43  53    1,745    1,828    95   
2000  25  46  54    1,690    1,912    88   
2001  31  54  57    1,979    2,042    97   
2002  39  74  53    3,085    3,325    93   
2003  65  115  57    6,160    6,214    99   
2004  90  155  58    5,000    5,032    99   
2005  165  245  67    2,814    2,837    99   
2006  196  289  68    1,813    1,828    99 
2007  198  299  66    2,040    2,067    99   
2008  225  356  63    2,809    2,860    98   
2009  411  648  63    3,981    4,064    98   
2010  536  822  65    7,491    7,621    98   
2011  680  1,014  67    21,072    21,635    97   
Source：  Yearbook of China‘s Securities and Futures Market 2011  
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Table A10:    The turnover of commodities in Shanghai Futures Exchange (2000-2010) 









1999  0.49    21.97    6.83    9.28   
2000  0.67    41.43    8.25    15.11   
2001  0.85    28.34    11.22    9.31   
2002  1.64    41.53    24.35    17.46   
2003  6.05    55.85    80.16    28.64   
2004  8.43    57.39    81.15    26.55   
2005  6.54    48.64    67.58    20.93   
2006  12.61    60.03    116.21    25.85   
2007  23.13    56.45    171.13    23.49   
2008  28.87    40.15    280.53    20.57   
2009  73.76    56.51    869.73    40.31   
2010  123.48    54.40    1,243.80    40.89   
Source:  Yearbook  of  China‘s  Securities  and  Futures  Market  2011,  Shanghai  Futures  Exchange 
website 
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Appendix 3 Implementation Guidelines for SIFC Development by 
2020   
Theme 1. strengthening financial markets 
Tasks  Key Points 
1.1 Expand the breadth of 
financial markets 
  Build  Shanghai  into  a  national  clearance  centre  for 
bills exchange 
  Develop credit loan transfer market 
  Explore the establishment of other markets, including 
insurance policy and trust asset transfer 
1.2 Expedite bond markets 
development 
  Improve the market-maker system 
  Allow  listed  commercial  banks  to  enter  SSE  bond 
market 
  Promote the connection and communication between 
bond exchange market and inter-bank market 
1.3 Boost futures markets 
development 
  Support  new  futures  products  such  as  crude  oil, 
gasoline, diesel oil and asphalt etc   
  Promote  new  option  products,  such  as  copper  and 
aluminium; 
  Introduce new futures products such as lead, silver as 
well as commodity index futures 
  Undertake delivery of futures products in the bonded 
area of    customs 
  Introduce qualified institutional investors into futures 
market 
1.4 Improve the 
multi-layered capital 
markets system 
  Explore  the  transfer  of  listed  companies  among 
different boards at exchange markets 
  Increase industry coverage of listed companies on the 
main board of SSE 
  Establish  an  over-the-counter  equity  market  for 
high-tech companies 
1.5 Develop reinsurance 
markets 
  Develop  domestic  invested  and  Sino-foreign  joint 
venture reinsurance companies 
  Attract  renowned reinsurance  agencies at  home and 
abroad 
  Foster reinsurance brokers 
  Develop offshore reinsurance business 
Theme 2. Strengthening financial institutions 
Tasks  Key Points 
2.1 Boost the development 
of various financial 
  Strengthen  policy  supports  for  the  development  of 
banks, security firms, insurance companies and trust  
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institutions  companies 
  Promote  development  of  investment  banks,  fund 
management  companies,  assets  management 
companies,  money  brokerage  companies,  financial 
leasing companies and auto financing companies etc   
2.2 Promote pilot 
programmes for 
integrated operations 
  Attract financial holding groups to Shanghai 
  Establish  financial  supervisory  and  coordination 
mechanisms 
2.3 Promote the reform 
and restructure of local 
financial SOEs 
  Encourage reform and restructure of local state-owned 
financial firms 
  Foster  and  attract  financial  firms  with  national 
influence 
2.4 Encourage the 
development of equity 
investment funds   
  Encourage equity investment from overseas PEs; 
  Encourage  the  set-up  of  qualified  foreign  limited 
partnership schemes.   
Theme 3. Accelerating financial innovations and business development 
Tasks  Key Points 
3.1 Boost the development 
of various debt 
instruments 
  Expand the issuance of corporate bonds 
  Develop asset-backed securities 
  Carry out pilot scheme of revenue bonds 
  Carry  forward  foreign  currency  bonds  and  others 
bonds 
3.2 Steadily develop 
various financial 
derivative products 
  Roll out financial derivatives e.g. stock index futures, 
treasury bond futures, foreign exchange futures, stock 
index options, interest rate options and gold ETFs etc. 
  Improve SHIBOR as benchmark interest rate 
  Foster  various  derivatives  using  this  pricing 
benchmark 




  Introduce pilot programmes for tax-deferred pension 
products 
  Formulate  relevant  rules  and  procedures  for 
tax-deferred pension products 
3.4 Support the M &A 
funding of commercial 
banks 
  Encourage commercial banks to increase loan-lending 
for M&A activities 
  Encourage  cooperation  among  commercial  banks, 
securities firms and trust companies regarding M&A 
funding 
3.5 Expand the types of 
financial services 
  Promote  business  development  such  as  private 
banking, broker direct investment, offshore financing, 
trust leasing, automobile financing etc 
  Introduce new mechanisms for hi-tech loans  
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  Improve IPR pledge financing 
  Carry  out  insurance  policy  credit  financing,  SMEs 
network  joint  guarantee  loans,  and  special  asset 
management business etc. 
Theme 4. Steadily opening up financial markets 
Tasks  Key Points 
4.1 Promote the further 
opening up of financial 
markets 
  Expand  overseas  investment  in  Shanghai‘s  financial 
markets 
  Encourage offshore Renminbi investment in domestic 
market 
  Expand QFII quota 
  Introduce QFII to Shanghai‘s futures markets 
  Expand issuance of Renminbi-denominated bonds by 
international  development  agencies,  foreign 
incorporated  banks  and  other  qualified  overseas 
institutions 
  Support the introduction of an international board on 
SSE 
4.2 Support the business 
expansion of existing 
joint ventures in 
Shanghai 
  Increase the number of joint-venture securities firms 
based in Shanghai 
  Encourage  the  establishment  of  subsidiaries  for 
joint-venture fund management companies 
4.3 Explore the 
cooperation between 
Shanghai and Hong 
Kong on securities 
products 
  Strengthen  cooperation  with  Hong  Kong  United 
Exchange; 
  Roll  out  Hang  Seng  Index  ETF,  SOEs  ETF  and 
red-chips index ETF in SSE 
Theme 5. Improving the financial system 
Tasks  Key Points 
5.1 Improve modern 
financial support 
systems 
  Form  a  unified  backstage  support  system  of 
registration, trust, clearance and settlement 
  Establish  a  cross-boarder  payment  and  clearance 
system for Renminbi-denominated trading 
  Establish a national trust registration system 
  Prepare for the opening of the Shanghai Clearance Co. 
Ltd 
5.2 Strengthen the 
planning and 
development of various 
financial zones 
  Lujiazui Financial City 
  The Bund Financial Belt 
  Zhangjiang  Industrial  base  of  financial  information 
services 
  YangShan bonded port area etc.  
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5.3 Accelerate the 
development of 
financial intermediaries 
  Financial guarantee institutions 
  Financial advisory firms 
  Credit ratings‘ agencies 
  Appraisal, accounting and legal services 
5.4 Facilitate the 
development of a 
financial information 
services platform 
  Facilitate  the  development  of  a  financial  services 
platform 
  Support  domestic  financial  information  service 
providers 
5.5 Optimise the growth 
environment for the 
financial industry 
  Improve taxation for the financial industry and overall 
legal system 
  Optimise the legal environment 
  Strengthen the development of a social credit system 
  Improve  the  policies  and  mechanisms  for  financial 
innovations 
  Improve the regulatory framework 
  Maintain  the  stability  and  security  of  the  financial 
system 
Source: Adapted from Shanghai Municipal Government Website, www.shanghai.gov.cn 
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Appendix 4 The Indicator System for GFCI 15 
Areas of 
Competitiveness 
Instrumental factor  Source 
1. Human 
Capital 
Graduates in Social Science Business and Law    World Bank 
Gross Tertiary Education Ratio    World Bank 
Visa Restrictions Index    Henley & 
Partners 
Human Development Index    UNDP 
Citizens Purchasing Power    City Mayors 
Quality of Living Survey    Mercer HR 
Happy Planet Index    New Economics 
Foundations 
(NEF) 
Number of High Net Worth Individuals    City Bank & 
Knight Frank 
Personal Safety Index    Mercer HR 
Homicide Rates    UN Office of 
Drugs and 
Crime 
World‘s Top Tourism Destinations    Euromonitor 
Archive 
Average Days with Precipitation per Year    Sperling‘s Best 
Places 
Spatial Adjusted Livability Index  EIU 
Human Capital  EIU 
Global Talent Index  EIU 
Citywide CO2 Emissions  Carbon 
Disclosure 
Project 
Healthcare  EIU 
Global skill Index  Hays 
2. Business 
Environment 
Business Environment  EIU 
Ease of Doing Business Index    World Bank 
Operational Risk Rating    EIU 
Real Interest Rate    World Bank 
Projected City Economic Growth    PWC 
Global Services Location Index    AT Kearney 
Corruption Perceptions Index    Transparency 
International 
Wage Comparison Index    UBS  
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Corporate Tax Rates    PWC 
Employee Effective Tax Rates    PWC 
Personal Tax Rates    OECD 
Total Tax Receipts (as % of GDP)    OECD 
Bilateral Tax Information 
Exchange Agreements 
OECD 
Economic Freedom of the World    Fraser Institute 
Banking Industry Country Risk Assessments    Standard & 
Poors 
Government Debt as Percentage of GDP    CIA World Fact 
Book 
Political Risk Index  Exclusive 
Analysis Ltd 
Global Peace Index    The Institute of 
Economics and 
Peace 
Financial Secrecy Index    Tax Justice 
Network 
Institutional Effectiveness  EIU 
City GDP Figure    Brookings 
Institute 
Number of Greenfield Investments  KPMG 
Open Government  The World 
Justice Project 





Capital Access Index  Milken Institute 
Securitization    IFS London 
Capitalization of Stock Exchanges    WFE 
Value of Share Trading    WFE 
Volume of Share Trading    WFE 
Broad Stock Index    WFE 
Value of Bond Trading    WFE 
Volume of Stock Options    WFE 
Volume of Stock Futures Trading    WFE 
Domestic Credit Provided by Banks (% GDP)    World Bank 
Percentage of Firms Using Bank Credit to 
Finance Investment 
World Bank 
Total Net Assets of Mutual Funds    Investment 
Company 
Institute 
Islamic Finance    International  




Net External Position of Banks  BIS 
External Position of Central Banks (as % GDP)  BIS 
Liner Shipping Connectivity  World Bank 
Commodity Options National Turnover  WFE 
Commodity Futures National Turnover  WFE 
Global Connectedness Index  DHL 




Office Occupancy Costs    CBRE 
Office Space Across the World    Cushman & 
Wakefield 
Global Property Index  Investment 
Property 
Databank 
Real Estate Transparency Index  Jones Lang 
Lasalle 
Digital Economy Ranking  EIU 
Telecommunication Infrastructure Index    United Nations 
City Infrastructure    Mercer HR 
Quality of Ground Transport Network    WEF 
Quality of Roads    WEF 
Roadways per Land Area    CIA World Fact 
Book 
Railways per Land Area    CIA World Fact 
Book 
Physical Capital  EIU 
Connectivity  EIU 
IT Industry Competitiveness  BSA/EIU 
Energy Sustainability Index  World Energy 
Council 
City Infrastructure  EIU 
Urban Sprawl  EIU 
Metro Network Length  Metro Bits 
Global Information Technology  WEF 





World Competitiveness Scoreboard    IMD 
Global Competitiveness Index    WEF 
Global Business Confidence    Grant Thornton  
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Factors  Foreign Direct Investment Inflows    UNCTAD 
FDI Confidence    AT Kearney 
City to Country GDP Ratio  World Bank, 
PWC 
GDP per Person Employed    World Bank 
Global Innovation Index    INSEAD 
Global Intellectual Property Index    Taylor Wessing 
Retail Price Index    Economist 
Price Levels    UBS 





Global Cities Index    AT Kearney 
Number of International Fairs & Exhibitions    WEF 
Innovation Cities Global Index    2thinknow 
Innovation 
Cities Project 
City Global Appeal  EIU 
Global City Competitiveness  EIU 
The Big Mac Index  The Economist 
City Global Image  KPMG 
City‘s Weight in National Incoming Investments  KPMG 
Sustainable Economic Development  BCG 
Global Enabling Trade Report  WEF 
Source：GFCI(2014) 
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Appendix  5  The  Indicator  System  for  Xinhua-Dow  Jones  IFCD 
Index   





Total Value of Share Trading    WFE 
Total Value of Bond Trading    WFE 
Total Volume of Commodity 
futures Trading   
WFE 
Total Volume of Stock Futures 
Trading   
WFE 
Stock Market's Significance in the 
National Economy   
WFE 
Internationalization of Securities 





Foreign Exchange Derivatives 
Turnover   
WFE 
Foreign Exchange Reserves    Pinggu.org 
Exchange Rate Volatility    MasterCard 
Banking 
Market 
Number of Major Bank    The Banker 
Major Bank Assets    The Banker 
Central Bank Assets To GDP    WFE 
Bank Assets To GDP    WFE 
Insurance 
Market 
Insurance Premium  WFE 
Growth of Insurance Premium  WFE 









Growth Rate of New Bonds  WFE 
Growth Rate of Listed Companies  WFE 
Growth Rate of Share Trading  WFE 
Economic 
Growth 





Three Year Average Growth Rate of 
Residential Income 
UBS 
Three Year Average Growth Rate of 
General Price Index 
UBS 





Three Year average Growth Rate of 
Domestic Purchasing Power 
UBS  
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Added Value of High-tech Products 




Five Year Average Growth Rate of 




Five Year Average Growth Rate of 






Innovation Index  INSEAD 
Employment in High-Tech Services 




Per Capita Expenditure on R&D 









Strength of Manufacturers  Global Urban 
Competitiveness 
Project 
Strength of Traders and Retailers  Global Urban 
Competitiveness 
Project 
Strength of IT Companies  Global Urban 
Competitiveness 
Project 
High-technology exports  World Bank 












Geographical Location  Global Urban 
Competitiveness 
Project 
City Population Density  Wikipedia 
Cost of Renting Office  UBS 
Urban 
Infrastructure 
Cargo Throughput  Global Urban 
Competitiveness 
Project 
Airline Carriers  Global Urban 
Competitiveness  
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Project 







Services Employment Proportion  Global Urban 
Competitiveness 
Project 
Regulatory Quality  World Bank 

























Per Capita GDP  World 
Economic 
Forum 
Cost of Living  Global Urban 
Competitiveness 
Project 
Quality of Living Index  Mercer HR 
Unemployment Rate Index  World 
Economic 
Forum 







Ease of Doing Business  World Bank 
Total Foreign Trade Volume  CIA-The World 
Facebook 
Consumer Price Index  IMF  
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Economic Freedom Index  Fraser Institute 





Happiness Planet Index  NEF 
Political Risk Index  Exclusive 
Analysis Ltd 
Corruption Index  Transparency 
International 
Openness  Social Globalization Index  KOF-Index of 
Globalization 
Networked Readiness Index  World 
Economic 
Forum 
Global Competitiveness Index  World 
Economic 
Forum 
Foreign Direct Investment  UNCTAD 
Source: Xunhua-Dow Jones International Financial Centres Development Index 2012   
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Appendix 6 List of Interviewees 
  Organization  Duration  Date 
Interview 1  Development Research 
Centre, SMG 
90 minutes  December 2009 
Interview 2  Tongji University  60 minutes  December 2009 
Interview 3  Shanghai Academy of Social 
Science 
45 minutes  July 2010 
Interview 4  Development Reform and 
Planning Commission, SMG 
60 minutes  July 2010 
Interview 5  Shanghai  Jiaotong 
University 
30 minutes  July 2010 
Interview 6  Development Research 
Centre, SMG 
60 minutes  July 2010 
Interview 7  Agricultural Bank of China,   
Shanghai Branch 
45 minutes  December 2011 
Interview 8  PBoC, Shanghai 
headquarters 
60 minutes  December 2011 
Interview 9  Shanghai Stock Exchange  60 minutes  December 2012 
Interview10  Shanghai Financial Services 
Office 
60 minutes  December 2012 
Interview 11  Shanghai Tongji University  60 minutes  September 2013 
Interview 12  Shanghai University of 
Finance and Economics 
60 minutes  September 2013 
Interview 13  Shanghai Academy of Social 
Science 
60 minutes  January 2014 
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Appendix 7 List of Semi-Structured Questionnaire 
General Judgement 
  What  do  you  think  of  SIFC  development  in  the  past  20  years?  Has  it  been 
successful or not?   




  Do you think financial statism is a good description of China‘s financial sector 
during past two decades? 
  Why did the central government remain stringent controls over the financial sector 
in the 1990s? Do you think it was a blessing or a curse?     
  What was the impact of state-ownership in banking and other financial firms on 
SIFC development?   
  What are the underlying reasons for interest rate control, particularly for deposits 
and lending?   
  What were the roles of the state (central and local government respectively) in the 
SIFC development? 
  Were there any disagreements or tensions between central and local government in 
terms of formulating financial policies to promote the SIFC? How did they deal 
with them? 
 
Evaluation of the SIFC 
  What do you think of the development of China‘s stock market in Shanghai? Why 
has it been so volatile in the past two decades? 
  Why did China have a dual system of tradable and non-tradable shares at early 
stages of stock market development? 
  What do you think of the recent boom in the bond market? What is the underlying 
reason for this? 
  What  are the key challenges  for the SIFC in  transforming into an international 
financial centre?  
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  Comment on Shanghai‘s ―soft amenities‖ to attract financial talents. 
  What are the key measures that the Shanghai Municipal Government has taken to 
attract financial expatriates?   
  Will the re-emergence of Shanghai as an international financial centre undermine 
the current position of Hong Kong?   
 
Recent Changes and Tendencies 
  Have the growing numbers of foreign-invested financial firms threatened domestic 
ones following China‘s WTO entry in 2001? Why?   
  What do you think of the recent joint-stock reforms of state banks? Does this favour 
the SIFC‘s development? 
  Do  you  think  it  is  the  right  time  for  China  to  further  relax  its  capital  account 
controls?   
  What are the underlying reasons for the state‘s internationalisation of the Renminbi 
since 2009? 
  What  is  the  impact  of  the  internationalisation  of  the  Renminbi  on  the  SIFC‘s 
development? 
  Has the state (both central and local) transformed their roles in developing the SIFC 
from 1990 to 2010? 
  What are the major problems or challenges for the SIFC‘s development in the next 
decades? 